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The aim of this thesis is to examine and analyse three separate aspects of child 
education. Being a developing and a global country, Turkey can be affected easily 
by the recent trends in the world. In order to overcome the possible hardships and 
poverty, and continue to develop, education is the most important and effective tool. 
Given the importance of education, it is needed to pay attention to diminish the 
inequalities in the education system particularly at the primary level, and help the 
most disadvantaged children. In this way, the country can develop as a whole and 
achieve a sustainable socio-economic development. This provides the motivation for 
the empirical analysis presented in this thesis which examines how the education of 
children is influenced by their parents’ decisions - whether the parents chose to 
migrate, who they chose to marry, and whether they choose to put their children to 
work - in detail and makes policy suggestions where needed. 
The first empirical study, which is presented in Chapter 2 examines the effect of 
having a mother with a migration background on the educational attainment of 
children in Turkey. The results indicate that having a migrant mother increases the 
probability of starting high school and to continue to post compulsory education.  
However once the selective nature of migration is taken into account, results change 
dramatically. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of intermarriage on the educational 
attainment of children from those marriages in Germany. Since the results are 
mixed, the findings indicate that it is not easy to generalize the effect of 
intermarriages on the educational attainment of children. However findings show 
that what children experience in the school environment changes the effect of 
intermarriage. The third empirical study, which is presented in Chapter 4 aims to 
examine the determinants of Turkish children’s participation in schooling and 
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alternate activities. The findings indicate that the parental education is the main 
determinant in deciding which activity the children participate in. Also, being older 
and female decreases the probability to attend school. Moreover, having very young 
children at home increases the probability that children engage in alternate activities 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. AIMS AND MOTIVATION OF THE THESIS 
Education is one of the critical elements of growth and development. The 
importance of education in development stemming from the fact that it contributes 
to economic growth, and individual and social development. Reducing poverty and 
inequalities, and improving economic status, health and lifestyle are included in the 
long-term positive outcomes of education. 
The role of education is undoubtedly critical in economic growth. Studies suggest 
that human capital is positively associated with economic development and growth 
and education enhances human capital formation (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Barro, 
2001). In addition to the direct effects, there are also indirect effects of education 
such as better public health, better parenting, lower crime, greater social cohesion, 
which in turn foster economic growth by stimulating the accumulation of productive 
inputs and by mitigating factors that impede economic growth (Sianesi and Reenen, 
2003). 
In terms of the effect of education and economic growth and development, it is 
found that countries at different development levels are affected differently by 
different educational levels. Petrakkis and Stamatakis (2002), for example, state that 
while higher education has more importance in developed countries, primary and 
secondary education are more important for the growth of developing countries. 
Because of the importance of education, particularly in developing countries, 
participation in primary and secondary schools as a kind of human capital 
enhancement has attracted much interest and has been used widely in the academic 
literature as an indicator for human capital (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992).  
As it is a developing country, education is important also for Turkey. In Turkey, an 
increase in the compulsory primary education from five to eight years in 1997 has 
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increased the net schooling ratio 1  for primary education (from 84.74% in the 
1997/1998 academic year to 98.67% in the 2011/2012 academic year). However, 
boys have slightly higher net schooling ratio than girls (90.25% for boys and 
78.97% for girls in the 1997/1998 academic year and 98.77% for boys and 98.56% 
for girls in the 2011/2012 academic year) (National Education Statistics, 2016). In 
2012, compulsory education was extended to 12 years, and contrary to the previous 
uninterrupted eight years of primary education, this new reform splits the 
compulsory education into three levels (4+4+4). After four years of primary school, 
students stream into one of the different middle schools. Upon completing middle 
school, students continue to secondary schools. In first year of the new education 
system (2012/2013), the net schooling ratios were 98.86%, 93.09% and 70.06% for 
the primary school, middle school and secondary school, respectively. As of the 
2015/2016 the net schooling ratios are 94.87% 2 , 94.39% and 79.79%, for the 
primary school, middle school and secondary school, respectively. Moreover, girls 
have slightly higher net schooling ratio than boys. These figures indicate that the 
education reforms have been beneficial to increase the net schooling ratios and close 
the gender gap significantly in the net schooling ratios. The presented figures on the 
schooling ratios above, however, reflect the enrollment at the beginning of the 
academic year, not the completed education of individuals.   
One of the main problems that most developing countries suffer is students’ 
discontinuity and consequent dropout from the education system. The students who 
are absent and drop out of school are expected to be the most disadvantaged 
students. Disadvantaged students may refer to the poor, working children, ethnic 
                                                 
1 Net Schooling Ratio =  (Number of students in the theoretical age group / Total population in the 
theoretical age group) x 100 
2 The reason for the considerable amount of decrease in the primary school net schooling ratio is 
enabling children who are at the age of primary school to enroll in the pre-primary school with the 
regulation in the law. 
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minorities, refugees, and so on. It should be countries’ highest priority to diminish 
the inequalities in the education system so as to increase retention of children in 
school, decrease drop-out and improve completion and progression  to secondary 
schooling.  
There are several factors that affect the educational attainment and success of 
children: child characteristics, school factors and family characteristics. Among 
these factors, the family plays a central role. Fathers and mothers are the first 
teachers of their children, and the education of children starts with what they learn 
and see from their parents at home.  
At certain decision points, parents take actions by evaluating the costs and benefits 
of the alternative choices. Any decision they made will impact their economic, 
cultural and social capitals. While building their own economic and non-monetary 
resources with their decisions, they will also shape their children’s current and 
future human capital investments including their education. Because educational 
attainment of children is closely linked to the backgrounds of their parents in the 
human capital literature, the decisions are made by parents will certainly affect 
children’s education.  
Given the importance of education (particularly the education of disadvantaged 
children) and families’ role in children’s education, this thesis examines the 
influence of parent’s decisions on the educational outcomes of children from 
different aspects with the aim of making suggestions for policy makers. 
Firstly, the aim of the second chapter is to investigate whether there is a causal effect 
of having a mother with a migration history on the educational attainment of 
individuals. In Turkey, during the last sixty years a massive internal migration has 
taken place. Currently, every three people out of ten are living in a province which is 
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different from their birth province (TURKSTAT, 2016). While internal migration is 
common, there are only a few studies which examine the effect of migration on 
human capital. It is important to know what kind of relationship exists between 
migration and education to develop suitable policies to prevent negative 
consequences of migration on the educational attainment of children. 
Like internal migration, migration flows across countries have also escalated 
significantly and has become one of the most significant issues in the world. 
Worldwide, the number of people who are living outside their countries of birth is 
estimated to be 243 million in 2015. In the last two decades, the rate of people who 
live in a country other than their countries of birth has increased from 2.7% in 1995 
to 3.3% in 2015 (OECD, 2017). Since migration is a costly event (not only financial 
cost but also social and psychological), as the rate of migration increases, it brings 
potential problems. A lack of integration of immigrants, for example, will result in 
unrest in society.  Therefore, one of the problems- maybe the most vital one- is how 
to integrate the immigrants and particularly the children of immigrants to the host 
society.  
Due to its nature, intermarriage is assumed to be a good indicator to what extent 
immigrants are integrated to a host country. Intermarriage took place in many 
societies throughout the centuries and it is now very prevalent as an inevitable result 
of globalization and migration flows. As education is the key to the development of 
a country and there is evidence that intermarriages have a positive effect on the 
education of children, it is imperative to understand the impact of parent’s marriage 
on the children's achievement for policy makers to design appropriate policies to 




Turkey, which has been a migrant giving country since the 1960s, is currently a 
migrant receiving country. In order for Turkey to continue and at least preserve the 
gains it made on education, policy makers should not focus only on the policies 
which design the immigration but also on the policies which design the integration 
of the immigrant population in the country. Although each country has its own 
dynamics, lessons and experiences of countries which have been migrant receiving 
countries for a long time, should be taken into account during the policy-making 
process. In this context, the aim of the third chapter is to examine the intermarriage 
theme and investigate its effect on child education in Germany with its largest 
migrant population in Europe, which serves as an example for Turkey. Germany has 
10.7 million foreign-born individuals and this equals to 13.1 percent of its 
population in 2011 (Rica et. al., 2013). 
Finally, the aim of the fourth chapter is to identify the relevant factors that determine 
the children’s participation in different activities in Turkey. As mentioned above, 
increased enrollment rates do not guarantee that children are getting a proper 
education, since the enrollment rates reflect only the figures at the beginning of the 
academic year. Because of the available alternate activities such as child labour 
(both market and non-market), it is possible that many children may not be actually 
attending school. Even if these activities do not prevent children from going to 
school, they may hamper children’s ability to do homework, play and rest. Despite 
the fact that Turkey having achieved increased enrollment rates and decreased child 
labour within the last two decades, there is still room for improvement. The share of 
children who are involved in market work dropped from 15% in 1994 to 10% in 
1999, and to 6% in 2006 and 2012. While there is a gradual decrease in market 
work, the share of children who do domestic work increased. The share of children 
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engaged in household chores rose significantly from 28% in 1999 to 44% in 2006, 
and to 49% in 2012. As of 2012, 46% of the children aged 6–14 and 57% of the 
children aged 15–17 are engaged in household chores (TURKSTAT and ILO, 2007; 
and TURKSTAT and ILO, 2013).  
Previous studies about child labour in Turkey considered child labour in the form of 
market work. Since the share of nonmarket work is much greater than the share of 
market work, however, this is an inappropriate approach in the context of Turkey. 
Excluding household chores from child labour studies does not adequately represent 
the situation in Turkey. Therefore, to understand child labour in its entirety, it is 
imperative that non-market work is also taken into consideration, and market and 
non-market work are disaggregated from each other in the empirical analysis. In this 
context, the fourth chapter identifies the factors underlying household decisions 
regarding the relevant determinants of participation in schooling and alternate 
activities by considering also non-market work as a form of child labour. In this way 
the findings may be informative for policy-makers and help to reduce the drop-out 
rate which are 10% at the primary school level (UNDP, 2016) and improve the 
completion and progression to secondary schooling. 
1.2. STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE THESIS 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, for which the aims and motivations are set out above, present 
the empirical studies of three separate studies on child education. Chapter 5 provides 
an overall conclusion of the thesis. The contents of Chapter 2, 3 and 4 are 
summarized below. 
1.1.1. Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 investigates the effects of having a mother with migration history on 
children’s education in Turkey. The analysis in this study uses the Turkey 
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Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) for the year 2008. It contains detailed 
information on both mothers and their children. The most important reason for using 
TDHS-2008 is that it differs from the other TDHSs by providing information on the 
migration history of the mothers since the age of 12. In order to explore the 
relationship between a mother’s migration background and the education of her 
children, a standard OLS equation is estimated as a starting point. However, due to 
the selective nature of migration, it is not straightforward to estimate the casual 
effect of mothers’ migration on child education. The migration decisions are 
correlated with individuals’ observed and unobserved characteristics, and this may 
cause biased results. Therefore an instrumental variables model is also estimated to 
solve potential endogeneity problem and to further explore the robustness of the 
results. 
The main finding of this chapter is that Turkish mothers’ internal migration has an 
effect on their children’s educational attainment. Having a migrant mother increases 
the probability of starting high school and to continue to post compulsory education. 
Another main finding relates to the econometric methodologies employed in this 
chapter since the results of the main interest variables are different, which highlights 
the importance of accounting for the selective nature of the migration. 
1.1.2. Chapter 3 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 3 investigates the effect of intermarriage on the 
educational attainment of children using data from Germany. In this study 
intermarriage is defined as the marriage between any immigrant and a native. Thus, 
a non-intermarried (immigrant-immigrant married) individual is any immigrant who 
is not married to a native, and he/she does not have to share the same country of 
origin as his/her partner. For the purpose of this study, the German Socio-Economic 
22 
 
Panel (SOEP) is used. The SOEP is a nationally representative longitudinal survey, 
which started in 1984, and in this chapter the 2013 wave is used as a cross sectional 
data set. The most important reason for using the 2013 wave is that it introduced a 
new sample (IAB-SOEP Migration Sample) to the survey which oversamples 
immigrants and includes rich information on both first and second generation 
immigrants.  
It is found that having intermarried parents does not have a significant effect on the 
educational attainment of children compared to having native-native and immigrant-
immigrant married parents respectively. However, while there are no significant 
differences between having an immigrant mother-native father and having two 
immigrant parents; having an immigrant father-native mother has a significant and 
negative relationship with the education of children compared to having two 
immigrant parents. These findings indicate that it is hard to generalize the effect of 
intermarriages on the educational attainment of children since the results are mixed. 
Moreover since the results are different for each type of intermarriage, this indicates 
that the results are not stemming from the characteristics of intermarriage but the 
characteristics of the intermarried fathers and mothers. Another important finding is 
that school environment is a vital factor that affects the children’s educational 
attainment. After additionally controlling for whether children had experienced any 
disadvantages in school due to country of origin, a positive effect of having 
intermarried parents compared to having native-native parents is found. This implies 
that policy makers should attach high importance to make institutions more aware 
about the potential discrimination against children with a migrant background and to 
make sure that all children have equal opportunities in education. 
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1.1.3. Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 identifies the relevant determinants of the participation in different child 
activities in Turkey using the 2012 Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS-2012) 
and the 2012 Working Child Survey (WCS-2012). As a first step, a multinomial 
logit model (MNL) is estimated in order to analyze the determinants of child 
participation in different activities. However, MNL requires the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, which may cause biased results when it is 
violated. Therefore, since the data set contains the children from the same 
households and these children are likely to share the same unobserved family 
characteristics, a random effects multinomial logit model is also estimated to relax 
the IIA assumption. 
The results indicate that parental education is found to be a primary determinant of 
child activities for all age groups (6-14 and 15-17). As fathers and mothers become 
more educated, the probability of doing a higher amount of housework and working 
in the labour market decreases. The findings also indicate that a child who is older 
and female is less likely to attend school for all age groups. Moreover, the number 
of siblings aged 5 and younger creates a burden on girls and boys. Presence of very 
young children prevents both girls and boys from schooling by increasing the 
probabilities of working in the labour market for boys and of doing only housework 
for girls in the 15-17 age group. It also increases the probability of doing more hours 
of housework for girls in the 6-14 age group.   
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CHAPTER 2: EFFECT OF MOTHER’S MIGRATION ON THE CHILD 
EDUCATION 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey has experienced a significant amount of internal migration over the past five 
decades. In particular, a large number of people migrated to urban areas from rural 
parts of Turkey. According to the last Census in 2000, 65% of the population is 
living in urban places and every three people out of ten are living in a province 
which is different from their birth provinces (Berker, 2011a). 
While migration is common in Turkey, there are few studies about the effect of 
migration on individuals’ human capital. The economic and social benefits of human 
capital are well known and its role for economic development cannot be denied. 
Therefore, an analysis of migration’s effect on human capital, especially education 
which has a crucial role in human capital accumulation, is necessary.  
In this context, the aim of this study is to examine the effect of having a mother with 
migration history on children’s education in Turkey. However, due to the selective 
nature of migration, it is not easy to estimate the causal effect of mother’s migration 
on child education. In order to address this problem caused by the selectivity of 
migration, the instrumental variables method is employed and risk of migration will 
be used as an exogenous variation in migration. The contribution of this study to the 
literature is two folded: there is no study that examines the impact of mother’s 
migration on children’s educational attainment using data from Turkey and this is 
the only study that uses risk of migration -measured by ever lived in a high conflict 
or migrant giving province- as an instrument to solve the endogeneity problem. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows, Section II summarizes the theoretical 
background and existing literature on the relationship between migration and child 
education. Section III presents background information on Turkey. Section IV 
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outlines the data and methodology as well as variable definitions and constructions. 
Section V presents the results, and finally Section VI concludes the study. 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Migration has been a popular research topic among economists for a long time with 
the aim of identifying the determinants and consequences of migration. As stated in 
the migration literature, migrants are a group of people who do not represent the 
population in their area of origin. Rather, they may have a tendency to be positively 
selected based on their socioeconomic characteristics such as, high education, 
income, occupational skills, age marital status, and so on (Ssengonzi et. al., 2002).  
The human capital theory of migration, which is introduced by Sjaastad (1962) 
treats individuals as rational agents who make the cost-benefit analysis of migration 
and decide to migrate if the benefit from migration is higher than that of staying. 
Thus, this theory considers migration as an investment.   
In these conditions it is expected that with migration better life conditions will be 
obtained. For example, urban areas are expected to have better infrastructure and 
public goods such as schools. This situation motivates individuals, who are seeking 
a way of improving their life outcomes, to migrate from rural areas to urban areas, 
the rural-urban migration. However, with rapid urbanization, developing countries 
may not be able to build enough infrastructure and houses for their new residents. 
As a result, migrants may not be better off than in their pre-migration situation due 
to increased unemployment and poverty levels. The motivation for migration differs 
among individuals and as a result the consequences of migration will differ 
depending on the type of migration.  
Considering the aim of the study, there are several channels that mother’s migration 
might affect the educational outcome of children (Onyango, 2011); 
26 
 
- Disruption: This mechanism comes from a social capital perspective. In 
Woolcook’s (2001) study, social capital is defined as a person’s family, friends and 
associates who can be asked for help in a bad situation or may be used to get an 
advantage. Since the structure and relations between individuals happen in a certain 
location, social capital is place-based (Lesage and Ha, 2012) and migration may 
harm one’s social networks and relationship with their family and society, so that 
educational attainment/outcomes of children may be affected negatively from 
migration. There is a large amount of studies that show the positive relationship 
between social capital and educational outcomes (see for example Anderson, 2008). 
However, studies on the determinants of migration (Filiztekin and Gokhan, 2008) 
state that social networks available in the potential migration province increase the 
probability to migrate and reduce the adverse effects of migration. In this case, 
migration may have a positive effect on child education. Although there might be a 
positive effect of potential social networks, there might be still a disruption effect, 
because of accumulated social capital left behind. 
- Selection: As stated earlier, migrants are a selected, generally positively, group of 
people based on certain characteristics which also will affect the educational 
outcome of children. 
- Adaptation: After migration children may need some time to adapt to the new 
location and social environment. As a result, at least at the beginning, they may have 
different attitudes toward school participation. This is likely to happen in a country 
such as Turkey since there are high level geographic, economic and social 
differences among its regions (Filiztekin and Gokhan, 2008). For example, in 2000 
the average completed years of schooling is 8.1 for the Istanbul, 7.5 for the Western 
Marmara, 7.4 for the Aegean, 7.6 for the Eastern Marmara, 8.3 for the Western 
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Anatolia, 7.3 for the Mediterranean, 7.1 for the Central Anatolia, 6.8 for the Western 
Black Sea, 7.1 for the Eastern Black Sea, 6.4 the North Eastern Anatolia, 6.1 for the 
Middle Eastern Anatolia and 5.4 for the South Eastern Anatolia regions in the year 
2000 (Filiztekin, 2009)3. As can be seen from these figures, there are differences 
across regions of Turkey in terms of educational attainment. Especially, there is a 
clear difference between the west and east parts. 
With regards to the effect of migration on child outcomes studies to date have 
mostly focused on health related variables such as height-for-age, weight-for-age 
(Escobal and Flores, 2009) and child mortality (Ssengonzi et. al., 2002; Konseiga et. 
al.,2009). 
Without controlling for the selectivity of migration and explanatory variables, 
Onyango (2011) found that mother’s migration status increases the probability of 
school enrolment. Once he controls for explanatory variables he found mixed results 
for the different type of migrations. According to his findings having a rural-urban 
migrant mother decreases the probability of enrolment in school.  
The most relevant studies to the current study are the ones which are done by Aina 
et. al. (2008) for Italy and Valverde and Vila (2003) for Spain. Valvarde and Vila 
(2003) found that the probability to enrol in higher education is lower for individuals 
whose parents are non-native. They also found that non-native children are more 
likely to stay in education for a shorter period. However, this negative effect is 
bigger for the first generation migrants and decreasing with the second generation 
migrants. 
                                                 
3 Istanbul, Western Marmara, Aegean, Eastern Marmara, Western Anatolia, Mediterranean, Central 
Anatolia, Western Black Sea, Eastern Black Sea, North Eastern Anatolia, Middle Eastern Anatolia 





In Turkey migration became an explanation for the increase in the number of urban 
residents (Berker, 2011a). Studies focused primarily on the determinants of internal 
migration in Turkey (Filiztekin and Gokhan, 2008) and labour market consequences 
of internal migration (Berker, 2011a). Berker (2009) studied the impact of migration 
on educational outcomes, although he examined its effect on only native (resident of 
migrant receiving province) children’s school completion rates. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no study that examines the impact of mother’s migration on 
children’s educational attainment using data from Turkey. 
2.3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TURKEY 
2.3.1. Education System 
The Basic Law of National Education, which was issued in 1973, determines the 
general framework of the Turkish National Education System. The Turkish National 
Education System consists of two main parts: formal education and informal 
education. Formal education can be defined as the regular education, which is being 
given in schools to individuals of a given age. Formal education includes pre-
primary, primary, secondary and higher education institutions. Informal education 
covers all activities and organizations intended to satisfy the educational needs of 
every individual at any age level and educational background. Informal education 
activities are offered out-of-school. The aim of informal education is to improve 
individuals’ standard of living by teaching them how to read and write and 
developing their current skills.  
Before August 1997, the formal educational system consisted of primary school, 
middle school, high school and tertiary levels of schooling. Primary schools were 
providing five years of compulsory education. After five-year compulsory 
education, middle school took three years to complete. Finally, high schools follow 
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the middle schools and take three years (four years in case of technical high schools) 
to complete.  
Between 1997 and 20124, the formal educational system consisted of pre-school, 
primary, secondary and higher education institutions. Primary education, which 
takes 8 years to complete, is compulsory for everybody and it is free of charge in 
public schools. With the extension of compulsory schooling, the terms “primary 
school” (5 years) and “middle school” (3 years) were removed and the term 
“primary education” (8 years) was introduced. Compulsory education starts at the 
year when children reach age 6 and it ends when they reach age 14. Finally, high 
schools, which follow the primary education, cover the education of children aged 
14 to 16 (OECD, 2007). 
2.3.2. Conflict-Induced Migration 
In 1984, the PKK, which is an illegal armed group, attacked Turkish military 
establishments. This was the starting point of an armed conflict, which has taken 
place in the provinces located in the East and Southeast of Turkey for 25 years (see 
Figure A2.1). During the 1987-2002 time period, provinces which experienced 
intensive clashes were governed by state emergency law. Moreover, in order to cope 
with the activities of the PKK, the government introduced the ‘village guard’ system 
(Berker, 2011b). The aim of the village guard system was to prevent the local 
individuals from providing support to the PKK, and make use of the knowledge of 
local individuals who knows the region well. If individuals refused to serve as a 
village guard, they were forced to leave their residence. On the other side, if they 
accepted to be a village guard or continued to stay at their residence, they 
                                                 
4 In 2012, a new education system, which is called a ‘4+4+4’ system, was introduced. This new 
system has extended the compulsory education from eight to twelve years and decreased the 
compulsory age of starting school from 72 to 60 months. However, as a result of the complaints of 
parents, the compulsory age of starting school was gradually increased to 69 months. 
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experienced pressure from the PKK to provide them with support (TBMM, 1998).  
Besides deaths and injuries of individuals, as a result of this long lasting armed 
conflict, several villages and hamlets were emptied. Eventually this armed conflict 
led Turkey to have conflict-induced migrants. Because of the security concerns, 
some of them left their residence voluntarily and others have been forced to 
displace. According to the estimates of the Turkey Migration and Internally 
Displaced Population Survey (TMIDPS, 2006), during the 1986-2005 time period 
the number of individuals who migrated for security reasons could be between 
953,680 and 1,201,200, and 87 percent of migrants who migrated for security 
reasons left forcibly. 
2.4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1. Data 
The Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) for 2008 is used in this study. 
The survey was administered to 40,054 individuals in 10,525 households, 7,405 of 
whom are ever-married women. The surveyed households were located in 81 
provinces of Turkey. The survey is nationally representative with 2,659 households 
from rural and 7,866 households from urban areas. 
TDHS contains two types of questionnaires: the household questionnaire and the 
individual questionnaire for ever-married women. The household questionnaire lists 
all members of and visitors to the selected household and contains information on 
the age, sex, educational attainment, marital status and relationship to the household 
head.  The ever-married women questionnaire is designed for women, who are listed 
in the household schedule, between ages 15 and 49 and have been married at least 
once. This questionnaire contains information on their age, educational attainment, 
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native language, migration history, marriage history, work history and the husband’s 
background characteristics.  
This survey is suited to the analysis because it contains detailed information on both 
mothers and their children, which constitutes a crucial part in examining the effects 
of mothers’ characteristics on educational attainment of their children. 
Another reason for using this data set is that the TDHS-2008 differs from the other 
TDHSs by providing information on the migration history of women. Migration 
history data of ever-married women was collected for the first time in TDHS-2008. 
A history of all migrations, since the age of 12, is recorded for each woman. 
This study makes use of this survey by merging the household and ever-married 
woman data sets. Since the aim is to examine the effect of maternal migration on the 
educational attainment of children, it is necessary to have information on both 
mothers and their children in one data set. In order to merge household-level 
household data set and individual-level ever-married woman data sets, 1:m option of 
STATA is used, since more than one woman from a unique household may be 
enlisted in the woman data set. After obtaining one household-level data set, it is 
reshaped from wide to long. As a result we end up with an individual level data set. 
Later, by keeping only those whose mother’s line number (this variable comes from 
household data set) is equal to line number (this variable comes from woman data 
set) of woman, a new data set is created, where each child in the household is 
matched with their mothers. 
As will be explained in the variable definitions section below, whether the child 
started high school or not and whether the child continued to post-compulsory 
education or not were used as dependent variables. In order to end up with children 
who should have completed compulsory education and primary education, children 
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who are younger than 14, are dropped from the sample. As a result, the final sample 
includes 2,251 girls and 3,052 boys. 
2.4.2. Variable Construction and Definition 
Table A2.1 gives an overview of the dependent and independent variables used in 
this estimating model. However it is important to explain some of them in more 
detail to have an understanding about their construction. 
2.4.2.1. Dependent Variables 
Started high school (14-34): This dependent variable takes the value of one if the 
highest number of years obtained in education (years of schooling ranges between 0-
17) or the number of years in education including current school year is higher than 
8. It takes the value of zero otherwise. This kind of coding is necessary. If we 
consider only the highest number of years obtained, the results may be biased since 
this coding excludes the children who have just started high school. Likewise, 
considering only the number of years in education including current school year 
excludes those who have already finished the high school, since if a child is not 
currently enrolled in school, this variable coded as zero. This dependent variable 
includes every person older than 13 and younger than 35 who should have finished 
eight-year primary education and potentially started high school. 
Started high school (14-21): This dependent variable takes the value of one if the 
highest number of years obtained in education or the number of years in education 
including current school year is higher than 8. It is constructed in the same way as 
the previous dependent variable, except that it is restricted to individuals aged 14-21. 
Since elder children may leave their family for higher education or marriage 
reasons, they may not be represented in the sample, As a result, it may leave an 
unrepresentative sample if including elder children in the analysis. 
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Continued to post compulsory education (14-34): If the child is older than 21 at the 
time of survey, compulsory education is 5 years for them. However if the child is 21 
and younger at the time of survey, compulsory education is 8 years. Therefore, this 
dependent variable takes the value of one if education in single years or education in 
single years for current school year is higher than 8 for younger children, and for 
older children it takes the value of one, if education in single years or education in 
single years for current school year is higher than 5. 
2.4.2.2. Independent Variables 
Mother’s reason of migration: This categorical variable consists of three different 
categories: forced migration, any reason migration and never migrated. The women 
were asked to list all their migrations along with the reasons for migration. Dummy 
variables are created by using the information on the last migration of the women. 
So that, the ‘forced migration’ dummy is equal to 1 if the last migration of the 
woman was for security reasons, and 0 otherwise. The ‘any reason’ migration 
dummy is equal to 1 if the last migration of the woman was for any reasons other 
than the security reasons, and 0 otherwise. The ‘never migrated’ dummy is equal to 
1 if the woman has never migrated since she was 12, and 0 otherwise. These 
categorical variables are not used as explanatory variables in every regression. They 
are used only once to see the effect of migration, which occurred for different 
reasons. 
Ever Migrated: Ever migrated is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if 
the woman has migrated at least once since the age of 12. 
Urban: Since the household questionnaire enlisted every person currently residing in 
that house, there are children who are visitors of and do not usually live in that 
household. If a person is not a usual resident of that household, they are asked for 
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their residence type. While the usual residents’ type of residence is recorded as 
urban or rural, visitors’ type of residence is recorded as province centre, district 
centre, sub-district/village or abroad in the data set. In order to make them 
comparable, in our analysis province centre and district centre are coded as urban, 
sub-district/village is coded as rural and abroad is coded as a missing value. 
Although TDHS-2008 defined “urban” as settlements with a population of 10,000 
and more and “rural” as settlements with a population less than 10,000, district 
centre, which may have a population less than 10,000, is coded as urban in this study 
for the visitors5. 
Province: Province is the name of the city where the persons usually lives. Visitors 
are asked for their province of residence.  If they reside abroad, it is coded as 
missing in this study. 
Mother’s working status: This categorical variable consists of three different 
categories: mother is currently working, currently not working and mother has never 
been employed. These dummy variables are created by using the working history 
information of women. Women were asked to list their paid or unpaid jobs since 
they were 12. The employed dummy is equal to 1 if a woman is still working in her 
last job, and 0 otherwise. The unemployed dummy is equal to 1 if a woman is not 
currently working at her last job, and 0 otherwise. The ‘never employed’ dummy is 
equal to 1 if a woman has never worked, and 0 otherwise. 
Father related variables: Children can be matched to their father in the household 
data set, if their father was enlisted in the household data set. Since there are 
children who are visitors in that household or it is possible that parents of children 
do not live together due to death or divorce, the fathers of some children are not in 
                                                 
5 When the visitors are excluded from the sample, the results do not change.  
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the dataset. Besides, even if fathers of children are enlisted, there is limited 
information on fathers. Therefore, only ‘father’s education’ could be included in the 
model. There is no variable that gives the father’s education directly. First, the 
identifier number of children’s father and personal identifier numbers were matched. 
If a person was matched with a child’s father, than the years of education of that 
person was coded as the father’s education. If the father was not enlisted, education 
of father is coded as missing.  
2.4.2.3. Instruments 
Ever lived in a high conflict city (everlivedhigh): In a report prepared by the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TBMM, 1998), the number of villages and hamlets 
emptied for security reasons is given. Those emptied villages and hamlets belong to 
three different types of province: provinces 6  which were governed by the state 
emergency law; provinces7 which were neighbouring provinces to the first type of  
provinces; and other provinces8 which have emptied villages and hamlets. In this 
study, the first and second types of provinces are defined as high-conflict provinces 
and the third type of provinces are defined as low-conflict provinces. The instrument 
is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the woman has ever lived in a 
high-conflict province, and zero otherwise. 
Ever lived in a migrant sending city (everlivedmig): According to TMIDPS, there 
are 14 provinces 9  in which severe displacement of individuals took place. The 
instrument is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the woman has ever 
lived in one of these provinces, and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
6 Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli, Van 
7 Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Mardin, Mus 
8 Agri, Kars, Erzurum, Erzincan, Sivas, Sanliurfa, Adiyaman, Igdir, Elazig 
9 Adiyaman, Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, 
Tunceli and Van. 
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The difference between the two instruments is that while ever lived in a migrant 
sending city contains all high-conflict provinces; it also contains three of the low-
conflict provinces. 
Tables A2.2 and A2.3 present the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
study. While Table A2.2 gives the descriptive statistics for the children between 
ages 14-21, Table A2.3 gives the descriptive statistics for the children between ages 
14-34. These tables indicate that there is no significant difference in the descriptive 
statistics of variables between the two groups of children. 
2.4.3. Methodology 
The aim of this study is to explore the effect of having a migrant mother on 
children’s educational attainment. However, studies focused on migrants may suffer 
from the issues of endogeneity without appropriate controls. Migration decisions are 
typically taken by individuals to make their lives better off, and these migration 
decisions are correlated with individuals’ observed and unobserved characteristics. 
For instance, income, age, gender, marital status, education, occupational skills, 
social capital which is defined as information or direct assistance which is available 
to potential migrants (Garip, 2008), educational aspirations for children, and risk 
aversion (Oyelere and Wharton, 2013) are some of the characteristics that may 
affect the propensity to migrate of a person. That is, the individual decision for 
migration is not random and certain individuals are more or less likely to migrate 
based on their unobserved characteristics. As a result, those who self-select 
themselves into migration could be different from those who stay in terms of their 
characteristics which may also affect their children’s future outcomes. Controlling 
for those characteristics in the estimation can solve the endogeneity problem of 
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migration, however, generally due to limited datasets it is not always possible to do 
so.  
One way of dealing with the potential endogeneity is employing instrumental 
variable (IV) analysis. This study uses the risk of migration as a source of 
exogenous variation in migration.  
In order to account for the potential endogeneity of being a migrant mother, 
instrumental variables will be employed in this study.  
Our empirical model takes the following form; 
 Yi




hh + β4EVERMIG𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
81
𝑘=2 + εi1       (1) 
Where, 
i = 1, 2,…, n denotes the child. 
Yi
child = Child’s educational attainment 
Xi
child = Vector describing characteristics of children 
Xi
family
= Vector describing characteristics of family  
Xi
hh = Vector describing characteristics of household 
εi = Error term 
In equation (1) Xi
child , is a vector containing the variables age, gender and birth 
order. Xi
family
, is a vector containing the variables mother’s education, father’s 
education, mother’s native language, maternal grandmother’s native language, 
maternal grandmother’s education, number of household members, number of living 
siblings, mother’s working status. Xi
hh, is a vector containing the variables urban, 
age of household head, gender of household head, being single parent and household 
head, and poorwealth which equals to 1 if a wealth index (poorest, poorer, middle, 
richer, richest) is poorer or poorest.  EVERMIG is a dummy variable, which equals 
one if the mother has migrated at least once, and zero otherwise. 
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Three dependent variables are used in this study. The first dependent variable is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one if the child, currently aged between 
14-34, ever started high school, and zero otherwise. The second dependent variable 
takes the value of one if the child, currently aged between 14-21, ever started high 
school, and zero otherwise. The third dependent variable is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of one if the child, currently aged between 14-34, continued to post-
compulsory education, and zero otherwise. In the sample, years of compulsory 
education is not same for everyone due to the change in the law in 1997. While the 
years of compulsory schooling is 5 for those who are older than 21 years, it is 8 for 
those who are 21 or younger.  In all three cases the dependent variables are binary 
variables.  
The method of Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) is used to estimate the output 
equation. It follows two steps (Cerulli, 2012): 
1. Running an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression of the endogenous variable 
on the instrument and exogenous variables and getting the predicted values of the 
endogenous variable. 
2. Running a second OLS regression of the dependent variable on the exogenous 
variables and the predicted values of the endogenous variable. 
As discussed by Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 142-144), IV probit (or logit) may 
be applicable since the endogenous variable is binary but it is unnecessary, since 
producing the first stage residuals that are uncorrelated with fitted values and 
covariates is guaranteed only by OLS estimation of first stage. They can also be 
produced by probit if the first stage functional form is truly probit, which is not 
known. With OLS, there is no need to worry about whether the first stage is really 
linear, since consistency of second stage estimates does not depend on the correct 
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specification of the first stage functional form (Kelejian,1971). Angrist and Krueger 
(2001) states that nonlinear second stage estimates require to be correctly specified; 
and even if the second stage is truly nonlinear, linear instrumental variables can 
capture the effect of the interest variable. Therefore, 2SLS is a robust estimation 
method, easily interpreted and consistent even if the dependent and explanatory 
variables are nonlinear (Angrist, 2001). 
As it was mentioned before, risk of migration is used as a source of exogenous 
variation in migration. That is risk of migration is used as an instrument. Due to high 
intensity conflict at certain provinces of Turkey, people living at those provinces 
either left their residences because of security concerns or have been forced to 
displace. Eventually, those provinces have become the most migrant giving 
provinces and therefore living in those provinces influences the risk of migration. 
With the data we have it is possible to explicitly identify the mothers who have ever 
lived in a high conflict or migrant giving province. Therefore, risk of migration is 
measured by by two other variables: everlivedhigh, and everlivedmig, which equal 
to one if the mother has ever lived in one of the cities classified for each dummy, 
and zero otherwise.  
Equations (2) and (3) shows the first stage regressions for the two different 
instruments: 




hh + α4everlivedhigh + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
81
𝑘=2 + εi2          (2) 




hh + γ4everlivedmig + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
81
𝑘=2 + εi3            (3) 
The key challenge in using an IV approach is finding a valid instrument. There are 
two necessary conditions: the instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable 
and uncorrelated with the error term in Equation 1. Thus, everlivedhigh and 
everlivedmig should be correlated with the migrant status of the mother and they 
40 
 
should be uncorrelated with εi1. If these assumptions fail, this study will have either 
weak instrument or inconsistent estimation issues respectively. The weak instrument 
problem arises when the correlation between the endogenous variable and the 
instrument is nonzero but small. If there is a weak instrument problem, the IV 
estimator will be biased. In order to test whether we have a weak instrument 
problem or not, we considered two approaches (Baum et al., 2008): Staiger-Stock’s 
(1997) rule of thumb (if the first stage F-statistics is more than 10, there is not a 
weak instrument problem) and the Cragg-Donald F-statistic (Cragg-Donald F 
statistics must exceed the critical values, which were tabulated by Stock and Yogo 
(2005) for the first-stage F-statistic to test whether instruments are weak). However, 
while it might be convincing that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
variable, it is not automatically true that the instruments are not correlated with the 
error term in Equation 1. That is, besides influencing the endogenous variable, an 
instrument may have additional consequences, which affect the outcome variable. If 
an instrument does not affect the dependent variable except through the endogenous 
variable (the instrument is not correlated with the error term in Equation 1), this 
means that the instrument is a valid exclusion restriction.  A valid exclusion 
restriction is a necessary condition for the validity of an instrument. However a test 
whether the instrument is a valid exclusion restriction or not cannot be performed in 
the just identified case, where the number of endogenous variable equals to the 
number of instruments. The instruments, having a mother who has ever lived in a 
high conflict city and in a migrant giving city, seem to satisfy exclusion restrictions. 
I see no reason why having a mother who has ever lived in a high conflict city or in 
a migrant giving city should have a direct effect on child’s educational attainment 
rather than affecting the mother’s probability to migrate.  
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2.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
2.5.1. OLS results 
Table 2.1 displays the estimates produced by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions of Equation (1), which shows the effect of migration on various 
educational attainment variables estimated by treating EVERMIG as exogenous.  
These estimates show that having a migrant mother is positively related to children’s 
educational attainment, an effect which is statistically significant. A child who has a 
migrant mother is 3.6 and 2.9 percentage points more likely to start high school in 
the unrestricted and restricted sample, respectively than those whose mothers have 
never migrated and lived in the current province of migrants. Since a dummy for 
each province in which the children are currently residing is included in the 
estimation, children of migrant and non-migrant mothers currently living in the same 
province are being compared. Children with migrant mothers are 3 percentage points 
more likely to continue to post-compulsory education than children with non-
migrant mothers.  
These results are expected as migration is considered as an investment decision 
taken by rational individuals. These results also support that migrants are a selective 
group and that there are some unobservable characteristics that might account for the 
better school participation of the children. While being female and living in a poor 
wealth household decreases the probability of starting high school and continuing to 
post-compulsory education, living in an urban area and living with a family who had 
difficulties to afford educational expenses increase the probability of starting high 
school and continuing to post-compulsory education. It is surprising that living with 
a family who had difficulties to afford educational expenses increases the 
probability of starting high school and continuing to post-compulsory education. It is 
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expected to have a negative sign.  One reason for this situation could be that having 
difficulty to afford in the last 12 months could be a temporary situation for the 
families. Or it could be that families with more children in school have higher 
educational expenses and are therefore more likely to have difficulties. In the 
sample, about 70% of children are coming from families who had difficulties to 
afford educational expenses. These families include not only poor wealth families 
but also middle and rich wealth families who may give high value to the education 
of their children. 
Mothers’ and fathers’ education also have a positive and significant effect.  One 
additional sibling decreases the probability of starting high school by 3.8 and 4.2 
percentage points for the unrestricted and restricted samples, respectively. 
Estimation results show that mothers’ native language, grandmothers’ native 
language and mothers’ employment status have insignificant effects.  
Table A2.4 shows the effect of migration for security reasons on various educational 
attainment variables by treating it as exogenous. Estimates show that having a 
mother who migrated for security reasons has a significant and positive effect on 
children’s educational attainment. This effect is bigger than the effect of having a 
mother who migrated for any other reason. However, it may be that mothers who 
migrated for security reasons self-selected themselves into migration to secure both 
their and their children’s economic and social-wellbeing. Although the observed 
characteristics of mothers are controlled, for the unobserved characteristics of 






Table 2 .1. OLS regressions (Linear probability model) for EVERMIG 
  (1) (2) (3) 
LHS variables 
started started continue to post 
high school  high school compulsory educ. 
 (14-34)  (14-21) (14-34) 
Ever migrated mother .036*** (0.013) .029** (0.014) .030** (0.013) 
Control variables 
   
Second child 0.009 (0.015) 0.018 (0.016) 0.018 (0.015) 
Third  child 0.012 (0.019) .038* (0.021) 0.02 (0.018) 
Fourth child -.058** (0.024) -0.027 (0.027) -0.038 (0.024) 
Fifth child 0.028 (0.027) .060** (0.029) .043* (0.026) 
Age of hh head .005*** (0.001) .005*** (0.001) .005*** (0.001) 
Gender of hh head -0.094 (0.072) -0.075 (0.079) -.124* (0.072) 
Gender of child -.054*** (0.012) -.048*** (0.013) -.067*** (0.012) 
Age of child .111*** (0.015) .239*** (0.05) .076*** (0.014) 
Square of child age -.003*** (0.000) -.006*** (0.001) -.002*** (0.004) 
Wealth of hh:poor -.153*** (0.017) -.167*** (0.018) -.143*** (0.017) 
Mother's education .009*** (0.002) .009*** (0.003) .009*** (0.002) 
























0.1 (0.128) 0.108 (0.108) 
Urban .094*** (0.016) .093*** (0.018) .093*** (0.016) 
# of siblings -.038*** (0.006) -.042*** (0.007) -.042*** (0.006) 
# of hh members -.009** (0.004) -0.003 (0.005) -0.006 (0.004) 
Had difficulties to afford 
educ. expenses 
.044*** (0.015) 
.054*** (0.016) .050*** (0.015) 
No educational expenses -.184*** (0.023) -.217*** (0.029) -.151*** (0.023) 
Single mother 0.294 (0.399) 0.338 (0.397) 0.335 (0.395) 
Mother is hh head 0.069 (0.097) 0.11 (0.107) 0.073 (0.096) 
Mother is hh head and single -0.112 (0.568) -0.225 (0.565) -0.124 (0.562) 
Mother's working status: 
employed 
-0.001 (0.017) 
0.011 (0.019) -0.001 (0.017) 
Mother's working status: 
never employed 
0.007 (0.015) 
0.022 (0.017) 0.014 (0.015) 
Constant -.673*** -1.782*** -.438** 
Observations 4824 3902 4824 
R-squared 0.33 0.336 0.321 
Notes: OLS=Ordinary Least Squares. The table shows the effect of having a migrant mother on the 
probabilities of their childrens' starting high school and continuing to post compulsory education. 
Data are from Turkey Demographic and Health Survey-2008. In addition to the regressors listed 
above, all specifications also include province dummies. Specification (1) and (3) include  children 
older than 13 and younger than 35. Specification (2) includes children aged 14-21. The number of 
observation is 4824 for the Columns (1) and (3), and it is 3902 for the  Column (2). Each coefficient 
is from an equation estimated using OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses.  Single asterisk denotes 






2.5.2. IV results 
Table A2.5 shows the result of estimating the first stage regressions as in Equation 
(2) and (3). Both instruments (everlivedhigh, everlivedmig) are positively and 
statistically significantly related to migration. Thus, they satisfy one of the criteria to 
be used as instruments for this variable. The results indicate that having ever lived in 
a high conflict city increases the probability of being a migrant by 31 percentage 
points and having ever lived in a migrant giving city increases the probability of 
being a migrant by 33 percentage points. As explained in the methodology section, 
the Staiger-Stock (1997) rule of thumb suggests that first-stage F statistics should be 
larger than 10 to avoid weak identification by the instrument. F-statistics on the 
instrument are significant. However, while the F-statistics are larger than 10 for the 
unrestricted sample, when the restricted sample is used, the F-statistics are 
somewhat below this threshold; 8.2 and 8.7 respectively. Therefore, we might worry 
that the coefficients on starting high school in Column (2) and (5) might suffer from 
weak instruments critique which means the correlation between the instruments and 
the endogenous variable is weak and instruments cannot identify the equation. 
When IV estimation is considered, results change dramatically in terms of the effect 
of migration. Table 2.2 shows the effect of migration instrumented by conflict on 
educational attainment of children by treating EVERMIG as endogenous.  
The IV estimator gives only the Local average treatment effect (LATE). This is the 
effect of migration on those whose migrant status is affected by the instruments. 
Therefore, these results do not represent the mothers who migrated even though they 
have never lived in the conflict region and who did not migrate even though they 
have ever lived in the conflict region.  The results show that having a mother whose 
migration is induced by conflict decreases the probability of continuing to post-
compulsory education by 23 percentage points if everlivedhigh is used as an 
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instrument, and this effect is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance 
level. Having a mother whose migration is induced by conflict decreases the 
probability of continuing to post-compulsory education 17 percentage points if 
everlivedmig is used as an instrument, and this effect is also significantly different 
from zero at 5% significance level. Having a mother whose migration is induced by 
conflict decreases the probability of starting high school for the restricted sample by 
20.7 and 16.9 percentage points in case everlivedhigh and everlivedmig are 
respectively used as instruments. These effects are significantly different from zero 
at 10% significance level.  
Finally, if everlivedmig is used as an instrument having a mother whose migration is 
induced by conflict decreases the probability of starting high school by 13.8 
percentage points for the unrestricted sample, this effect is significantly different 
from zero at 10% significance level. However if everlivedhigh is used as an 
instrument, the coefficient is insignificant. Therefore, there is no effect of having a 








                                                 
10 Once the empirical analyses were run for boys and girls separately, it is found that there is no 
significant relationship for girls. For boys, however, having a mother whose migration is induced by 
conflict decreases the probability of continuing to post-compulsory education by 25 percentage points 
if everlivedhigh is used as an instrument, and by 26 percentage points if everlivedmig is used as an 
instrument at 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 2. 2. IV regressions 
 
started  started continue to post started  started continue to post
high school           
(14-34)
 high school     
(14-21)
compulsory educ
high  school     
(14-34)
 high school           
(14-21)
compulsory educ
Ever migrated mother -0.169 (.103) -.207* (.113) -.232** (.104) -.138* (.072) -.169* (.078) -.170** (.072)
Control variables
Second child 0.013 (0.103) 0.025 (0.017) 0.022 (0.015) 0.012 (0.015) 0.024 (0.017) 0.021 (0.015)
Third  child 0.025 (0.015) .056** (0.023) .037* (0.02) 0.023 (0.019) .054** (0.022) .033* (0.019)
Fourth child -.048* (0.02) -0.014 (0.029) -0.025 (0.025) -.050** (0.024) -0.016 (0.027) -0.028 (0.024)
Fifth child .055* (0.025) .097*** (0.035) .078** (0.03) .051* (0.028) .091*** (0.032) .070** (0.028)
Age of hh head .005*** (0.03) .004*** (0.001) .005*** (0.001) .005*** (0.001) .004*** (0.001) .005*** (0.001)
Gender of hh head -0.118 (0.001) -0.11 (0.082) -.155** (0.075) -0.115 (0.073) -0.104 (0.08) -.147** (0.072)
Gender of child -.056*** (0.074) -.051*** (0.013) -.071*** (0.012) -.056*** (0.012) -.050*** (0.013) -.070*** (0.012)
Age of child .104*** (0.012) .237*** (0.051) .068*** (0.015) .105*** (0.015) .238*** (0.05) .070*** (0.015)
Square of child age -.003*** (0.015) -.006*** (0.001) -.001*** (.0004) -.003*** (.0004) -.006*** (0.001) -.001*** (.0002)
Wealth of hh:poor -.164*** (0) -.177*** (0.019) -.157*** (0.018) -.162*** (0.017) -.176*** (0.019) -.154*** (0.017)
Mother's education .009*** (0.018) .010*** (0.003) .009*** (0.002) .009*** (0.002) .010*** (0.003) .009*** (0.002)
Father's education .0178*** (0.002) .015*** (0.002) .016*** (0.002) .018*** (0.002) .015*** (0.002) .016*** (0.002)
Mother's native language:turkish 0.012 (0.002) -0.005 (0.043) 0.003 (0.039) 0.015 (0.038) -0.001 (0.041) 0.009 (0.038)
Mother's native language:other -0.02 (0.039) -0.081 (0.091) -0.008 (0.079) -0.018 (0.077) -0.075 (0.088) -0.005 (0.077)
Grandmother's native 
language:turkish
0.018 (0.079) 0.022 (0.044) 0.018 (0.04) 0.021 (0.038) 0.027 (0.042) 0.026 (0.038)
Grandmother's native 
language:other
-0.058 (0.04) -0.063 (0.087) -0.086 (0.077) -0.049 (0.073) -0.053 (0.083) -0.069 (0.073)
Grandmother's education:low 0.112 (0.077) 0.15 (0.135) 0.156 (0.113) 0.106 (0.109) 0.138 (0.129) 0.142 (0.109)
Grandmother's education:middle 0.12 (0.112) 0.166 (0.134) 0.158 (0.113) 0.114 (0.109) 0.155 (0.129) 0.146 (0.109)
Urban .138*** (0.112) .140*** (0.029) .150*** (0.028) .131*** (0.022) .132*** (0.023) .137*** (0.022)
# of siblings -.040*** (0.028) -.048*** (0.008) -.047*** (0.006) -.040*** (0.006) -.047*** (0.007) -.046*** (0.006)
# of hh members -0.006 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005) -0.007 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) -0.003 (0.004)
Had difficulties to afford educ. 
expenses
.054*** (0.004) .065*** (0.018) .063*** (0.016) .052*** (0.015) .064*** (0.017) .060*** (0.015)
No educational expenses -.178*** (0.016) -.207*** (0.03) -.144*** (0.024) -.179*** (0.023) -.209*** (0.029) -.146*** (0.023)
Single mother 0.202 (0.023) 0.233 (0.408) 0.217 (0.41) 0.215 (0.4) 0.25 (0.397) 0.245 (0.397)
Mother is hh head 0.108 (0.408) 0.167 (0.113) 0.123 (0.101) 0.102 (0.098) 0.158 (0.108) 0.111 (0.097)
Mother is hh head and single 0.024 (0.101) -0.078 (0.581) 0.051 (0.584) 0.004 (0.569) -0.102 (0.565) 0.01 (0.565)
Mother's working status: employed -0.012 (0.58) -0.003 (0.021) -0.014 (0.018) -0.01 (0.018) -0.001 (0.02) -0.011 (0.017)
Mother's working status: never 
employed
-0.012 (0.018) -0.005 (0.022) -0.011 (0.019) -0.009 (0.017) -0.001 (0.019) -0.005 (0.017)
Instruments
lived in a high 
conflict city
lived in a high 
conflict city
lived in a high conflict 
city
lived in a migrant 
giving city
lived in a migrant 
giving city
lived in a migrant 
giving city
Constant -.544*** -1.701*** -0.274 -.564*** -1.714*** -0.313
Observations 4824 3902 4824 4824 4824
R-squared 0.293 0.192 0.19 0.199 0.2 0.284
F-test of instrument
F(109,  4714) =    
10.15
F(109,  3792) =    
8.24
F(109,  4714) =    10.15
F(109,  4714) =   
10.74
F(109,  3792) =    
8.70
F(109,  4714) =   
10.74
Underidentification test
Anderson canon. LM statistic~ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 75.84>CV 61.75>CV 75.84>CV 129.20>CV 102.83>CV 129.20>CV
Weak-instrument-robust inference
Anderson-Rubin Wald test(F)~ 0.096 0.062 0.021 0.077 0.051 0.028
Anderson-Rubin Wald test(χ2 )~ 0.092 0.058 0.02 0.073 0.047 0.026
Stock-Wright LM S statistic~ 0.092 0.058 0.02 0.073 0.047 0.026
Panel A: Estimation Results
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests
LHS variables
Notes: IV- Instrumental Variables.   In addition to the regressors listed above, all specifications also include province dummies. Specification (1), (3), (4), (6)  i nclude  
children older than 13 and younger than 35. Specification (2) and (5) include children aged 14-21. The number of observation is 4824 for the former, and it is 3902 for 
the latter. Each coefficient in Panel A is from an IV estimation using ever  lived in a high conflict city or ever lived in a migrant giving city as instruments of being an 
ever migrated mother.   Standard errors are in parentheses.  Single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 
99%. Panel B reports the tests for instruments' robustness. The F-tests are the test for the strenght of the instruments. ~ denotes a p-value and CV denotes Stock-Yogo 
weak ID test critical values.
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When the IV and OLS results of control variables are compared, it could be seen 
that coefficients are quite similar in terms of both significance and magnitude.  For 
example, a one year increase in mothers’ and fathers’ education increases the 
probability of starting high school and continuing to post compulsory education in 
OLS and all specifications of IV. Considering that mothers typically spend more 
time with their children, it is surprising that fathers’ education increases the 
probabilities more than mothers’ education.  
In terms of birth order, estimates give mixed results. While there is no significant 
difference between second and first children, being fifth or younger than fifth child 
increases the probability of starting high school and continuing to post-compulsory 
education. This contradicts earlier findings in the education literature, as Dayioglu 
et.al. (2009) find in their study that there is a negative relationship between 
educational enrolment and birth order. Thus, the educational enrolment of the first 
children is higher than the later born children. From my point of view, one 
explanation for my result could be that older children are more likely to experience 
the effect of conflict-induced migration in person.    
In Column (2) and (5), it is shown that F-statistics of the instruments are 8.24 and 
8.70. This means that these instruments are potentially weak, since the rule of thumb 
is that first stage F-statistics should be above 10. Therefore, a range of test statistics 
is used to test the weak identification in this study. Table 2.2 summarizes statistical 
tests for instruments’ robustness. The underidentification test (Baum et al., 2008) 
suggests that the null hypothesis of underidentification can be rejected comfortably, 
since p-values of Anderson canonical correlations LM statistic are 0.00 for all 
specifications. This implies that the model is identified, which means that the 
instrument is correlated with the endogenous regressor. The underidentification test 
48 
 
is an LM test of whether the instrument is correlated with the endogenous regressor. 
The weak identification test (Baum et al., 2008) suggests that the instruments used 
in the model are not weak, since the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics are higher than 
the Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values in all specifications. As a 
result instruments and the endogenous regressor are correlated and this correlation is 
not weak. Since only one of the instruments is used in each regression, there are no 
overidentifying restrictions and results for weak-instrument-robust inference tests 
are not interpreted.  The weak-instrument-robust inference tests (Baum et al., 2008) 
examine the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the 
structural equation are jointly equal to zero and that the overidentifying restrictions 
are valid. Accepting the null hypothesis means that the coefficients of the excluded 
instruments are jointly equal to zero and the instruments are valid. In conditions 
which researchers have more instrument than the number of endogenous regressors 
an overidentifying test should be applied in order to check whether orthogonality 
conditions hold or not. Orthogonality conditions mean that the instruments are 
independent to each other. Rejection of the hypothesis of the overidentifying test 
means rejecting orthogonality conditions. When the orthogonality conditions do not 
hold, it is still necessary to assume that at least one of the instruments is valid 
(uncorrelated with error term in the structural equation). 
In order to check that if this negative effect of maternal migration is not reflecting 
the children’s own migration experiences, the analyses were run for the children 
who were younger than the age of 6 at mother’s last migration or were born after 
their mothers’ last migration. Table 2.3. shows the IV results of the effect of 
mother’s migration. Having a mother whose migration is induced by conflict 
decreases the probability of continuing to post-compulsory education by 23 
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percentage points if everlivedhigh is used as an instrument, and by 18 percentage 
points if everlivedmig is used as an instrument at 5% significance level. Thus, 
obtained negative effect is not stemming from children’s own experience but it is the 
real effect of mothers’ migration. 
Table 2. 3 IV Regressions 
(children who were younger than the age of 6 at mother’s last migration or 
were born after their mothers’ last migration) 
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
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Observations 4049 3342 4049 4049 3342 4049 
R-squared 0.287 0.294 0.263 0.299 0.305 0.284 
 
Panel B: Diagnostic Tests 
F-test of instrument 8.26 6.82 8.26 8.71 7.17 8.71 
Underidentification test 
      
Anderson canon. LM 
statistic~ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weak identification test 
      
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic  







Notes: IV- Instrumental Variables.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Single asterisk denotes 
statistical significance at the at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.  In 
addition to the regressors listed above, all specifications also include province dummies. 
Specification (1), (3), (4), (6) include children older than 13 and younger than 35. 
Specification (2) and (5) include children aged 14-21. The number of observation is 4049 for 
the former, and it is 3342 for the latter. Each coefficient in Panel A is from an IV estimation 
using ever lived in a high conflict city or ever lived in a migrant giving city as instruments. 
Panel B reports the tests for instruments' robustness. The F-tests are the test for the strenght of 







Migration is one of the most studied subjects in the economics literature. The 
literature presents a particular interest to identify the determinants and immediate 
effects of migration. However, even though it has not been studied much in the 
economics literature, in addition to its direct effect on the people who migrate, 
migration may have intergenerational effects. Therefore, the aim of this study is to 
contribute to the literature by examining the effect of mother’s migration on the 
educational attainments of children in Turkey. The Turkey Demographic and Health 
Survey (TDHS) for 2008 is used for the aim of the study.  
This study provides evidence that Turkish mothers’ internal migration has an effect 
on their children’s educational participation. The results suggest that a mother’s 
migration increases the probability of her children starting high school and 
continuing to post compulsory education.  However, it is also found that there is an 
important endogeneity problem. The results provide support for the selective nature 
of migration. In order to identify the exogenous variation in migration, the 
instrumental variable method is employed. Risk of migration, which is measured by 
ever living in a high conflict or migrant giving city is used as an instrument. After 
controlling for the endogeneity of migration, the effect of migration becomes 
negative. There might be several reasons that lead to this situation. One of them is, 
as mentioned before, the endogeneity of migration. Because of the endogeneity of 
migration, OLS estimation gives biased results. In this case, the OLS estimation 
leads to upward biases. When the bias is larger in absolute value than the true value 
(given that the estimated value of the OLS coefficient is positive, the bias will be 
larger than the true value in absolute value), and IV provides a consistent estimate of 
the true value, it is possible that OLS and IV are of the opposite sign. Another 
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reason could be that the coefficient in the IV model is an estimate of the local 
average treatment effect (LATE), which means the estimations include a narrower 
population than the OLS.  In this case, IV presents the results for those 
whose migrant status is affected by living in a conflict city. The third explanation for 
the sign switch could be the violation of the monotonicity assumption. The 
monotonicity assumption is necessary in order to identify a local average treatment 
effect. There are four groups of people: compliers, always-takers, never-takers and 
defiers (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The first group is called compliers who are 
induced to take the treatment by the instrument. That is they get the treatment when 
they are assigned to the treatment but not otherwise. Always-takers and never-takers 
are not influenced by the instrument. While always-takers always take the treatment, 
never-takers never takes the instrument whatever the instrument is. The last group is 
called defiers who are doing exactly the opposite of the instrument.  Monotonicity 
implies that the effect of the instrument on the treatment should go in the same 
direction for all individuals in the sample and therefore there are no defiers. This 
assumption is crucial for identification because in the case there are defiers in the 
sample, the treatment effect for those who shift from non-participation to 
participation when instrument shift from 0 to 1 can be offset by treatment effect of 
those who shift from participation to non-participation. However, there is a general 
consensus that monotonicity cannot be testable and its plausibility has to be 
evaluated in the context. In the context of this study, defiers are the mothers who 
migrate if they never lived in a high conflict or migrant giving city, but do not 
migrate if they ever lived in a high conflict or migrant giving city. It is hard to think 
of examples here but there may be defier mothers which leads to the sign switch of 
the estimated parameter.  
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Apparently, each migration type has different effects on the migrant people and their 
children. People who migrate for economic reasons, for example, go through a 
preparation process and decide the migration if they think it will be beneficial for 
them. However, if migrants do not go through such a preparation process before 
they migrate that may lead to many negative consequences for both them and their 
children. It is highly possible that migrants migrate to the parts of big cities, which 
are less urbanized, less industrialized and poorer. Those places limit the access to 
the key public infrastructure services, the school facilities and the opportunities to 
find a job. Therefore, one of the negative consequences might be through the access 
channel. As a suggestion governments could improve the infrastructure services and 
build enough school buildings in the regions, which migrants migrate to. Another 
channel might be the information channel. Since migrants left their social networks 
behind, it is possible that they do not have any friends or relatives to exchange 
information with at their new place.  Therefore, one other suggestion could be that 
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Table A2. 1. Description of Variables 
Variable Name Description 
Dependent variables  
started  high school (14-34) =1 if started high school (age>13) 
=0 if otherwise 
started high school (14-21) =1 if started high school (13<age<22) 
=0 if otherwise 
continued to post compulsory education =1 if continued to post-compulsory educ. 
(age>13) 
=0 if otherwise 
Independent variables  
Mother's reason of migration (reference category: never migrated) 
forced migration =1 if mother migrated for security reasons 
 =0 if otherwise 
any reason migration =1 if mother migrated for any other reason 
 =0 if otherwise 
never migrated =1 if mother has never migrated 
 =0 if otherwise 
ever migrated =1 if mother has migrated at least once 
=0 if otherwise 
female =1 if female 
=0 if male 
age  Age of the child 
age2 Square of the child age 
mother's education Years of schooling in single years of mother 
father's education Years of schooling in single years of father 
family Number of household members 
(including visitors) 
sibling Number of living siblings 
age of household head Age of the head of household 
gender of household head Gender of the head of household 
urban =1 if urban residence 
=0 if rural residence 
poorwealth =1 if poorer/poorest 
=0 if middle/richer/richest 
province current province of children 
single mother =1 if mother is widowed/divorced/not living 
together 
 =0 if married 
mother is head of the household =1 if mother is the head of household 
=0 if otherwise 
mother  is  single and  head of household interaction of being the household 
and single for mother 
Birth order (reference category: first child) 
first child =1 if first child 
=0 if otherwise 
second child =1 if second child 




=1 if third child 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if fourth child 





Table A2.1 continued: Description of Variables 
fifth child =1 if fifth child or younger than fifth child 
=0 if otherwise 
Mother's native language (reference category: kurdish) 
turkish =1 if native language of mother is turkish 
=0 if otherwise 
kurdish =1 if native language of mother is kurdish 
=0 if otherwise 
other =1 if native language of mother is arabic or 
other 
=0 if otherwise 
Grandmother's native language (reference category: kurdish) 
turkish =1 if native language of grandmother is turkish 
=0 if otherwise 
kurdish =1 if native language of grandmother is kurdish 
=0 if otherwise 
other =1 if native language of grandmother is arabic 
or other 
=0 if otherwise 
Grandmother's education (reference category: high education) 
low education =1 if grandmother's education is no 
educ./incomplete primary 
=0 if otherwise 
middle education =1 if grandmother's education is 
primary/secondary complete 
=0 if otherwise 
high education =1 if grandmother's education is high 
school/graduate education 
=0 if otherwise 
Mother's working status(reference category: unemployed) 
employed =1 if mother is currently working 
=0 if otherwise 
unemployed =1 if mother is not working 
=0 if otherwise 
neveremployed =1 if mother has never worked 
=0 if otherwise 
Had difficulties to afford educational expenses (reference category: had no difficulties) 
had difficulties =1 if family had difficulties to afford educ.           
  expenses in the last 12 months 
=0 if otherwise 
had no difficulties =1 if the family could afford the educ. expenses 
=0 if otherwise 
no educational expenses =1 if family did not have educ. expenses 
=0 if otherwise 
Instruments  
ever lived in a high conflict city =1 if mother have ever lived one of the 11 high 
conflict cities 
=0 if otherwise 
ever lived in  a migrant sending city  =1 if mother have ever lived one of the 14 
migrant sending cities 




Table A2. 2. Descriptive Statistics (Age 14-34) 
  Age Group 14-34  
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
started high school (14-34) 0.648 0.478 0 1 
continued to post compulsory education 0.672 0.469 0 1 
Independent variables 
Mother's reason of migration (reference category: never migrated) 
forced migration 0.013 0.115 0 1 
any reason migration 0.571 0.495 0 1 
never migrated 0.415 0.493 0 1 
ever migrated 0.587 0.492 0 1 
female 0.430 0.495 0 1 
age  18.314 3.591 14 34 
age2 348.282 143.953 196 1156 
mother's education 3.897 3.464 0 19 
father's education 6.511 3.616 0 17 
family 6.117 2.516 3 35 
sibling 4.174 2.181 1 14 
age of household head 47.054 7.486 20 95 
gender of household head 0.016 0.127 0 1 
urban 0.718 0.450 0 1 
poorwealth 0.457 0.498 0 1 
province 35.849 21.018 1 81 
single mother 0.000 0.020 0 1 
mother is head of the household 0.009 0.093 0 1 
mother  is  single and  head of household 0.000 0.014 0 1 
Birth order (reference category: first child) 
first child 36.754 22.005 1 90 
second child 0.287 0.452 0 1 
third child 0.158 0.365 0 1 
fourth child 0.087 0.282 0 1 
fifth child 0.104 0.306 0 1 
Mother's native language(reference category: kurdish) 
turkish 0.698 0.459 0 1 
kurdish 0.267 0.442 0 1 
other 0.035 0.184 0 1 
Grandmother's native language(reference category: kurdish) 
turkish 0.671 0.470 0 1 
kurdish 0.286 0.452 0 1 
other 0.043 0.203 0 1 
Grandmother's education (reference category: high education) 
low education 0.862 0.345 0 1 
middle education 0.135 0.342 0 1 
high education 0.003 0.054 0 1 
Mother's working status(reference category: unemployed) 
employed 0.301 0.459 0 1 
unemployed 0.220 0.414 0 1 
neveremployed 0.479 0.500 0 1 
Had difficulties to afford educational expenses  (reference category: had no difficulties) 
had difficulties 0.665 0.472 0 1 
had no difficulties 0.214 0.410 0 1 
no educational expenses 0.121 0.326 0 1 
Instruments 
ever lived in a high conflict city 0.172 0.377 0 1 
ever lived in  a migrant sending city  0.252 0.434 0 1 





Table A2. 3. Descriptive Statistics (Age 14-21) 
   Age Group 14-21 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
started high school (14-21) 0.658 0.475 0 1 
Independent variables 
Mother's reason of migration (reference category: never migrated) 
forced migration 0.013 0.115 0 1 
any reason migration 0.562 0.496 0 1 
never migrated 0.424 0.494 0 1 
ever migrated 0.578 0.494 0 1 
female 0.459 0.498 0 1 
age  16.918 2.162 14 21 
age2 290.891 74.696 196 441 
mother's education 3.941 3.485 0 19 
father's education 6.517 3.624 0 17 
family 6.121 2.488 3 35 
sibling 4.159 2.177 1 14 
age of household head 46.178 7.593 20 95 
gender of household head 0.016 0.126 0 1 
urban 0.714 0.452 0 1 
poorwealth 0.473 0.499 0 1 
province 35.680 21.159 1 81 
single mother 0.001 0.023 0 1 
mother is head of the household 0.008 0.092 0 1 
mother  is  single and  head of household 0.000 0.016 0 1 
Birth order (reference category: first child) 
first child 36.659 22.121 1 90 
second child 0.284 0.451 0 1 
third child 0.160 0.367 0 1 
fourth child 0.088 0.283 0 1 
fifth child 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Mother's native language(reference category: kurdish) 
turkish 0.689 0.463 0 1 
kurdish 0.278 0.448 0 1 
other 0.033 0.177 0 1 
Grandmother's native language(reference category: kurdish) 
turkish 0.662 0.473 0 1 
kurdish 0.299 0.458 0 1 
other 0.039 0.194 0 1 
Grandmother's education (reference category: high education) 
low education 0.863 0.344 0 1 
middle education 0.134 0.341 0 1 
high education 0.003 0.051 0 1 
Mother's working status(reference category: unemployed) 
employed 0.311 0.463 0 1 
unemployed 0.210 0.408 0 1 
neveremployed 0.479 0.500 0 1 
Had difficulties to afford educational expenses  (reference category: had no difficulties) 
had difficulties 0.708 0.455 0 1 
had no difficulties 0.216 0.411 0 1 
no educational expenses 0.076 0.265 0 1 
Instruments 
ever lived in a high conflict city 0.175 0.380 0 1 
ever lived in  a migrant sending city  0.260 0.439 0 1 





Table A2. 4. OLS regressions (Linear probability model) for forced migration 





high school  high school 
compulsory 
educ. 
 (14-34)  (14-21) (14-34) 
forced migration .166*** .212*** .157*** 
any reason migration .034*** .026* .0292** 
Control variables 
   
Birth order                                                                                                                                                     
(reference category: first child) 
Second child 0.011 0.02 0.019 
Third  child 0.015 .043** 0.023 
Fourth child -.057** -0.026 -0.036 
Fifth child 0.028 .062** .044* 
Age of hh head .005*** .005*** .005*** 
Gender of hh head -0.109 -0.1 -.139* 
Gender of child -.055*** -.050*** -.069*** 
Age of child .110*** .230*** .075*** 
Square of child age -.003*** -.006*** -.002*** 
Wealth of hh:poor -.154*** -.168*** -.144*** 
Mother's education .008*** .008*** .008*** 
Father's education .019*** .016*** .017*** 
Mother's native language                                                                                                                   
(reference category: kurdish) 
Mother's native language:turkish 0.033 0.024 0.03 
Mother's native language:other -0.009 -0.043 0.006 
Grandmother's native language                                                                                                        
(reference category: kurdish) 
Grandmother's native language:turkish 0.045 0.053 0.053 
Grandmother's native language:other 0 -0.005 -0.013 
Grandmother's education                                                                                                                               
(reference category: high education) 
Grandmother's education:low 0.066 0.076 0.097 
Grandmother's education:middle 0.083 0.102 0.111 
Urban .092*** .089*** .092*** 
# of siblings -.038*** -.044*** -.044*** 
# of hh members -.009** -0.002 -0.005 
Had difficulties to afford educational expenses                                                                               
(reference category: had no difficulties) 
Had difficulties to afford educ. expenses .045*** .055*** .052*** 
No educational expenses -.180*** -.213*** -.147*** 
Single mother 0.294 0.335 0.336 
Mother is hh head 0.06 0.119 0.065 
Mother is hh head and single -0.09 -0.203 -0.102 
Mother's working status                                                                                                                    
(reference category: unemployed) 
Mother's working status: employed -0.002 0.01 -0.002 
Mother's working status: never employed 0.006 0.022 0.013 
Constant -.658*** -1.694*** -.422** 
Observations 4800 3882 4800 







Table A2. 5. First stage regressions (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Aged Aged  Aged Aged Aged  Aged 
14-34 14-21 14-34 14-34 14-21 14-34 
LHS variable ever migrated 
Instruments       
lived in a high conflict city .309*** .312*** .309***    
lived in a migrant giving city     .329*** .327*** .329*** 
Control variables        
Second child 0.019 0.03 0.019 0.017 0.029 0.017 
Third  child .063*** .075*** .063*** .059*** .071*** .059*** 
Fourth child .045* .056* .045* 0.041 .054* 0.041 
Fifth child .122*** .147*** .122*** .117*** .141*** .117*** 
Age of hh head 0 -0.001 0 0 -0.001 0 
Gender of hh head -0.122 -.151* -0.122 -0.13 -0.149 -0.13 
Gender of child -0.012 -0.007 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 
Age of child -.031* -0.004 -.031* -.028* -0.003 -.028* 
Square of child age .001** 0 .001** .001** 0 .001** 
Wealth of hh:poor -.050*** -.042** -.050*** -.050*** -.043** -.050*** 
Mother's education 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 
Father's education -.006** -.005* -.006** -.006*** -.005** -.006*** 
Mother's native language:turkish -0.057 -0.07 -0.057 -0.051 -0.064 -0.051 
Mother's native language:other -0.013 -0.112 -0.013 0 -0.098 0 
Grandmother's native language:turkish -.091** -.098** -.091** -.083** -.094** -.083** 
Grandmother's native language:other -.256*** -.238** -.256*** -.242*** -.228** -.242*** 
Grandmother's education:low .220* .307** .220* .212* .296** .212* 
Grandmother's education:middle 0.184 .272* 0.184 0.179 .265* 0.179 
Urban .211*** .193*** .211*** .204*** .187*** .204*** 
# of siblings -.019*** -.028*** -.019*** -.019*** -.028*** -.019*** 
# of hh members .013*** .017*** .013*** .011** .014*** .011** 
Had difficulties to afford educ. expenses .042** .041** .042** .035** .033* .035** 
No educational expenses 0.012 0.026 0.012 0.011 0.025 0.011 
Single mother -0.193 -0.454 -0.193 -0.47 -0.459 -0.47 
Mother is hh head 0.178 .248** 0.178 .199* .259** .199* 
Mother is hh head and single 0.696 0.634 0.696 0.798 0.732 0.798 
Mother's working status: employed -.049** -.059*** -.049** -.051*** -.062*** -.051*** 
Mother's working status: never employed -.100*** -.119*** -.100*** -.097*** -.117*** -.097*** 
Constant .551*** 0.27 .551*** .527** 0.28 .527** 
F-test of instrument 
F(109,  
4714) =    
10.15 
F(109,  
3792) =    
8.24 
F(109,  
4714) =    
10.15 
F(109,  
4714) =   
10.74 
F(109,  
3792) =    
8.70 
F(109,  
4714) =   
10.74 
Observations 4824 3902 4824 4824 3902 4824 
R-squared 0.19 0.192 0.19 0.199 0.2 0.199 










In many immigrant-receiving countries including Germany, a primary challenge that 
both immigrants and natives face is immigrants’ integration into the host country. 
Therefore, the integration of immigrants and particularly the integration of their 
children is a key challenge for policy makers and is at the forefront of the political 
debate in many societies. Confiriming its importance, how immigrants fit into their 
host countries has generated a large literature in the social sciences, including 
economics.  
Marriage is a channel through which cultural specific values and practices are 
conveyed to the partners and in particular to the children. A high level of 
intermarriage is a sign of a low level of cultural and social distance between 
immigrants and natives because it decreases the dissimilarities between them 
(Gordon, 1964; 2003; Muttarak, 2004).  Therefore, intermarriage is considered as a 
way to examine the immigrants’ integration level, both socially and economically, to 
the host country in the economics and sociology literature. 
As the intermarriage rates are increasing in the immigrant-receiving countries, 
studies that examine the effect of intermarriage on both the immigrants themselves 
and their children are growing. While most of the studies examine the effect of 
intermarriage on the labour market outcomes of the immigrants (Kantarevic, 2004; 
Meng and Gregory, 2005; Gevrek, 2010), only a few studies have specifically 
investigated the relationship between intermarriage and the educational attainment 
of the children from those marriages. The children of immigrants spend their lives in 
the host country as students, labourers, tax payers and so on, and therefore, how they 
fare in the host country is needed to be taken into account while assessing the long-
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run effects of immigration (Furtado, 2009). The long-run effects of immigration 
probably affect the children of immigrants more than their parents.  
For these reasons, it is important to understand in greater depth the relationship 
between parental marriage type and its effect on children's human development. In 
this respect, this study aims to investigate one of the main aspects of second-
generation immigrants’ human development: their educational attainment. In the 
study, the effect of intermarriage on the educational attainment of children from 
these marriages is examined using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). 
Moreover, it is also investigated whether the effects of an immigrant’s marriage to a 
native differs by gender. 
The chapter is organized as follows; Section 2 provides information on the structure 
of the German education system. Section 3 reviews the literature focusing on 
intermarriage. Section 4 describes the data and the variables used in the analysis as 
well as the estimation method employed in the study. Section 5 presents the 
descriptive statistics and the results. Section 6 discusses the main findings and the 
limitations of the study. 
3.2. EDUCATION SYSTEM IN GERMANY 
The education system in the Federal Republic of Germany is under the responsibility 
of the federal structure of the state. Unless it is mentioned in the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), each of the individual states has the complete power and 
responsibility to make arrangements (Eurydice, 2009).  With the aim to coordinate 
the educational practices, as well as cultural matters, at the national level, the 
Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs has been 
established (Kultusministerkonferenz, 2012). However, there are still slight 
deviations and the education system in Germany varies from state to state. 
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The German education system has a highly stratified structure, and after only four 
years of schooling, children are assigned to one of the three11 secondary schools. 
The education system is divided into five stages; pre-school education, primary 
education, secondary education, tertiary education and continuing education. Figure 
A3.1 presents the Basic Structure of the Educational System. 
3.2.1. Pre-school Education 
In Germany, pre-school education is not part of the public education and is not 
compulsory. Children aged three to six may attend pre-school institutions 
(Kindergarten). These institutions may be run by public, private, church or non-
profit organisations (Education in Germany, 2011).  Therefore not all of them are 
free. 
3.2.2. Primary Education 
Primary school is compulsory, and it starts when the child is six years old. It takes 
four12 years to complete the primary education. At the end of the primary school 
teachers direct students to one of four different types of secondary school based 
largely on their grade point average as well as their abilities and interests.  
3.2.3. Secondary Education 
Considering a child’s academic performance, their teacher’s recommendation and 
parent’s choice13, the child will continue his/her education in one of the three types 
of secondary schools. The three types of schools lead the students to different career 
possibilities. 
                                                 
11 In some regions there are four different secondary school tracks. 
12 It is six years in Berlin and Brandenburg. 
13 Parents can override the teacher’s recommendations in some states, but schools are not willing to 
accept students who have not been recommended. In other states, the recommendations of teachers 






Hauptschule is a vocational school that takes five years (or six) to complete. It is 
considered the least prestigious and demanding of the secondary school types. The 
main aim of this type of school is to prepare the students for a vocational education. 
It covers the same subjects as the other secondary schools plus some vocational 
education. Upon completion of the Hauptschule, the student can go into vocational 
training (part-time or full-time) or enter an apprenticeship in a manual trade or may 
be able to transfer to the Gymnasium (see below).  
3.2.3.2. Realschule 
Realschule is the most common secondary school and it takes five years (or six) to 
complete. Although the structure of the Realschule is similar to Hauptschule, it 
offers a more comprehensive and challenging curriculum compared to Hauptschule. 
Graduates of Realschule are more qualified for white-collar professions than the 
graduates of the Hauptschule. On the other side, although it offers high academic 
standard, it is more vocationally oriented compared to Gymnasium. 
3.2.3.3. Gymnasium 
Gymnasium is considered the most prestigious of the three secondary school tracks. 
It is a secondary school that prepares the student for a university education, and it 
takes eight years (or nine) to complete. At the end of the Gymnasium, students take 
the Abitur, which is a series of rigorous exams. The students who graduate from 
Gymnasium receive the Abitur diploma, which is required to study at a university or 
equivalent.  The Gymnasium curriculum is highly academic with two foreign 




Gesamtschule combines the two kinds of secondary school types. Students usually 
spend six years in this type of school and either obtain a Hauptschule or a 
Realschule certificate. If they would like to continue to university, they spend three 
more years in order to get the Gymnasium diploma (Abitur).  
After children complete the compulsory education, they continue to the upper 
secondary education based on their qualifications (Eurydice, 2009). After getting a 
certificate from Hauptschule and Realschule, children who want to work in 
vocational jobs can move to vocational schools. Vocational schools combine part-
time education and an apprenticeship for two to three years. 
3.2.4. Tertiary Education 
Tertiary schools include institutions, which enable children to obtain qualifications 
in order to work in the professional occupations. These establishments are 
universities, technical universities, teachers colleges, colleges of arts and music, 
technical institutes, theological seminaries and administrative training institutes. 
Students who completed upper secondary education and obtained a higher education 
entrance qualification can continue to these institutions. 
3.2.5. Continuing Education 
Continuing education includes training and courses given by continuing education 
centres. These institutions offer general, vocational and academic continuing 
education. Besides experience, it adds to current knowledge and skills. Within the 
lifelong learning concept, continuing education is becoming more of an issue and is 
becoming a field of education. 
Figure 3.1 below presents the organisation of the education system in Germany in 
terms of the education levels and age categories.  
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Figure 3. 1. Organization of the Education System in German 
 
Source: Eurydice, 2009 
 
3.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.3.1. Studies on the Interethnic marriage 
Studies in the literature on the interethnic marriage can be classified into three 
categories.  
Studies in the first category focus on the determinants of interethnic marriage. They 
investigate why some immigrants are more likely to engage in interethnic marriage 
than other immigrants. While studies mention similar factors that affect the 
propensity of interethnic marriage, they may make different classifications. From a 
sociological perspective, Muttarak (2004) grouped these factors into four categories: 
economic, demographic, propinquitous, and psychological. However, from an 
economics perspective, Furtado and Trejo (2012) put these factors into three 
categories: (1) immigrants’ own characteristics that directly affect their preferences 
of marrying within their ethnicity; (2) immigrants’ preference for potential partners 
to have certain characteristics that are rare or common in their ethnicity; (3) the 
chance of marrying within their ethnicity.   
According to Meng and Gregory (2005), to be eligible to marry interethnically it is 
essential for an immigrant to be eager to accept a different cultural practices, beliefs, 
and way of lives within the marriage. This eagerness is expected to have a negative 
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relationship with strong religious beliefs. Therefore, more religious immigrants are 
more likely to marry within their own ethnicity.  
It is expected that highly educated people, in contrast to religious people, are more 
permissive to other lifestyles, and therefore schooling makes immigrants more likely 
to marry someone from outside of their ethnicity. This is defined as the ‘cultural 
adaptability effect’ by Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2011). Furtado and 
Theodoropoulos (2011) also propose two other mechanisms through which 
education may affect the probability to intermarry: the ‘enclave’ effect and the 
‘assortative matching’ effect. The enclave effect states that more educated people 
are more likely to live outside of their ethnic enclaves in order to obtain schooling or 
get better opportunities in the labour market. Therefore, they are less likely to meet 
someone from their own ethnic group and therefore they are more likely to 
intermarry. Finally, the assortative matching effect refers to the theory, suggested by 
Becker (1973), that people tend to choose their partners from a similar educational 
level (Kalmijn, 1991).   
Linguistic competence in the host country’s native language and the length of stay in 
the host country are also important factors that affect an immigrant’s marrying 
preference. Immigrants who arrived in the host country recently and have limited 
native language skills are less likely to marry interethnically (Meng and Gregory, 
2005; Chiswick and Houseworth, 2011). 
Another important factor that affects an immigrant’s interethnic marriage probability 
is the probability of meeting and interacting with someone from the immigrant’s 
own ethnic group (Muttarak, 2004; Furtado and Trejo, 2012; Meng and Gregory, 
2005). Independently of the characteristics that affect the preferences for interethnic 
marriage, the relative size of the ethnic groups in a community and also the 
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allocation of them across the country also have an effect on the probability to marry 
someone from the same ethnic group. Ethnic group size and sex ratios are used to 
predict the chance for an immigrant to interact and marry someone from the same 
ethnic background. As the group size increases in a community, the probability to 
marry interethnically decreases. If there is an unbalanced sex ratio in a certain ethnic 
community- the number of males/females is relatively larger than the number of 
females/males- it increases the probability of interethnic marriage for the ones 
whose numbers exceed that of others.  
The second type of studies examines the importance of interethnic marriage on the 
human capital levels of the immigrants. Studies in this category are based on two 
hypotheses suggested by Kantarevic (2004): (1) the productivity hypotheses, and (2) 
the selection hypothesis.  According to the productivity hypotheses, a foreign-born 
immigrant may benefit from their native partner in a number of ways in the process 
of human capital accumulation. Native spouses help their immigrant partners to 
advance quickly in the language; to learn easily the customs, norms and behaviours 
that are acceptable/nonacceptable to the host country; to provide access to broader 
social networks and knowledge of the local labour markets (Meng and Gregory, 
2005). Therefore, an intermarried immigrant may assimilate faster than an 
immigrant who is married with another immigrant. In contrast, the selectivity 
hypothesis states that the effect of intermarriage on the human capital accumulation 
of immigrants may be biased if the endogeneity of the intermarriage is not taken into 
account. Intermarried immigrants are an unrepresentative sample of the married 
immigrant population as they self-select themselves into intermarriage. Therefore, 
they may differ in various ways from nonintermarried immigrants, which also leads 
them to have a different human capital level. The findings of Kantarevic (2004) and 
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Nottmeyer (2010) support the selection hypothesis. In his study, Kantarevic (2004) 
finds that there is a labour market premium for the intermarried immigrants. 
However, when he controls for the endogeneity of intermarriage, this intermarriage 
premium vanishes. This means that the intermarried group is a highly selected group 
of people among all the immigrant people. On the contrary, Meng and Gregory 
(2005) and Gevrek (2010) suggest that intermarriage affects the earnings of an 
immigrant in Australia and Netherlands, respectively, even after taking the 
endogeneity of the intermarriage into account. Meng and Gregory (2005) also find 
that even immigrants who marry into another ethnic group do not attain this 
premium. Moreover, by using U.S. data, Furtado and Theodoropoulos’s (2009) find 
that intermarriage increases the probability of employment by almost 5 percentage 
points, and once the endogeneity of intermarriage is considered intermarriage more 
than doubles the likelihood of employment.  
The third type of studies focuses on the effects of interethnic marriages on the 
educational levels of the children from those marriages. There are two basic 
channels through which the type of parents’ marriage impacts their children’s 
educational attainments (Furtado, 2009): (1) displaying different parenting styles 
during child’s human capital development, and (2) attachment to ethnic community. 
Each type of marriage may have positive or negative effects on children’s 
educational outcomes. Having a native parent affects the children’s proficiency in 
the host country’s native language, for example, which will affect the educational 
outcomes of children in a positive way (Bleakley and Chin, 2008). Similarly, having 
two immigrant parents will increase the probability of the children being bilingual, 
and there is evidence in the literature that bilingual children show better cognitive 
and educational achievement than monolingual children (Portes and Hao, 1998). 
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Having a strong attachment to the ethnic community may also have negative and 
positive effects. Even though in an ethnic community people tend to share their 
experiences and knowledge when finding better schools and finding jobs (Furtado, 
2009), excluding themselves from social networks composed of natives may result 
in negative consequences which also affect the children’s human capital outcomes 
(Ramakrishan, 2004). 
By using the allocation of Moluccans as a natural experiment, Van Ours and 
Veenman (2010) studied the effect of interethnic marriage on the educational 
attainment of children in the Netherlands. In their analysis they applied both an 
ordered probit model and a probit model. Since the Dutch education system allows 
students to attain the same schooling level through different tracks of different 
length, the ordered probit model is used for the children who completed their 
schooling. For the children who were still at school they applied the probit model. 
They find no meaningful effect of intermarriage on the educational attainment of 
children. Once they make a distinction between the types of intermarriage, however, 
they find a positive effect of Moluccan father-native mother marriage on the 
education of children, while they find no meaningful effect of Moluccan mother-
native father marriage. 
Furtado (2009) examined the relationship between marriage of an immigrant to a 
native and high school dropout rates of children (aged 16-17) from this marriage by 
using 2000 US Census data. Her results show that while having an immigrant 
mother and a native father has no significant effect, having an immigrant father and 
a native mother increases the probability of drop out. Once she controls for the 
endogeneity of the intermarriage, however, she finds a positive and signifcant effect 
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of intermarriage on the children’s drop out for both types of intermarriage relative to 
other immigrant children. 
Ramakrishan (2004) and Chiswick and DebBurman (2004) also studied the effect of 
intermarriage on the educational outcomes of children by using data from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1991 to 2001 for the first study and from 
1995 for the latter. They both applied an Ordinary Least Squares model and the 
educational characteristics of parents were not controlled for. Ramakrishan (2004) 
found that having intermarried parents decreases the probability of drop out and 
increases the years of schooling compared to having two intermarried parents. 
Similarly, Chiswick and DebBurman (2004) show that having intermarried parents 
increases the years of education relative to having two immigrant parents. The 
difference between those studies is the importance of gender. While the first study 
found that the magnitude of the effect of having an immigrant father-native mother 
is larger than having an immigrant mother-native father, the latter study finds the 
opposite.  
Finally, Luthra (2010) tested whether having at least one parent who is German 
affects the educational attainment of children compared to having two immigrant 
parents by using the German Mikrozensus data from 2005 and 2006.  A multinomial 
logistic regression is used to undertake the analysis, and the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the parents such as parental educational and occupational 
attainment, household income, and children in the household are controlled for. In 
her study she presents evidence of an immigrant advantage by finding that among 
the children of parents who have similar socio-economic characteristics, children of 
immigrants have higher educational attainment than the children of natives. Once 
she controls for the parental characteristics, she finds that many ethnic groups show 
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higher educational attainment than natives. Therefore she actually concludes that 
having a German parent has a negative relationship with the children’s educational 
attainment and marrying to a native decreases the effect of immigrant advantage. 
3.3.2. Econometric Issues 
Estimating the causal impact of intermarriage on the educational attainment of 
children is not easy since intermarriage may be endogenous for the reasons 
discussed. Intermarried immigrants might be a selected sub-sample of all married 
immigrants (Kantarevic, 2004). They may have, for example, unobserved 
characteristics, such as education or income, that could also affect their children’s 
educational outcome. 
In order to control for the endogeneity of intermarriage, studies have adopted an 
instrumental variables approach. Van Ours and Veenman (2010), for example, using 
the allocation of Moluccans as a natural experiment, applied an IV model by using 
three instruments: an indicator for whether or not a municipality had a Moluccan 
quarter, the size of the municipality, and the percentage of Moluccans within the 
municipality. 
Following Meng and Gregory (2005), some other studies (Furtado, 2009; Gevrek, 
2010) used the group size and the sex ratio as instruments for the probability of 
interethnic marriage. The underlying assumption is that these instruments determine 
the marriage choice but they are also irrelevant in both the labour and educational 
outcomes equations.  
In the current study, the instrumental variable method could not be applied because 
of the lack of regional information in the dataset. Instead, it is attempted to control 
for as many as possible explanatory variables in predicting educational attainment, 
such as the religion and language of parents in addition to the parental education and 
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the length of the stay in the host country. These variables are motivated by the 
existing literature on the determinants of intermarriage. However, in spite of trying 
to control for a considerable amount of observable characteristics in the analysis 
there might still be omitted variables, which may lead to a biased coefficient for 
intermarriage. For example, immigrants who marry other immigrants may value 
their child’s education different to immigrants who marry a native. In such a case 
the issue of endogeneity bias will arise.  
3.4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1. Data 
The empirical analysis uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). 
The SOEP is a nationally representative longitudinal survey, which started in 1984. 
This data source includes rich information on the social and economic 
characteristics of individuals. The SOEP wave from 2013 is used as a cross-
sectional data set. The SOEP-2013 was not only the most recent survey available at 
the time of data application, but also it oversamples immigrants and includes rich 
information on them.  The 2013 survey includes 24,113 individuals whose age is 18 
and older, and 14,170 private households.  
The SOEP-2013 wave introduced a new sample (IAB-SOEP Migration Sample) to 
the survey. It is a joint project by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and 
SOEP (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2016). A separate survey, which 
includes only the households of this new sample, includes some new questions that 
were not previously considered in the SOEP or other household surveys in 
Germany, or not in the necessary depth, such as occupational status before 
migration, German language ability before migration, and labour market integration. 
Moreover it covers not only direct immigrants, but also second generation 
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immigrants. The first wave of the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample includes 4,964 
individuals and 2,723 private households. 
The final data set is prepared by merging several data sets. Parent related variables 
are obtained in two ways; (1) from the bioparent data set, which asks respondents 
the information about their parents, such as the country of origin and nationality of 
father and mother, and (2) if the parents are also a member of the SOEP, by using 
the father’s and mother’s identifier numbers respondents are linked to their parents 
to obtain the information directly from the main data set. By merging different data 
sets it is also aimed to replace missing values if a similar variable included in the 
other data sets. Because of merging different data sets, which includes different 
information, we have a large number of missing values for some variables. In order 
to deal with these missing values a dummy variable is created which equals to one if 
missing and zero otherwise; and then a value of zero is given to the missing values. 
Since the aim of this study is to examine how the parental marriage type affects the 
children’s education, the data requirements for studying connections between 
parental information and the educational attainment of individuals are stringent. 
Therefore, the SOEP-2013 is an appropriate survey for the kind of study as it 
contains a rich set of relevant variables and enables linking parents with their 
children. 
As previously explained the upper secondary level in Germany includes the age 
group of children between 15/16 and 18/19.  Therefore the sample is restricted to 
individuals aged 20 to 33 who are supposed to have completed their schooling. The 
final sample consists of 1,805 male and 2,036 female respondents. 
Two main research questions are posed in the chapter: (1) does marrying a native 
male/female increase the probability of the children of an immigrant female/male 
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relative to a child with two immigrant parents attending an upper-level secondary 
school? (2) does marrying an immigrant male/female decrease the probability of  the 
children of a native female/male relative to a child with two native parents attending 
an upper-level secondary school? This study contributes to the literature by using the 
SOEP data set, which allows to control a number of important variables that affect 
the probability of intermarriage such as language ability, religiosity. Moreover to the 
best of my knowledge, there is no previous study that control for the school related 
characteristic, which affects both the educational attainment and educational success 
of children. 
3.4.2. Variable Construction and Definition 
An overview of the dependent and independent variables is presented in Table A3.1. 
I will go on to explain them in more detail.  
3.4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Education: Measures the educational attainment of the respondents. The variable is 
ranked from one to six. It takes the value of one if the individual has no school 
degree or dropped out of school; two if the individual has no school degree yet, 
which implies being behind schedule given the age group studied; three if the 
individual has completed secondary school; four if the individual has completed 
intermediate school; five if the individual has completed technical school; six if the 
individual has completed upper secondary school. If the variable is coded as ‘other 
degree’ in the data set, they are omitted from the sample. Such individuals 
completed their schooling in another country, and they are not the focus of this study 
because we are interested in the success of individuals in the host country.   
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3.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
Type of Marriage: In this study, parents’ marriage pattern is shown by three 
categories: mixmarriage, native marriage and immigrant marriage. The 
‘mixmarriage” category takes the value one if the children have one immigrant and 
one native parent. In other words, this variable takes the value one if the children 
have an immigrant father and a native mother; or if the children have an immigrant 
mother and a native father. It takes the value of zero otherwise. Following 
Nottmeyer (2010), nationality is taken into account to determine if father/mother is 
an immigrant, in cases where there is no information on the country of origin of 
parents.  
Intermarriage (mixmarriage) is defined as the marriage between any immigrant and 
a native. Immigrant-immigrant marriages, on the other hand, are defined as the 
marriage between two immigrants, regardless of nationality. The reason for not 
considering specific ethnic groups is due to sample size considerations. 
Table 3.1 presents the marriage types of parents by the gender of their children. 
Native-native marriages have the highest percentage among the marriage types. The 
intermarriage rate is lower compared to both native-native and immigrant-immigrant 
marriages. 
Native_mother and Native_father: In order to analyse the effect of intermarriage by 
gender, these categorical variables are created. Native_mother equals one if the 
respondent has an immigrant father and a native mother, and takes the value of zero 
otherwise. Native_father equals one if the respondent has an immigrant mother and 





Table 3. 1. Marriage Types by the Gender of Children 
  Boys Girls Total 
Native Marriage 
1101   
(65.5%) 
1258       
(66.04%) 





540      
(28.35%) 
1017       
(28.36%) 
Mixed Marriage     
Immigrant Father-Native Mother 
63      
(3.75%) 
60              
(3.15%) 
123         
(3.43%) 
Immigrant Mother-Native Father 
40      
(2.38%) 
47           
(2.47%) 
87           
(2.43%) 
Total 
1681     
(100%) 
1905           
(100%) 
3586       
(100%) 
*Numbers in parentheses are percentage values  
 
Male: Represents the gender of the respondent. This variable takes the value of one 
if the individual is male, and zero if the respondent is female. 
Agechild: Measures the age of the person in years. Individuals who are born before 
1979 and after 1994 are omitted from the sample. The lower cut-off is set in order to 
exclude the individuals who are still at schooling age, as we are interested in 
completed schooling. In order to prevent treating the younger age cohort together 
with the older age cohort, the higher cut-off is applied because the older age cohort 
were facing different conditions in terms of their education.  
Education of parents: The variables for the education of fathers and mothers are 
continuous. They measure the parent’s education in years, in other words, the 
number of years of schooling. They take the value of zero if the parents did not 
attend school. If these variables are missing after merging the different data sets, the 
procedure to create these variables that are defined in the survey paper (SOEP 
Group, 2014) is applied to replace those missing values14. Table 3.2 presents the 
                                                 
14 Years of education=years of schooling + years of occupational training. ‘Schooling’ equals to 7 if 
no degree; 9 if lower school degree; 10 if intermediary degree, 12 if a professional college; 13 if high 
school degree; 10 if others. ‘Occupational training’ equals 1.5 if apprenticeship; 2 if technical schools 




average years of education of parents. As can be seen from the table, in each case 
the education of the intermarried immigrant parents is higher than that of the 
immigrant-immigrant parents. Moreover, the difference is higher for the immigrant 
mothers. Considering the total sample there is a difference of 1.88 between the 
average years of education of an immigrant mother who is married to a native and 
an immigrant mother who married to another immigrant. The difference is 0.63 
when we compare the average years of schooling of an immigrant father who is 
married to a native and an immigrant father who married to another immigrant. 
Finally, the education of parents who are both native is the highest among the whole 
sample.  The average years of schooling of a native father/mother who is married to 
a native mother/father is higher than a native father/mother who is married to an 
immigrant mother/father. 
Table 3. 2. Education of Parents by Marriage Type 
  Boys Girls Total 
  Avg. Yrs. of Educ. Avg. Yrs. of Educ. Avg. Yrs. of Educ. 
  Mother Father Mother Father Mother Father 












Immigrant Marriage 9.51   
(.14) 
9.94   
(.14) 
9.50   
(.14) 
9.88   
(.14) 
9.50   
(.10) 
9.91   
(.10) 





























*Standard errors are shown in the parentheses  
 
Parents’ religion: Father’s and mother’s religious affiliation has three different 
categories; religious, nonreligious and religion not stated. If the father/mother 
belongs to a religious denomination (Catholic, Protestant, Islam, or other religious 
78 
 
communities), they are coded as religious. If they do not belong to any 
denomination, they are classified in the nonreligious group. The “nonreligious” 
category is used as the reference category. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 give the religious 
status of parents by marriage type. As discussed in the literature review, religious 
people are not prone to intermarry. While the “religious” category has the higher 
share for both the intermarried and non-intermarried immigrant fathers, the 
percentage of the “religious” category for the intermarried immigrant mothers and 
native non-intermarried mothers is lower than the percentage of the “not stated” for 
them. 
Table 3. 3. Religion of Father by Marriage Type 









455          
(19.29%) 








357   
(35.10%) 
82             
(8.06%) 






Mixed Marriage      
Immigrant Father-
Native Mother 
40   
(32.52%) 
4               
(3.25%) 








26   
(29.89%) 
7                
(8.05%) 
26   
(29.89%) 
28   
(32.18%)  
87   
(100%) 
*Numbers in parentheses are percentage values  
  
Table 3. 4. Religion of Mother by Marriage Type 









348          
(14.75) % 
960   
(40.70%) 





381   
(37.46%) 
82             
(8.06%) 






Mixed Marriage      
Immigrant Father- 
Native Mother 
41   
(33.33%) 
7               
(5.69%) 
38      
(30.89%) 






33   
(37.93%) 
3                
(3.45%) 
37   
(42.53%) 
14    
(16.09%) 
87   
(100%) 




Parents’ language ability: Parents’ language ability in German is measured 
separately for speaking and writing with three categories; poor, good and native. If 
the speaking/writing ability of the father/mother is very good or good, it is defined 
as ‘good’; and it is defined as ‘poor’ if it is fairly good, poor or not able to speak the 
language at all. If the native language of the father/mother is German, they are coded 
as ‘native’. 
Parents’ length of stay: This variable is a continuous variable, and it measures the 
fathers’ and mothers’ years of stay in the host country. It takes the value of 
father/mother’s age if he/she is not an immigrant.  
Parents’ region of origin: Parents’ country of origin is grouped into four different 
geographical regions; Europe, Asia, America, and Africa. “Africa” is used as the 
reference category. The classification of the United Nations (UN)15 is taken as the 
reference when assigning countries to geographical regions. Table A3.2 illustrates 
the regions in which the countries are located. As for the marriage type variable, 
country of nationality is used when there is no information on the country of origin. 
Disadvantages in school: This variable measures if children experienced 
disadvantages in school due to their country of origin. This variable has four 
categories: often, seldom, never, and native. 
Table A3.3 gives the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study.  
3.4.3. Estimation Methods 
In cases where the dependent variable has more than two categories and each 
category naturally has a rank or meaningful order, the ordered probit model is an 
appropriate econometric method to use.  
The ordered probit model takes the following form: 






′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖
∗ is the latent schooling attainment for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ individual, 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of 
individual characteristics, and 𝜀 is a stochastic error term (𝜀 ~ 𝑁(0,1)). 
For an 𝑚 alternative model, 𝑦𝑖 is defined as: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗 if 𝛼𝑗−1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼𝑗,  𝑗 = 1,2,… . . , 𝑚 
where the 𝛼’s denote the threshold values, and for all the probabilities to be non-
zero 𝛼0 <  𝑎1 < ⋯ < 𝛼𝑚, where 𝛼0 =  −∞ and 𝛼𝑚 =  +∞.  
The conditional probability of observing the 𝑗𝑡ℎ category is: 
Prob(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗) = Prob(𝛼𝑗−1 <  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼𝑗) 
                     = Prob(𝛼𝑗−1 < 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑗) 
                     =Prob (𝛼𝑗−1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 < 𝜀𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
                     =F(𝛼𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) – F(𝛼𝑗−1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
 It is assumed that the stochastic error term, 𝜀, has a standard normal distribution. 
Therefore F is the normal cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) and the 
conditional probability of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ category is: 
Prob(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗) =  Ф(𝛼𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) – Ф(𝛼𝑗−1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
where Ф denotes the standard normal c.d.f. (Greene, 2003; Train, 2003; Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009). 








1 if the child dropped out from school                                                                             
2 if the child does not have a school degree yet                                                            
3 if the child has a secondary school degree                                                                  
4 if the child has an intermediate school degree                                                           
5 if the child has a technical school degree                                                                     






3.5.1. Descriptive Analysis 
Table 3.5 presents descriptive statistics for the sample used in the analysis. This 
table provides information on the mean value of the continuous variables and the 
percentage values of the categorical variables for the different marriage types 
seperately.  
The children of two immigrant parents have the lowest level of education.  Although 
the educational level of children of an immigrant male and a native female is lower 
than the educational level of of children of an immigrant female and a native male, it 
is still higher than the children of two immigrant parents. The children of two native 
parents have the highest level of education. 
As discussed in the literature review, there are parental characteristics which may 
affect both intermarriage rates and schooling levels of their children. Consistent with 
the literature on assortative matching on education, immigrants that marry other 
immigrants have fewer years of schooling than those who marry natives. When we 
consider the marriages of the immigrants, the immigrant females who are married to 
native males have the highest level of education (11.4). Comparing the education 
level of the intermarried immigrant males and the intermarried native males, even 
though there is a very small difference, native males have more years of education 
than immigrant males. The education levels are 10.7 and 10.8 for the immigrant 
males and native males, respectively. In contrast to intermarried males, the 
intermarried immigrant females have slightly longer education than the intermarried 
native females. Among all parents, the native males who are married to native 
















4.753       
(.026) 
3.964           
(.047) 
4.319          
(.125 ) 




Age of child 
26.875       
(.085 ) 
26.165         
(.140) 
24.797       
(.344) 
24.482    
(.395 ) 
Square of age 
738.272    
(4.399 ) 
702.521            
(7.399) 
628.142              
(17.774) 
611.840               
(20.295) 
Male 
0.466       
(.010) 
.469              
(.016) 
.531           
(.047) 
.457             
(.056) 
Missing_disadvantage 
0.013       
(.002) 
0.297           
(.015) 
0.319          
(.044) 
0.531     
(.056) 
Disadvantage_often 
0.011         
(.002) 
0.071           
(.008) 
0.097          
(.028) 
0.062     
(.027) 
Disadvantage_seldom 
0.009        
(.002) 
0.160           
(.012) 
0.115         
(.030) 
0.086     
(.031) 
Disadvantage_never 
0.033       
(.004) 
0.453           
(.016) 
0.319            
(.044) 
0.222     
(.047) 
Disadvantage_native 
0.934       
(.005) 
0.019           
(.004) 
0.150         
(.034) 
0.099     
(.033) 
Father's Characteristics 
Age of father 
56.999     
(.139) 
55.612         
(.272) 
54.973                 
(.644) 
54.704          
(.783) 
Education of father 
12.578     
(.071) 
9.915                 
(.101) 
10.673                 
(.316) 
10.790         
(.370) 
Missing_religion_father 
0.096       
(.006) 
0.457                 
(.016) 
0.407                          
(.046) 
0.321         
(.052) 
Religious father 
0.373         
(.010 ) 
0.354                 
(.016) 
0.336                 
(.045) 
0.272         
(.050) 
Nonreligious father 
0.188       
(.008) 
0.084                 
(.009) 
0.035                 
(.018) 
0.086         
(.031) 
Not stated rel. father 
0.343       
(.010) 
0.105                 
(.010) 
0.221                 
(.039) 
0.321         
(.052) 
Missing_stay_father 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.604                 
(.016) 
0.549                
(.047) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
Father's length of stay 
56.999       
(.139) 
9.770                 
(.462) 
16.363        
(1.832) 
54.704   
(.783) 
Missing_speaking_father 
0.00              
(0.00) 
0.612                 
(.016) 
0.460                 
(.047) 
0.00              
(0.00) 
Good speaking father 
0.00              
(0.00) 
0.191                 
(.013) 
0.310                 
(.044) 
0.00              
(0.00) 
Poor speaking father 
0.00              
(0.00) 
0.141                 
(.012) 
0.071                 
(.024) 
0.00              
(0.00) 
Native language father 
1.00              
(0.00) 
0.055                 
(.008) 
0.159                 
(.035) 
1.00              
(0.00) 
Missing_writing_father 
0.00              
(0.00) 
.621              
(.016) 
.460             
(.047) 
0.00              
(0.00) 
Good writing father 
0.00              
(0.00) 
.140                             
(.011) 
.230              
(.040) 
0.00              
(0.00) 
Poor writing father 
0.00              
(0.00) 
.192                              
(.013) 
.150             
(.034) 
0.00              
(0.00) 
Native language father 
1.00              
(0.00) 
.055                               
(.008) 
.156            
(.035) 
1.00              
(0.00) 
Father's region_europe 
1.00        
(0.00) 
.443                       
(.016) 
.504                 
(.047) 
1.00        
(0.00) 
Father's region_asia 
0.00        
(0.00) 
.519                
(.017) 
.416                  
(.047) 
0.00        
(0.00) 
Father's region_america 
0.00        
(0.00) 
.017                 
(.005) 
.062                 
(.023) 
0.00        
(0.00) 
Father's region_africa 
0.00        
(0.00) 
.021                 
(.005) 
.018                 
(.013) 





Age of mother 
54.164      
(.122) 
52.147                
(.240) 
51.797         
(.616) 
50.68         
(.734) 
Education of mother 
12.294     
(.060) 
9.476                 
(.105) 
11.319         
(.257) 
11.395          
(.314) 
Missing_religion_mother 
0.091         
(.006) 
0.403                    
(.016) 
0.283         
(.043) 
0.161         
(.041) 
Religious mother 
0.352       
(.010) 
0.394                
(.016) 
0.354                
(.045) 
0.370         
(.054) 
Nonreligious mother 
0.141       
(.007) 
0.083                 
(.009) 
0.044                 
(.019) 
0.037         
(.021) 
Not stated rel. mother 
0.416       
(.011) 
0.121                
(.011) 
0.319                 
(.044) 
0.432         
(.055) 
Missing_stay_mother 
0.00        
(0.00) 
0.531                 
(.017) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.198         
(.045) 
Mother's length of stay 
54.164     
(.122) 
10.533                 
(.438) 
51.797                 
(.616) 
24.049         
(1.749) 
Missing_speaking_mother 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.538                 
(.016) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.173         
(.042) 
Good speaking mother 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.213                 
(.014) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.481         
(.056) 
Poor speaking mother 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.194                 
(.013) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.161         
(.041) 
Native language mother 
1.00           
(0.00) 
0.055                     
(.007) 
1.00           
(0.00) 
0.185         
(.043) 
Missing_writing_mother 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.539                 
(.016) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.173         
(.042) 
Good writing mother 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.172                    
(.012) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.420         
(.055) 
Poor writing mother 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.235                        
(.014) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
0.222         
(.047) 
Native language mother 
1.00           
(0.00) 
0.055                      
(.008) 
1.00           
(0.00) 
0.185         
(.043) 
Mother's region_europe 
1.00           
(0.00) 
.468                
(.017) 
1.00           
(0.00) 
.568        
(.055) 
Mother's region_asia 
0.00           
(0.00) 
.495                 
(.017) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
.309        
(.052) 
Mother's region_america 
0.00           
(0.00) 
.019                 
(.004) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
.087         
(.031) 
Mother's region_africa 
0.00           
(0.00) 
.019                
(.004) 
0.00           
(0.00) 
.037       
(.021) 
N 2244 921 113 81 
*Standard deviations are shown in the parentheses 
 
Not surprisingly, the immigrant males/females who are married to native 
females/males have lived in Germany for more years than the immigrant 
males/females who are married to another immigrant. Finally, although there is no 
significant difference in terms of the age of immigrants, the immigrants who marry a 
native are relatively younger than those immigrants who are married to other 
immigrants. Likewise, native males/females who are married to an immigrant are 
relatively younger than the native males/females who are married to another native. 
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As mentioned in the literature review, linguistic ability is another important factor 
that can affect both parents’ marrying preference and children’s educational 
outcomes. Consistent with the literature, the probability of having good speaking 
and writing abilities in the host country’s language is higher for the immigrant 
parents who are married to a native rather than the immigrant parents who are 
married to another immigrant. The difference is higher for the intermarried mothers 
than for non-intermarried mothers. While the proportion of good speaking and 
writing abilities are 48% and 42% respectively for the intermarried immigrant 
females, they are 21% and 17% for the nonintermarried immigrant females.  
Looking at the region that an immigrant comes from, both males and females who 
are married to other immigrants generally come from the countries labelled as Asia 
and Europe. While the percentages of males are 44% and 52% for Europe and Asia 
respectively; the corresponding percentages for females are 47% and 50%. 
However, the proportions of fathers and mothers who are married to a native 
indicate that 50% of intermarried male immigrants and 57% of intermarried female 
immigrants comes from European countries. For the intermarried parents who come 
from Asian countries, these percentages are 42% and 31% for males and females 
respectively. 
Table 3.6 presents the schooling levels of children by the marriage type of their 
parents. As expected, while most of the children of the immigrant-immigrant 
married parents (29%) continue to lower-level schools which do not allow them to 
go on to a higher education, most of the children of the native-native married parents 
(42%) continue to upper-level secondary schools which is a must to go on to the 
university. Considering intermarried parents, those children who have an immigrant 
father married to a native complete lower-level schools more often than those 
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children who have an immigrant mother married to a native. Most of the the children 
whose parents have the immigrant-immigrant and immigrant father-native mother 
marriage type continue to the lower secondary schools.  The share of children who 
hold an upper secondary school degree is almost 37%  for the ones with an 
immigrant mother who is married to a native.  This is the highest proportion within 
this group. Looking at this table, it seems that being an intermarried immigrant 
mother has a more positive effect on the schooling levels of their children than being 
an intermarried immigrant father.  
Table 3. 6. Schooling Levels of Individuals by Marriage Type 
  Total 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Native Marriage 




















296   
(29.11%) 








Mixed Marriage          
Immigrant Father-
Native Mother 
3    
(2.44%) 














1    
(1.15%) 










87   
(100%) 
*Numbers in parentheses are percentage values  
** (1)-(6) represents the dependent variable which defined as:1=dropout, 2=no degree yet, 3=secondary 
school degree, 4=intermediate school degree, 5=technical school degree, 6=upper secondary school 
degree. 
 
3.5.2. Ordered Probit Results 
Table 3.7 presents the coefficients of the ordered probit estimations. The parameter 
estimates of an ordered probit model give information only on the direction of the 
relationships and the statistical significance levels of the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables used in the analysis. In order to examine the magnitude of the 
effects of a change in the explanatory variables on each educational track, the 
marginal effects should be calculated. Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 presents the marginal 
effects of the ordered probit model for different models.  
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The first column of Table 3.7 represents the Model 1 which does not take into 
account parental characteristics. It shows the effect of having an intermarried parent 
on the educational level of respondents when controlling for only a baseline set of 
variables. According to these results, there is a positive and significant relationship 
between having an intermarried parent and the educational level of their children, 
relative to having non-intermarried immigrant parents. Contrary to this result, 
having an intermarried immigrant parent has a negative and significant effect on the 
education of children compared to having two native parents. Even though it is at a 
decreasing rate, age is positively associated with the educational level of children, 
and finally there is a negative relationship between being male and educational 
attainment.  
Starting from the second column of Table 3.7, in addition to the respondent 
characteristics, different parental characteristics are also gradually added to the 
analysis. Models (2) and (3) show that adding the educational characteristics of 
parents to the estimation removes the effect of having an intermarried immigrant 
parent compared to having two native parents. However, the effect still exists 
compared to having two immigrant parents. These models also show that education 
of both fathers and mothers has a positive and significant effect on the education of 
their children. Father’s education seems to be more important than the mother’s 
education, judging by the magnitude of the coefficients. Finally, having religious 
parents does not have any meaningful effect on the education of children compared 
to having nonreligious parents. While having a parent whose religious affiliation is  
not stated has a significant effect on the educational level of the children, it is 
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Table 3. 7. Effect of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; Estimation 
Results for the Ordered Probit Model 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Nativemarriage 0.23***      
(0.08) 
0.04         
(0.08) 
-0.03         
(0.08) 
-0.11          
(0.08) 
-0.15         
(0.13) 
Immigmarriage -0.39***     
(0.08) 
-0.17*        
(0.09) 
-0.17*        
(0.09) 
0.02           
(0.14) 
0.10          
(0.15) 
Child Characteristics 
Age of child 0.21***      
(0.07) 
0.19***        
(0.07) 
0.24***         
(0.07) 
0.24***         
(0.07) 
0.26***        
(0.07) 




-0.00***        
(0.00) 
-0.00***        
(0.00) 
-0.00***        
(0.00) 
Male -0.16***     
(0.04) 
-0.20***        
(0.04) 
-0.21***         
(0.04) 
-0.21***        
(0.04) 
-0.21***        
(0.04) 
Father's Characteristics 
Age of father - 0.06          
(0.08) 
0.05          
(0.05) 
0.05          
(0.04) 
0.04          
(0.04) 
Age square of father - -0.00        
(0.00) 
-0.00         
(0.00) 
-0.00          
(0.00) 
-0.00          
(0.00) 
Education of father - 0.10***         
(0.01) 
0.09***         
(0.01) 
0.09***         
(0.01) 
0.10***         
(0.01) 
Missing_religion_father - - -0.1           
(0.12) 
-0.09        
(0.15) 
-0.09        
(0.15) 
Religious father - - 0.13          
(0.08) 
0.12          
(0.08) 
0.12          
(0.08) 
Not stated rel. father - - 0.40***         
(0.09) 
0.38***        
(0.09) 
0.38***         
(0.09) 
Missing_stay_father - - - -0.06        
(0.24) 
-0.03        
(0.25) 
Father's length of stay - - - 0.00          
(0.00) 
0.00          
(0.00) 
Missing_speaking_father - - - 0.07          
(0.20) 
0.02          
(0.20) 
Good speaking father - - - 0.12          
(0.15) 
0.09          
(0.15) 
Native language father - - - 0.14          
(0.19) 
0.17          
(0.20) 
Missing_writing_father - - - (omitted) (omitted) 
Good writing father - - - -0.03          
(0.15) 
-0.01               
(0.15) 
Native language father - - - (omitted) (omitted) 
Father's region_europe - - - - 0.71*        
(0.43) 
Father's region_asia - - - - 0.70            
(0.44) 
Father's region_america - - - - 0.98*        
(0.53) 
Mother's Characteristics 
Age of mother - -0.00         
(0.05) 
0.01          
(0.05) 
0.01           
(0.05) 
0.01          
(0.05) 
Age square of mother - 0.00          
(0.00) 
0.00          
(0.00) 
-0.00          
(0.00) 
-0.00          
(0.00) 
Education of mother - 0.08***         
(0.01) 
0.08***         
(0.01) 
0.08***         
(0.01) 
0.08***          
(0.01) 
Missing_religion_mother - - 0.02          
(0.13) 
0.10           
(0.16) 
0.11          
(0.16) 
Religious mother - - 0.11          
(0.09) 
0.1            
(0.09) 




Not stated rel. mother - - -0.18*        
(0.09) 
-0.17*        
(0.10) 
-0.18*        
(0.10) 
Missing_stay_mother - - - 0.08           
(0.24) 
0.07          
(0.25) 
Mother's length of stay - - - 0.01           
(0.01) 
0.01          
(0.01) 
Missing_speaking_mother - - - 1.08           
(1.07) 
1.25          
(1.07) 
Good speaking mother - - - 0.24*        
(0.14) 
0.19          
(0.14) 
Native language mother - - - -0.03        
(0.19) 
-0.1          
(0.19) 
Missing_writing_mother - - - -1.13        
(1.06) 
-1.26        
(1.06) 
Good writing mother - - - -0.11         
(0.13) 
-0.08        
(0.13) 
Native language mother - - - (omitted) (omitted) 
Mother's region_europe - - - - -0.70          
(0.43) 
Mother's region_asia - - - - -0.88**        
(0.44) 
Mother's region_america - - - - -0.73               
(0.53) 
Log-likelihood -5104.2329  -4423.0804 -4395.8952 -4387.4222  -4376.0682 
LR chi2 278.35 900.54 954.91 971.85  982.03 
N 3586 3364 3364 3364 3359 
+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses 
 
difficult to make any comments about this variable, as they can be either religious or 
nonreligious. Finally, when adding the language abilities of parents to the estimation 
(Model (4)) having a mother whose speaking ability is good rather than poor has a 
positive effect on the education of their children. However, this effect becomes 
insignificant when adding regional dummies to the model (Model (5)). 
Table 3.8 presents the marginal effects of the ordered probit model for Model (1). 
The Marginal effects indicate that relative to those children who have intermarried 
parents if a child has immigrant-immigrant parents, this decreases the probability of 
holding an upper secondary school degree by 14 percentage points and increases the 
probability of dropping out by 2 percentage points. However being the child of a 
native-native parent rather than being a child of intermarried parents increases the 
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probability of holding an upper secondary school degree by 8 percentage points and 
decreases the probability of dropping out by 1 percentage points. 
Table 3. 8. Effect of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; Marginal 


















































































+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses 
 
Table 3.9 presents the marginal effects for the second model. Upon adding the 
parental education and age characteristics, the effect of having two native parents 
relative to having intermarried parents disappeares. However, even though the 
magnitude is diminished, the effect of having two immigrant parents compared to 
having intermarried parents is still significant at the 10% level. Relative to those 
children who have intermarried parents, If a child has two immigrant parents, this 
decreases the probability of holding an upper secondary school degree by 5 
percentage points and increases the probability of dropping out by 1 percentage 
point. The results indicate that parental education is associated with the school 
attainment of their children. However, the marginal effects indicate that it cannot be 
said that fathers’ education is more or less important than the education of mothers. 
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A one year increase, for example, in the education of both fathers and mothers 
increases the probability of holding an upper-level secondary school degree by 3 
percentage points. 
Table 3. 9. Effect of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; Marginal 






















-0.01   
(0.014) 



























































-0.01   
(0.007) 




















































-0.00    
(0.00003) 



















+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses 
 
Table 3.10 presents the marginal effects for the Model 5. When controlling for all of 
the parental characteristics and regional variables, the effect of both having two 
native parents and having two immigrant parents compared to having intermarried 




Table 3. 10. Effect of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; Marginal 
























-0.01      
(0.01) 
0.0002     
(0.002) 
0.03     
(0.05) 
Child Characteristics 







-0.02***     
(0.01) 
0.004***     
(0.001) 
0.08***     
(0.02) 







0.0004***     
(0.0001) 
-0.0001***     
(0.00002) 









0.02***     
(0.003) 
-0.004***     
(0.001) 
-0.07***     
(0.01) 
Father's Characteristics 







-0.003     
(0.003) 
0.001     
(0.001) 
0.01     
(0.01) 







0.00002     
(0.00003) 
0.00     
(0.00) 
-0.0001     
(0.0001) 







-0.01***     
(0.001) 
0.002***     
(0.0002) 
0.03***     
(0.002) 








-0.01      
(0.01) 
0.002     
(0.001) 
0.04     
(0.03) 







-0.03***     
(0.01) 
0.01***     
(0.01) 
0.12***     
(0.03) 
Missing_stay_father 0.001 (.01) 0.001 (.01) 0.005 (.04) 0.002     (.02) -0.001(.004) -0.01 (0.08) 







-0.0001     
(0.0003)  
0.00002     
(0.0001) 
0.0003     
(0.002) 
Missing_speaking_father (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 







-0.01      
(0.01) 
0.002     
(0.003) 
0.03     
(0.05) 







-0.01      
(0.02) 
0.003     
(0.003) 
0.05     
(0.06) 
Missing_writing_father (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 







0.001     
(0.01) 
-0.0001     
(0.003) 
-0.002     
(0.05) 
Native language father (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Father's region_europe -0.04 (.02) -0.03 (.02) -0.12* (.07) -0.06*     (.03) 0.01  (0.01) 0.22* (.14) 








-0.08*      
(.04)  
0.02*     
(.01) 
0.31*     
(.17) 
Mother's Characteristics 







0.00       
(0.04) 
0.0002     
(0.001) 
0.004     
(0.02) 







0.00     
(0.0003) 
0.00     
(0.00) 
-0.00002     
(0.0001) 







-0.01***     
(0.001) 
0.001***     
(0.002) 
0.02***     
(0.003) 








-0.01      
(0.01) 
0.002     
(0.001) 
0.03     
(0.03) 







0.01*     
(0.01) 
-0.003*     
(0.002) 
-0.06*     
(0.03) 
Missing_stay_mother -0.003(.01) -0.003(.01) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02) 0.001 (.004) 0.02  (0.08) 







-0.0001     
(0.0004)  
0.0001     
(0.0001) 
0.002     
(0.002) 
Missing_speaking_mother (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Good speaking mother -0.01 (.01) -0.01 (.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.01     (0.01) 0.003 (.002) 0.06 (.04) 
Native language mother 0.005 (.01) 0.004 (.01) 0.02  (.03) 0.01  (0.02) -0.002(.003) -0.03 (.06) 
Missing_writing_mother (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Good writing mother 0.004 (.01) 0.003 (.01) 0.01  (.02) 0.01       (.01) -0.001(.002) -0.03   (.04) 
Native language mother (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Mother's region_europe 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.12  (0.07) 0.05      (0.03) -0.01  (0.01) -0.22 (0.14) 
Mother's region_asia 
0.04* (.02) 0.04* (.02) 0.15** .07) 0.07**   (.03) -0.02*  (.01) 
-
0.28**(.14) 
Mother's region_america 0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) 0.12  (0.09) 0.06      (0.04) -0.01  (0.01) -0.23 (0.17) 
N 3359 
+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses 
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Looking at Table 3.5, which shows the descriptive statistics by marriage type, we 
can see that the immigrant fathers/mothers who marry another immigrant are 
different to the immigrant fathers/mothers who marry a native. Moreover, the table 
also provides evidence that the immigrant fathers who marry a native and the 
immigrant mothers who marry a native also have different characteristics. Therefore, 
the analysis is also distinguished between the types of intermarriage. Table 3.11 
presents the coefficients of the ordered probit estimation by distinguishing between 
native mother-immigrant father and native father-immigrant mother marriages.  
Table 3. 11. Effect of Types of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; 
Estimation Results of the Ordered Probit Model (Ref. Category: native-native 
marriage) 







 0.11   
(0.20) 
0.23     
(0.21) 
Native_father -0.12   
(0.12) 
0.09     
(0.12) 








-0.12   
(0.10) 
-0.06   
(0.11) 
-0.30   
(0.23) 
-0.30   
(0.25) 
Log-likelihood -5103.3707 -4422.1466  -4395.1144 -4385.2669  -4373.8896 
LR chi2 280.08 902.40 956.47 976.16 986.39 
N 3586 3364 3364 3364 3359 
+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. 
+++Column (1) is the baseline estimation, and the Columns (2)-(5) are the different specifications of the 
baseline estimation 
 
As explained before, intermarried immigrant males and intermarried immigrant 
females have different characteristics. Therefore it is not surprising that they have 
different effects on child education for all Models. Table 3.11 indicates that if the 
parental characteristics are not taken into account, having an immigrant mother-
native father does not have a significant effect on the education compared to having 
a native-native married parent. However, having an immigrant father-native mother 
is associated negatively with the education. On the other hand, when all the parental 
characteristics are controlled for, the results are changed.  Compared to having a 
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native-native parent, having immigrant mother-native father is associated positively 
with education while having an immigrant father-native mother does not have any 
significant relationship with education.  
 According to Table 3.11, if the parental characteristics are not taken into account, 
the type of intermarriage does not change the results in terms of the direction of the 
relationship relative to immigrant-immigrant parents. Compared to immigrant-
immigrant married parents having an immigrant-native parent has a positive and 
significant16 relationship with education. Upon considering the age and educational 
characteristics of parent (Model (2)), while having an intermarried immigrant 
mother is associated positively with education, having an intermarried immigrant 
father does not have any significant relationship with education. Finally, when all 
the characteristics of parents are controlled for, only having an intermarried father 
has a meaningful but negative effect on the education of children compared to 
having an immigrant-immigrant parent.  
Table 3.12 indicates that compared to native-native parents, having an immigrant 
mother-native father increases the probability of holding an upper-level secondary 
school degree by 19 percentage points and decreases the probability of dropping out 
from school by 3 percentage points. However, there is no meaningful difference 
between having a native-native parent and having an immigrant father-native 
mother.  
According to Table 3.12, compared to immigrant-immigrant parents, having an 
immigrant father-native mother decreases the probability of holding an upper-level 
secondary school degree by 17 percentage points and increases the dropping out 
                                                 
16 The information on the significance of the difference cannot be drawn from Table 3.11. It is found 
by looking at the estimation results of the ordered probit model when the immigrant-immigrant 
parents are the reference category. These results are not reported in the study.  
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from school by 3 percentage points17. However, there is no meaningful difference 
between having an immigrant-immigrant parent and having an immigrant mother-
native father.  
Table 3. 12. Effect of Types of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; Marginal Effects 





















































N 3359 3359 3359 3359 3359 3359 
+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. 
+++ All the parental characteristics are controlled for. 
 
3.5.3. Disadvantages in School 
As shown in Table 3.6, 42% of respondents with a native-native parents hold an 
upper level secondary school degree. However, this percentage drops to 21% for the 
respondents with immigrant-immigrant parents. While the share of upper level 
degree holders for respondents who have an immigrant father and a native mother is 
27%, it is 32% for respondents who have an immigrant mother and a native father. 
By looking at these raw descriptives statistics, it seems that there is a large disparity 
in education, and the students who struggle most in school and are least likely to 
continue to higher education are the children of immigrants. 
                                                 
17 These figures are obtained by looking at the coefficients of immigrant-immigrant marriage and 
immigrant father-native mother marriage on the Table 3.12. However, the information on the 
significance of the difference cannot be drawn from Table 3.12. It is found by looking at the 
estimation results of the ordered probit model when the immigrant-immigrant parents are the 
reference category. These results are not reported in the study. 
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It is argued in the literature that the reason children of immigrants perform worse in 
school is the lower socio-economic background of their parents. However, focusing 
only on children and parental characteristics may neglect what children experienced 
in the school environment, which is one of the most important factors that affect the 
students’ educational attainment and achievements. Bucerius (2014) states that 
children from an immigrant background, particularly second-generation immigrants 
and boys, face serious disadvantages within the German education system, and even 
if students with an immigrant background have a similar or better academic 
achievement than their native peers, they are more likely to be recommended for 
lower level school tracks. As intermarriage decreases cultural and social differences 
between immigrants and native parents, the children from such marriages will 
probably take characteristics from both of their parents. Therefore, it is expected that 
they are going to share more common characteristics with native children than the 
children of two immigrant parents, and compared to the children of two immigrant 
parents they are less likely to be exposed to discrimination/disadvantage due to their 
country of origin, if there is any. 
Table A3.4 presents the coefficients of the ordered probit estimations with the 
models (1)-(5) after additionally controlling also for whether the children 
experienced any disadvantages in school due to their country of origin, and Table 
3.13 and Table 3.14 present the marginal effects. To be specific, Table 3.13 presents 
the results for the disadvantages-variables-added Model (1) and Table 3.14 presents 
the results for the disadvantages-variables-added the Model (5). While having a 
native-native parent was positively associated with holding upper-secondary level 
degree and negatively associated with dropping out of school, after controlling also 
for the ‘disadvantages’ variables, these effects disappear. This implies that having 
96 
 
experienced disadvantage at school is why the children of intermarried parents do 
worse than native children. Regarding the disadvantages coefficients there does not 
seem to be much difference across categories of disadvantage in their effect on 
education. Those children who suffer disadvantages often are 14% less likely to 
continue to upper secondary school and 2% more likely to dropout.  
Table 3. 13. Effect of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; Marginal 









































































































































3586 3586 3586 3586 3586 3586 
+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. 
 
Table 3.14 shows that adding the ‘disadvantages’ variables to Model (5) changes 
only the significance of the ‘native marriage’ coefficient. Before adding the 
‘disadvantages’ variable there was no meaningful difference between having an 
intermarried parent and a native-native parent (see Table 3.10), according to Table 
3.14, compared to having an intermarried parent, having a native-native parent 
actually decreases the probability of holding an upper-level secondary school degree 
after controlling for disadvantages.  
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Table 3. 14. Effect of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; Marginal 
























0.04    
(0.02) 
0.02       
(0.01) 
-0.004        
(0.003) 







-0.02   
(0.02) 
-0.01      
(0.01) 
0.002        
(0.003) 
0.04        
(0.05) 









0.004***        
(0.001) 
0.08***        
(0.02) 









-.0001***        
(0.00002) 











-0.004***        
(0.001) 







0.02    
(0.02) 
0.01       
(0.01) 
-0.002        
(0.002) 







-0.01   
(0.02) 
-0.003        
(0.01) 
0.001        
(0.002) 







-0.03   
(0.02) 
-0.02        
(0.01) 
0.004        
(0.002) 







-0.01   
(0.02) 
-0.004        
(0.01) 
0.001        
(0.002) 
0.01        
(0.04) 
N 
3359 3359 3359 3359 3359 3359 
+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. 
 
Table 3.15 presents the marginal effects of the ‘disadvantages’ variables added to 
Model (5) again but distinguishing between the types of intermarriage. Comparing 
Table 3.12 and Table 3.15, the significance and the magnitude of the marginal effect 
for immigrant father-native mother marriage coefficient does not change. At the 
same time the magnitude of the marginal effect for the immigrant mother-native 
father has increased. According to Table 3.15, relative to having a native-native 
parent, having an immigrant mother and native father increases the probability of 
holding an upper-level secondary school degree by 22 percentage points after 




Table 3. 15. Effect of Types of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; Marginal 






















-0.06   
(0.04)  























0.04       
(0.04) 


















































0.02    
(0.01) 
0.01 (0.01) -0.002 
(0.002) 







-0.01   
(0.02) 











-0.03   
(0.02) 











-0.01    
(0.02) 




0.01    
(0.04) 
N 3359 3359 3359 3359 3359 3359 
+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
++Standard errors are shown in the parentheses 
+++Estimation is controlled for child characteristics, all of the parental characteristics, and 
‘disadvantages in school’ categorical variables 
 
Overall, it is hard to generalize the results and relate them back to the literature both 
because the findings of the current study are mixed and there is no consensus on the 
literature relating the effect of  intermarriage on the educational attainment of 
children. While Furtado (2009), for example, finds that having immigrant father-
native mother increases the probability of dropping out, Van ours and Veenman 
(2010) finds that having immigrant father-native mother is positively associated with 
the educational attainment of children. Moreover, while Furtado (2009) and Van 
ours Veenman (2010) find no meaningful effect of having immigrant mother-native 
father, Ramakrishan (2004) and Chiswick and DebBurman (2004) provide evidence 
of positive effect of having both immigrant father-native mother and immigrant 
mother-native father. Finally Luthra (2010) finds that marrying to a native decreases 
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the immigrant advantage effect and as a result children of intermarried parents 
obtains lower educational attainment. 
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether there is an effect of intermarriage on the educaional 
attainment of children is not easy to answer. Intermarried immigrants may have 
unobserved characteristics that also effect the educational attinment of their 
children. In such a situation, unobserved characteristics of the intermarried 
immigrants may cause an overestimate/underestimate of its true effect. In order to 
deal with this problem some studies used instruments such as group ratio and sex-
ratio. Group ratio mesaures the number of female/male immigrants of a country of 
origin in a certain age group and living in a certain region divided by the total 
number of female/male population in the same age group and living in the same 
region. The second instrument, however, measures the number of female/male 
immigrants of a country of origin in a certain age group and living in a certain 
region divided by the number of male/female immigrants of the same country of 
origin of the same age group and the same region. 
  However in the current study, given the lack of relevant instruments, IV could not 
be applied. Instead, the chapter has attempted to  include in the analysis as many 
control variables as possible, exploiting the rich information in the SOEP data. In a 
further study, the results of this chapter could be tested by using an IV model after 
acquiring additional data on the regional variables.  
In this study, when the background characteristics of parents are not taken into 
account,  having intermarried parents have significant negative and positive effects 
on the educational attainment of children compared to having native-native and 
immigrant-immigrant married parents, respectively. When the parental 
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characteristics are also included in the estimation equation, these significant effects 
disappear for both native-native and immigrant-immigrant marriages. So this 
suggests that it is the caharacteristics of individuals in the different marriage types 
that are driving the differences in children’s education outcomes, rather than the 
type of marriage itself. 
When distinguishing between the types of intermarriage, we could not find any 
significant differences between having an immigrant mother-native father and 
having two immigrant parents. It is shown, however, that having an immigrant 
father-native mother has a significant and negative relationship with the education of 
children compared to having two immigrant parents. Since the findings are not same 
for each type of intermarriage, it appears that these results are not stemming from 
the characteristics of intermarriage but the characteristics of the intermarried fathers 
and intermarried mothers.  
After additionally controlling for whether the child had experienced any 
disadvantages in school due to country of origin, having intermarried parents 
increases the probability of attaining an upper-level secondary school degree 
compared to having native-native parents. This is an important result which shows 
that children from intermarried parents are actually doing better in school than their 
native peers. This result explains that why the children with a migration background 
are doing worse than the children of two native parents.  
In order to develop a strong national education system, disparities in education 
should be eliminated. Reducing inequalities and offering the children of immigrants 
equal opportunities in the education system should be a priortiy for governments to 
integrate them into society, since the participation and attainments in the education 
system are key components for their integration into society and therefore for the 
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future of country. As a suggestion, providing better information to the students both 
with  and without an immigrant background, as well as teachers and instutions, 
observing and reducing discrimination may help to attain equal opportunities in 
education. It is also important to inform parents and students better about the 
German education system, which has different school types for the different 
educational  paths. It is possible that immigrant parents may be aspiring to send their 
children to university but at the same time they might not know that the Gymnasium 
is the main route to university education. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study in this field using a variable 
related to school environment to explain the educational outcomes of second 
generation immigrants versus natives. This is an important contribution, as the  
school environment and obstacles faced in the school will almost certainly have an 
effect on the students’ success in both education and the life after education, so any 




3.7. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
Figure A3. 1. Basic Structure of the Educational System in the Federal 










Table A3. 1. Definition of Variables 
education  =1 if dropout 
=2 if no degree yet 
=3 if secondary school degree 
=4 if intermediate school degree 
=5 if technical school degree 
=6 if upper secondary 
Marriage Type of Parents 
mixedmarriage (ref. cat.) =1 if father/mother is native and mother/father is immigrant 
=0 if otherwise 
nativemarriage =1 if both father and mother is native 
=0 if otherwise 
immigmarriage  =1 if both father and mother is immigrant 
=0 if otherwise 
native_father =1 if father is native and mother is immigrant 
=0 if otherwise 
native_mother =1 if mother is native and father is immigrant 
=0 if otherwise 
Child Characteristics 
agechild Age of the child in years 
age2 Square of the child age 
male Binary variable, =1 if the child is male 
                          =0 if the child is female 
disadvantage_often =1 if children often experienced disadvantages in school 
=0 otherwise 
disadvantage_seldom =1 if children seldom experienced disadvantages in school 
=0 otherwise 
disadvantage_never =1 if children never experienced disadvantages in school 
=0 otherwise 
disadvantage_native (ref. cat.) =1 if the children is native 
=0 otherwise 
missing_disadvantage =1 if the information on disadvantages in school is missing 
=0 otherwise 
Father’s Characteristics 
agefather Age of the father in years 
age2father Square of the father’s age 
edufather Education of father in years 
relfather =1 if father belongs to a denomination 
=0 if otherwise 
notrelfather (ref. cat.) =1 if father does not belong to a denomination 
=0 if otherwise 
narelfather =1 if no answer for father’s denomination 
=0 if otherwise 
missingreligion_father =1 if the information on the father’s religion is missing 
=0 if otherwise 
good_oral_ability_father =1 if father’s speaking ability in German is very good or 
good 
=0  if otherwise 
poor_oral_ability_father (ref. cat.) =1 if father’s speaking ability in German is fairly, poorly or 
not at all  
=0 if otherwise 
native_oral_father =1 if the father’s native language is German 
=0 if otherwise 
missingoral_father =1 if the information on the father’s speaking ability is 
missing 
=0 if otherwise 
good_writing_ability_father =1 if father’s writing ability in German is very good or good 
=0 if otherwise 
poor_writing_ability_father (ref. cat.) =1 if father’s writing ability in German is fairly, poorly or 
not at all  
=0 if otherwise 
native_writing_father =1 if the father’s native language is German 
=0 if otherwise 




=0 if otherwise 
stayfather Length of stay of the immigrant father in years 
father_region_europe =1 if immigrant father comes from European countries 
=0 if otherwise 
 father_region_asia =1 if immigrant father comes from Asian countries 
=0 if otherwise 
father_region_america =1 if immigrant father comes from American countries 
=0 if otherwise 
father_region_africa (ref. cat.) =1 if immigrant father comes from African countries 
=0 if otherwise 
Mother’s Characteristics 
agemother Age of the mother in years 
age2mother Square of the mother’s age 
edumother Education of mother in years 
relmother =1 if mother belongs to a denomination 
=0 if otherwise 
notrelmother (ref. cat.) =1 if mother does not belong to a denomination 
=0 if otherwise 
narelmother =1 if no answer for mother’s denomination 
=0 if otherwise 
missingreligion_mother =1 if the information on the mother’s religion is missing 
=0 otherwise 
good_oral_ability_mother =1 if mother’s speaking ability in German is very good or 
good 
=0  if otherwise 
poor_oral_ability_mother (ref. cat.) =1 if mother’s speaking ability in German is fairly, poorly 
or not at all  
=0 if otherwise 
native_oral_mother =1 if mother’s native language is German 
=0 if otherwise 
missingoral_mother =1 if the information on the mother’s speaking ability is 
missing 
=0 if otherwise 
good_writing_ability_mother =1 if mother’s writing ability in German is very good or 
good 
=0  if otherwise 
poor_writing_ability_mother (ref. cat.) =1 if mother’s writing ability in German is fairly, poorly or 
not at all  
=0 if otherwise 
native_writing_mother =1 if mother’s native language is German 
=0 if otherwise 
missingwriting_mother =1 if the information on the mother’s writing ability is 
missing 
=0 if otherwise 
staymother Length of stay of the immigrant mother in years 
mother_region_europe =1 if immigrant mother comes from European countries 
=0 if otherwise 
 mother_region_asia  =1 if immigrant mother comes from Asian countries 
=0 if otherwise 
mother_region_america =1 if immigrant mother comes from American countries 
=0 if otherwise 
mother_region_africa (ref. cat.) =1 if immigrant mother comes from African countries 











Table A3. 2. Region Classification of the Countries 
Regions Countries 
Europe Germany, Ex-Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Ex-GDR, Austria, France, 
Benelux, Denmark, Great Britain, 
Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Romania, 
Poland, Hungary, Portugal, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Russia, Australia, 
Ireland, Albania, Ukraine, Estonia, 
Latvia, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Belarus, 
Kosovo-Albania, Lithuania, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Eastern-Europe 
Asia Turkey, Korea, Iran, Indonesia, Syria, 
Philippines, India, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Cyprus, Iraq, Sri Lanka, 
China, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, 
Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, Pakistan, Jordan, 
Uzbekistan, Malaysia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Armenia, Palestine, Taiwan, 
Cambodia 
America USA, Chile, Bolivia, Columbia, 
Venezuela, Canada, Cuba, Brazil, Peru, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Puerto Rico, 
Nicaragua, Guyana 
Africa Cap Verde Isl., Ghana, Tunisia, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Morocco, Algeria, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Kenya, 






















Table A3. 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Estimation Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Education 3359 4.518 1.344 1 6 
Independent Variables 
Mixedmarriage 3359 0.058 0.233 0 1 
Nativemarriage 3359 0.668 0.471 0 1 
Immigmarriage 3359 0.274 0.446 0 1 
Native_father 3359 0.024 0.153 0 1 
Native_mother 3359 0.034 0.180 0 1 
Respondent's Characteristics 
Age of child 3359 26.553 4.085 20 33 
Square of age 3359 721.716 217.554 400 1089 
Male 3359 0.466 0.499 0 1 
Missing_disadvantage 3359 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Disadvantage_often 3359 0.031 0.174 0 1 
Disadvantage_seldom 3359 0.056 0.230 0 1 
Disadvantage_never 3359 0.162 0.368 0 1 
Disadvantage_native 3359 0.637 0.481 0 1 
Father's Characteristics 
Age of father 3359 56.495 7.144 35 93 
Education of father 3359 11.740 3.492 0 18 
Missing_religion_father 3359 0.211 0.408 0 1 
Religious father 3359 0.364 0.481 0 1 
Nonreligious father 3359 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Not stated rel. father 3359 0.273 0.446 0 1 
Missing_stay_father 3359 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Father's length of stay 3359 42.627 23.613 0 93 
Missing_speaking_father 3359 0.183 0.387 0 1 
Good speaking father 3359 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Poor speaking father 3359 0.041 0.199 0 1 
Native language father 3359 0.713 0.453 0 1 
Missing_writing_father 3359 0.183 0.387 0 1 
Good writing father 3359 0.046 0.210 0 1 
Poor writing father 3359 0.058 0.233 0 1 
Native language father 3359 0.713 0.453 0 1 
Father's region_europe 3359 0.831 0.375 0 1 
Father's region_asia 3359 0.156 0.363 0 1 
Father's region_america 3359 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Father's region_africa 3359 0.006 0.079 0 1 
Mother's Characteristics 
Age of mother 3359 53.444 6.352 34 76 
Education of mother 3359 11.467 3.176 0 18 
Missing_religion_mother 3359 0.185 0.388 0 1 
Religious mother 3359 0.364 0.481 0 1 
Nonreligious mother 3359 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Not stated rel. mother 3359 0.332 0.471 0 1 
Missing_stay_mother 3359 0.150 0.357 0 1 
Mother's length of stay 3359 41.395 21.425 0 76 
Missing_speaking_mother 3359 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Good speaking mother 3359 0.070 0.255 0 1 
Poor speaking mother 3359 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Native language mother 3359 0.721 0.448 0 1 
Missing_writing_mother 3359 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Good writing mother 3359 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Poor writing mother 3359 0.070 0.255 0 1 
Native language mother 3359 0.721 0.448 0 1 
Mother's region_europe 3359 0.844 0.363 0 1 
Mother's region_asia 3359 0.143 0.350 0 1 
Mother's region_america 3359 0.007 0.084 0 1 




Table A3. 4. Effect of Intermarriage on the Educational Attainment; 
Estimation Results for the Ordered Probit Model with ‘disadvantages’ 
variables 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Nativemarriage 
0.01    
(0.10) 
-0.02    
(0.11)    
0.01    
(0.11)    
-0.16   
(0.14)      
-0.24*   
(0.15)   
Immigmarriage 
-0.33***  
(0.08  ) 
-0.16*   
(0.09 ) 
-0.19**   
(0.09)   
0.04    
(0.14)  
0.13     
(0.15)  
Child Characteristics 
Age of child 
0.21***   
(0.07  ) 
0.20***   
(0.07)   
0.25***  
(0.07)   
0.25***   
(0.07) 
0.26***   
(0.07)  
Square of age 





(0.00)   
-0.00***  
(0.00)  




(0.04)     
-0.20*** 
(0.04)   
-0.21***   
(0.04)  
-0.21*** 
(0.04)   
-0.21***  
(0.04)   
Missing_disadvantage 
-0.16*   
(0.09)       
-0.04   
(0.10)      
-0.01    
(0.10)    
-0.05   
(0.10)  




(0.12)     
-0.17    
(0.12)        
0.10   
(0.14)     
0.05      
(0.14) 




(0.10)   
 0.02   
(0.11)    
0.28**  
(0.12)   
0.23*   
(0.13)    
0.21     
(0.13)   
Disad_never 
-0.42*** 
(0.08)     
-0.13   
(0.09)    
0.13    
(0.10)  
 0.08    
(0.11)    
0.04     
(0.12)   
 Father's Characteristics 
Age of father - 
0.06    
(0.04)     
0.05     
(0.04) 
0.05    
(0.04)  
0.04    
(0.04)   
Age square of father - 
-0.00   
(0.00)     
-0.00   
(0.00)   
-0.00   
(0.00)   
-0.00  
(0.00)     
Education of father - 
0.10***   
(0.01)   
0.10***  
(0.01)  
0.09***   
(0.01) 
0.10***   
(0.01)  
Missing_religion_father - - 
 -0.17   
(0.12)     
-0.17   
(0.16)   
-0.18    
(0.16)  
Religious father - - 
 0.12    
(0.08)   
0.12     
(0.08) 
0.12    
(0.08)   
Not stated rel. father - - 
0.40***  
(0.09)   
0.39***   
(0.09) 
0.39***   
(0.09) 
Missing_stay_father - - - 
-0.06     
(0.24)   
-0.01    
(0.25)   
Father's length of stay - - - 
0.00    
(0.00)   
0.00   
(0.00)   
Missing_speaking_father - - - 
0.12      
(0.20) 
0.09   
(0.20)    
Good speaking father - - - 
0.12    
(0.15)   
0.07    
(0.16)   
Native language father - - - 
0.21      
(0.20) 
0.24    
(0.21)     
Missing_writing_father - - - (omitted)      (omitted)      
Good writing father - - - 
-0.01    
(0.15)   
0.02     
(0.15)   
Native language father - - - (omitted)      (omitted)      
Father's region_europe - - - - 
0.72*     
(0.43)   
Father's region_asia - - - - 
0.67       
(0.44) 
Father's region_america - - - - 
1.00*    
(0.54)   
Mother's Characteristics 
Age of mother - -0.00  0.01     0.01    0.01     
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(0.05) (0.05)    (0.05)  (0.05)  
Age square of mother - 
0.00   
(0.00)     
-0.00    
(0.00)   
-0.00   
(0.00)   
-0.00      
(0.00) 
Education of mother - 
0.08***   
(0.01)  
0.08***   
(0.01)  
0.08***   
(0.01) 
0.08***   
(0.01) 
Missing_religion_mother - - 
0.01    
(0.13)   
0.09     
(0.16)  
 0.11  
(0.16)     
Religious mother - - 
0.11    
(0.09)   
0.10   
(0.09)    
0.08   
(0.09)    
Not stated rel. mother - - 
-0.15   
(0.10)    
-0.16*   
(0.10)   
-0.17*     
(0.10) 
Missing_stay_mother - - - 
0.05    
(0.24)   
0.01      
(0.25) 
Mother's length of stay - - - 
0.01    
(0.01)   
0.01    
(0.01)   
Missing_speaking_mother - - - 
1.02    
(1.07)   
1.19    
(1.07)    
Good speaking mother - - - 
0.26*    
(0.14)   
0.21     
(0.14)   
Native language mother - - - 
0.01     
(0.19)   
-0.05    
(0.20)    
Missing_writing_mother - - - 
-1.02     
(1.06)  
-1.15     
(1.06)   
Good writing mother - - - 
-0.13      
(0.13) 
-0.10    
(0.14)     
Native language mother - - - (omitted)      (omitted)      
Mother's region_europe - - - - 
-0.67    
(0.43)     
Mother's region_asia - - - - 
-0.83*    
(0.44)   
Mother's region_america - - - - 
-0.69     












LR chi2 312.34  905.88 962.57 978.32 989.88 
N 3586 3364 3364 3364 3359 
+*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 





CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEWORK OF CHILDREN, AND 
PARTICIPATION IN CHILD ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In reducing the poverty in a country, human capital improvements play an important 
role. Education is one of the most important elements for human capital 
improvements since it increases the human capital, which has a positive relationship 
with economic development and growth (Barro, 2001). Regarding the effect of 
education on economic development and growth, studies point out that the effect of 
different levels of education differs for developing and developed countries. For 
example, Petrakis and Stamatakis (2002) found that while higher education is 
essential for developed countries, primary and secondary education is more 
important for developing countries. For this reason, it is crucial that children 
participate in primary and secondary schools in developing countries such as 
Turkey. 
Any activities that prevent children from attending school or prevent them sparing 
more time for school-related activities are obstacles that need to be overcome. Child 
labour (both market and non-market) is one of these activities. As in many 
developing countries, child labour is a widespread problem also in Turkey. 
Comparison of the results of the Working Child Survey-2006 and the Working Child 
Survey-2012 show that there has not been much improvement in child labour from 
2006 to 2012. While the employment rate for boys aged 6-17 increased from 7.7% 
to 7.9%, it decreased from 4.0% to 3.7% for girls aged 6-17. In 2012, 364,000 (41%) 
of the children, who are engaged in economic activities and aged 6-17, were 
working more than 45 hours as either a regular/casual employee, self-employed or 
unpaid family worker. A high majority of those children (307,000 children out of 
364,000) are working in a paid job. Considering that an employee cannot work by 
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law more than 45 hours in a week, labour market conditions are very demanding for 
child labourers. 
Some early studies from Turkey (Dayioglu and Assad, 2003; Kiral and Tiras, 2013) 
only considered working in the labour market as child labour. In this study, a 
distinction between market and non-market work is made. This will be a more 
appropriate approach in the context of Turkey because excluding non-market work 
from the analysis will underestimate the extent of girls’ working in particular. From 
this point of view, this chapter aims to get a better understanding of the child labour 
phenomena in Turkey.  
The empirical methodology used in this chapter is discussed in Section 3.4.3 below. 
A multinomial logit model is used and it is extended to allow for a random 
household specific component in the error term. Siblings coming from the same 
household within the sample might share the same unobserved family 
characteristics, which cause the error terms to be correlated for these individuals. 
The reason for allowing a random household specific component in the error term is 
to prevent this problem that may arise (King and Lillard, 1983). To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study, to use the random effects multinomial logit model 
to examine the determinants of children’s participation in different activities. 
Bearing in mind the importance of investing in education, an understanding of the 
factors underlying household decisions regarding the children’s participation in 
different activities other than attending school may be useful for policy makers in 
implementing true strategies to increase the education levels of society by reducing 
the burden of children. From this point of view, the aim of this chapter is to identify 
the relevant determinants of the participation in different child’s activities of girls 
and boys in Turkey using the 2012 Household Labour Force Survey and the 2012 
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Working Child Survey. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt 
to use the 2012 Working Child Survey in the determinants of the child’s 
participation in different activities. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows; Section 2 provides information on 
the structure of the education system and the child labour in Turkey. Section 3 
reviews the background literature focusing on the econometric methodologies of the 
studies and discusses the contributions of the current study. Section 4 describes the 
data, explains the variables used in the analysis and the estimation methods 
employed in this study. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 discusses the 
main findings. 
4.2. THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AND CHILD LABOUR IN TURKEY 
4.2.1. Structure of the Education System  
The Basic Law of National Education, which was issued in 1973, determines the 
general framework of the Turkish National Education System. The Turkish national 
education system consists of two main parts: formal education and informal 
education. Formal education can be defined as the regular education, which is being 
given in schools to individuals of a given age. Formal education includes pre-
primary, primary, secondary and higher education institutions. Informal education 
covers all activities and organisations intended to satisfy the educational needs of 
every individual at any age level and educational background. Informal education 
activities are offered out-of-school. The aim of informal education is to improve 
individuals’ standard of living by teaching them how to read and write and 
developing their current skills. 
Between 1997 and 2012, the formal educational system consisted of pre-school, 
primary, secondary and higher education institutions. Primary education, which 
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takes eight years to complete, is compulsory for everybody and it is free of charge in 
public schools. With the extension of compulsory schooling, the terms “primary 
school” (5 years) and “middle school” (3 years) were removed and the term 
“primary education” (8 years) was introduced. 
In 2012, the act 6287 named as amendment in primary school and public education 
law was introduced. The law introduced strict changes to the structure and 
curriculum of the Turkish education system. By this law, the uninterrupted 8-year 
compulsory school structure was changed with the establishment of a 12-year 
compulsory fragmented system which makes it possible to orient children toward a 
religious vocational middle school in the second 4-year-period and an Anatolian 
high school, a high school of science, a fine arts high school or a vocational and 
technical high school in the third 4-year-period. The starting school age was also 
reduced by the law. Before this law, children who were 72 months of age by the 31st 
of December of that year could enrol in school. This rule has been changed by 
enabling children, who are 66 months of age by the 30th of September, to enrol in 
school. 
Figure 4.1 below presents the organisation of the education system in terms of the 
education levels and age categories.  
Figure 4. 1. Organization of the Education System in Turkey, 2014/2015 
 





4.2.2. Review of Child Labour in Turkey 
Child labour is a serious problem in Turkey like other developing countries. 
Although discussions on child labour arise from time to time, generally necessary 
attention is not paid to it.  For example, while outcomes of household labour surveys 
are announced monthly, the results do not contain child labour surveys.  However 
Turkey has to take necessary precautions against child labour within the framework 
of agreements which are contracted by the International Labour Organization (ILO).  
Since 1992, Turkey is a part of the “International Programme for the Elimination of 
the Child Labour” (IPEC), which was launched by the ILO.  By participating in this 
programme, Turkey aims to eliminate child labour in the long term; and to protect 
working children and improve their working conditions in the short and medium 
terms (TURKSTAT and ILO, 2013). Under this project the first child labour survey 
was conducted in 1994 and later child surveys of Turkey were conducted in 1999, 
2006 and 2012. Comparison of results of the last two child surveys (Table 4.1) 
indicates that there has not been much improvement in child labour.  While the 
employment rate for boys increased from 7.7% to 7.9%, the employment rate for 
girls decreased from 4.0% to 3.7% from 2006 to 2012. 
Table 4. 1. Employment rate of children by gender and age groups 
 Boys Girls 
 6-14 15-17 6-17 6-14 15-17 6-17 
 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 
Employed 
Population 
207 185 425 430 632 614 113 108 213 171 326 279 
Child 
Population 
6286 5794 1906 1981 8192 7775 6192 5592 1880 1880 8072 7472 
Employment 
Rate(%) 
3.3 3.2 22.3 21.7 7.7 7.9 1.8 1.9 11.3 9.1 4.0 3.7 
* TURKSTAT and ILO, 2007; and TURKSTAT and ILO, 2013 
**Numbers are in thousand 




Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show that most of the children engaged in economic 
activities are working in the agriculture sector. This situation is prevalent especially 
for the 6-14 age group boys and for girls in both the 6-14 and 15-17 age groups. 
Since agriculture is one of the most dangerous sectors for children (ILO, n.d.a) it is 
worrying that the highest increase in the share of agriculture happened in the 6-14 
age group categories. 
Figure 4. 2. Branches of economic activities for boys by age groups 
 
*Numbers are in percentages 
**Based on author’s calculations using figures from TURKSTAT and ILO, 2007; and TURKSTAT and ILO, 2013  
 
Figure 4. 3. Branches of economic activities for girls by age groups 
 
*Numbers are in percentages 






















































Table 4. 2. The actual hours of work of children engaged in economic activities (ages 6-17) 
 






  2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 
1-7  
hours 
2        
(0%) 
5       
   (1%) 
2    
  (8%) 
0      
(0%) 
69    
(16%) 
133   
(32%) 
72     
   (8%) 
138 
  (15%) 
8-15 
hours 
17      
(3%) 
18    
    (4%) 
3     
(12%) 
na 
86    
(20%) 
96     
(23%) 
106   
  (11%) 
114  
  (13%) 
16-30 
hours 
63    
(12%) 
87  
    (19%) 
5  
  (19%) 
3    
(30%) 
100    
(24%) 
78     
(19%) 
168   
  (18%) 




15      
(3%) 
14      
  (3%) 
4   
  (15%) 
1    
(10%) 
31       
(7%) 
37      
(9%) 
51    
    (5%) 
51    
   (6%) 
40-45 
hours 
34      
(7%) 
35      
  (7%) 
2       
(8%) 
2    
(20%) 
30      
(7%) 
16      
(4%) 
66    
    (7%) 
53   
    (6%) 
46-54 
hours 
116   
(23%) 
108   
  (23%) 
3    
 (12%) 
1    
(10%) 
11      
(3%) 
16      
(4%) 
130 







199   
  (%42) 
6   
  (23%) 
4    
(40%) 
82     
(20%) 
36       
(9%) 
345   





9        
(2%) 
3      
    (1%) 
0      
 (0%) 
na 
11      
(3%) 
1        
(0%) 
20      
  (2%) 



















*Numbers are in thousand 
** Total numbers may not be correct due to rounding of the numbers. 
***Based on author’s calculations using figures from TURKSTAT and ILO 2007; and TURKSTAT and ILO, 2013 
 
Table 4.2 shows the actual hours worked in a week. According to this table, 32 
percent of the children who are working as an unpaid family worker work less than 
7 hours in a week; and 70 percent of them work 30 hours in a week at most. Despite 
that, 475,000 (50%) of the working children and 364,000 (41%) of the working 
children were working more than 45 hours in 2006 and 2012 respectively as either 
regular/casual employee, self-employed or unpaid family worker. A high majority of 
those children (307,000 children out of 364,000) are working in a paid job. 
Considering that in Turkey, an employee’s total working hours cannot exceed 45 





Table 4. 3. Weekly working hours of children who engage in housework by gender (ages 6-17) 
 Boys Girls Total 
1-7 hours 2959 3053 6012 
8-15 hours 196 738 934 
16-30 hours 84 388 472 
31-39 hours 1 35 37 
40+ hours 3 45 49 
*Numbers are in thousand 
** Based on author’s calculations using figures from TURKSTAT and ILO, 2013 
 
Table 4.3 shows the number of working hours in household chores in 2012. Most of 
the children spend at most 7 hours per week doing housework. According to this 
table the number of hours of housework done by girls is much higher than boys. 
45,000 (1.1%) girl children are engaging in housework for more than 40 hours per 
week. It may be possible to attend school with long hours of work, but both due to 
fatigue and attentiveness in school, and spending less time on homework at home 
will likely affect the learning of children (Assaad et. al., 2010).  
Because enrolment decision is a one-time event and occurs only at the beginning of 
the school year, it is also possible that even though children are enrolled in school, 
they may not actually be attending school (Burkee and Beegle, 2004). In their study, 
Rivera-Batiz and Durmaz (2014) found that one of the reasons for the decreased 
success of Turkish students in The Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) is increasing student absenteeism. Therefore child labour must be a priority 
for policy makers. 
4.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.3.1. Child Labour 
Child labour is difficult to define since it is a complex phenomenon and there is no 
universally accepted definition of it. The purpose of this section is to review how 
child labour is defined in related studies. 
According to the ILO not all types of work have negative effects on children. 
Therefore the ILO makes a distinction between work to be eliminated and beneficial 
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work. Child labour is defined as work that worsens children’s physical, mental, 
moral or social development. If work does not interfere with a child’s schooling nor 
affects a child’s personal development and health, it is considered as positive. This 
is a narrow definition of child labour since it includes only market work and 
housework is not included in this definition. Housework is considered as a type of 
work that enhances the children’s and their families’ welfare (ILO, n.d.b).  
On the other hand, The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) makes a more 
broad definition of child labour. Work is defined as child labour if it exceeds; 1 hour 
of economic work or 28 hours of household work per week for children aged 
between 5 and 11 years, 14 hours of economic work or 28 hours of household work 
per week for children aged between 12 and 14 years, and 43 hours of economic or 
household work per week for children aged between 15 and 17 years (Fassa et. al., 
2010).  
Most of the child labour and schooling literature has focused on the traditional 
definition of child labour and thus only focused on labour force participation (Lodhi 
et al., 2011; Dayioglu and Assaad, 2003; Gunnarsson et al., 2006). They assume that 
the lost value of a child’s labour is the opportunity cost of attending school by 
treating schooling as the only alternative to work in the labour market (Burke and 
Beegle, 2004; Emerson and Souza, 2008).  
However it is important to note that child labour can cover activities other than paid 
jobs. Household chores, for example, are a part of children’s life in many parts of 
the world. It is likely to be the most prevalent kind of child labour. Therefore, it is 
also possible to define child labour as including time spent on household activities, 
which are not directly related to income earning activities. From one point of view, 
children may benefit from working at home as they will gain attitudes and personal 
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qualities such as responsibility and dependability, which are likely to affect their 
future achievements. Moreover they will learn how to use their time wisely. From 
another point of view, doing housework may also require them to give up other 
productive activities such as gaining an education, doing homework, studying or 
working in the labour market (Wikle, 2014).  
Zapata et al., (2011); Edmonds (2008); Levision, Moe and Knaul (2001); Kurosaki 
et al. (2006); Assaad et al., (2001); Moyi (2011) included housework in their 
analysis. Based on the definition of work a significant gender bias may occur. In 
order to avoid this bias happening, Assaad et al., (2001), for example, make different 
work definitions to be used in the analyses of girls and boys; inclusive work 
(includes housework, agriculture and animal husbandry, and market work), 
exclusive work (includes agriculture and animal husbandry, and market work ) and 
market work (includes only market work). While they use the inclusive work 
definition for girls, they used the market work definition for boys. Similarly, Kruger, 
et al. (2010) defined three activities; attending school, working, and a combination 
of school and work. They run separate analyses for their two different work 
definitions; including only market activities, and including both market and 
housework activities. 
In the current study a broader definition of child labour is adopted. One reason for 
this is to become able to include a large number of children who engage in 
household chores. Excluding housework from the definition of child labour would 
underestimate the burden on the children. This is especially the case for girls, since 
worldwide housework is mostly carried out by girls (Biggeri et al., 2003; Cigno and 
Rosati, 2002). The other reason for including housework in the child labour 
definition is that the determinants of children’s participation in market work and 
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family or housework may differ from each other (Webbink et al., 2010) and 
therefore it is important to examine the factors that affect children’s participation 
choices in different child labour types. 
4.3.2. Theoretical Discussion 
Two approaches are used in the literature to study the joint allocation of time within 
the family: the household production model, and the collective model. The most 
common model used in analysing the participation decision to the multiple activities 
of children is the standard household production model which is introduced by 
Becker (1965). The standard household model (which is also called the ‘unitary’ 
model) assumes that a household acts as a single decision-making unit. That is, 
either family members have the same preferences and agree completely regarding 
the choices or there is a dictator within the family who takes all the decisions. 
Contrary to the unitary model of household decision-making, the collective model 
rejects the common utility function and allow for differences in individual 
preferences by assuming that a household consists of several individuals with 
different utility functions. The collective model can be separated into two broad 
categories (Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1994): cooperative setting and non-
cooperative setting. The non-cooperative setting (bargaining approach) assumes that 
the decision of the allocation of household resources is the consequence of a 
bargaining process which depends on the bargaining strength of individual 
household members who aim to allocate the resources to the goods they individually 
prefer. In the bargaining model family members do not cooperate and act like there 
is a game between them. On the other hand, a cooperative setting does not make any 
assumption relating to the decision process, and only assumes that the outcomes of 
the household decisions are Pareto efficient. 
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The decision to alocate the children to the multiple activities will differ depending 
on whether households behave as in the unitary model or the collective model. A 
household consisting of several individuals with different preferences does not 
always behave as a single rational decision maker. Because the utilities of different 
household members differ, they have different preferences over different choices 
and therefore they may have different impacts. In order to analyze the factors 
affecting the decision-making process, it is necessary to depart from the unitary 
household model. 
In the current study, it is assumed that a household is described as a group of 
individuals (instead of a single decision maker/household head), each of whom is 
characterized by particular preferences, and among whom a collective decision 
process takes place. That is, a household structure consisting of a mother, a father 
and n children who can be sons or daughters is considered. Additionally, it is 
assumed that all the relevant decisions are made by parents. The decision of the 
parents regarding child activities is influenced by any child, individual, household 
and community characteristic. 
4.3.3. Estimation Issues 
Most researche undertakes separate analyses for the estimations of schooling and 
work by estimating a linear probability, logit or probit models. For example, 
Dayioglu and Assaad (2003) applied a probit model in order to examine the 
determinants of child labour in urban Turkey; and Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu 
(2007) also applied a probit model to examine the determinants of school enrollment 
in Kenya. However, a child who attends school might also engage in market work or 
non-market work or even might combine them. Therefore, as it is argued in Patrinos 
and Psacharopoulos (1997), schooling and child labour decisions are naturally not 
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mutually exclusive. As a result, researchers have started to include the work decision 
in order to analyze schooling and child labour jointly; and have applied empirical 
methods in order to analyze the correlations between schooling and other 
alternatives to schooling. 
The bivariate probit model is one method that can be applied to consider both only 
schooling and only working. Kamga (2011) estimates a bivariate probit model to 
examine the relationship between child work hours and school performance. 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) also use a bivariate probit model to analyze the 
determinants of child labour in conjunction with schooling for Ghana by treating 
schooling and working as two interdependent activities. Zapata et al. (2011) is 
another example of a study using the bivariate probit model. They used data from 
Bolivia to examine the work and schooling decisions of children.  
When the dependent variable takes the form of several unordered activities, other 
approaches that can be applied are the multinomial logit (MNL) model and the 
multinomial probit (MNP) model. MNL is simpler but imposes the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, which will be defined later in the 
methodology section (Greene, 2003). MNP is more flexible since it does not make 
the assumption of IIA. Lodhi et al. (2011) analyzed the determinants of children’s 
participation in different activities in Pakistan by using the MNP model. In addition 
to attending secular school, they defined four other categories; religious education, 
child labour, attending secular school and child labour, and inactivity. Moyi (2011); 
Levision, Moe and Knaul (2001); Levision and Moe (1998) used MNL in their 
analysis to explore the determinants of children’s participation in school and/or 
market/non-market work.  
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There are also other studies using alternative estimation methods such as the 
generalized ordered logit model. The ordered logit model depends on an ordering of 
activities. Thus, it assumes that parents order their preferences on child activities 
from worst to best. Kruger et al. (2010) apply a generalized ordered logit model in 
order to analyse the relationship between all possible time allocation patterns of 
children. In this study, parents prefer the ‘schooling only’ option to ‘working and 
schooling’; and ‘working with schooling’ is preferred to the ‘working only’ option. 
Therefore schooling only, working with schooling, and working only are defined as 
best, intermediate and worst outcome respectively. In order to order these activities, 
two principles are considered; the welfare of the child and the child’s contribution to 
household income.  
All the models above assume that the choice between alternatives is made 
simultaneously. However, there are also studies which assume that households 
consider a sequential decision-making process. Grootaert and Patrinos (1999), for 
example, used a sequential probit model to examine the determinants of child labour 
in four countries - Côte Ivoire, Colombia, Bolivia and Philippines. With sequential 
decision making, a choice is made between sending children to school (preferred 
option) and all other options. If the household does not choose the preferred option, 
then the next step will be to make a decision between the second best and the 
remaining options. This process continues until no alternative remains.  
In the current study, it is assumed that time allocation decisions are simultaneous 
and they are unordered. The MNL model is a good starting point for this kind of 
study. Therefore the MNL model is applied, and in order to relax the IIA assumption 
and compare the results with the multinomial logit model a random effect 
multinomial logit model is also applied.  
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This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, in terms of the 
methodology used to analyze the determinants of child participation in different 
activities, this study uses a random effect multinomial logit model in addition to the 
standard multinomial logit model to relax the IIA assumption. To the best of my 
knowledge this is the first study that uses this methodology in this literature. Second, 
most of the studies consider only schooling and working in the labour market. In this 
study housework is also considered as one of the alternatives to schooling. We 
investigate different thresholds of housework intensity for the 6-14 age group and 
whether decisions vary according to the family’s characteristics. To the best of my 
knowledge this is the first study that includes housework in child time allocation 
decisions using data from Turkey. 
4.4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1. Data 
The 2012 Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS-2012) for Turkey and the 2012 
Working Child Survey (WCS-2012) for Turkey are used in this study.  The WCS 
was administered to 27,118 children whose age is between 6 and 17, in 15,538 
households. The surveyed households were located in 26 sub-regions (NUTS2) of 
Turkey. The survey is nationally representative with 3,931 households from rural 
and 11,607 households from urban areas. 
The questions of the WCS are grouped into three categories. The first category 
contains questions related to labour force status (i.e. whether the child is working, 
status in employment, hours of working, monthly earnings, and reason for working). 
The second group of questions is related to the education of the child such as 
whether they are attending school, reasons for non-attendance, last school and class 
attended. Having measures of educational outcomes such as grades received and test 
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scores would be useful, however this information is not available in the dataset. 
Finally, the third category contains questions related to housework. The housework 
section includes the question of whether children helped doing household chores 
such as shopping, cooking, house cleaning, laundry, childcare and collecting water, 
as well as the total amount of time spent on all housework activities. 
Since the WCS was conducted with the same households who were selected for the 
HLFS, it is possible to match the two data sets by using the household number, 
which is unique for each household. The WCS contains information on children’s 
characteristics but not information on their parents such as parents’ education and 
income which is in the HLFS. The unique data set, which is created by merging the 
two data sets, is suited to the analysis because it contains detailed information on 
both parents and their children, which constitutes a crucial part in examining the 
participation decisions of children in different activities.  
In this study, the dataset is split into two age groups (6-14 and 15-17 age groups) 
and analyzed separately.  For the 6-14 age group, those children who work in the 
labour market, doing only housework and participating in none of the activities are 
dropped from the analysis. The reason for dropping the children who work in the 
labour market is because there are too few children. Only 2.4% of (475 children out 
of 19,815 children) children in the data engage in labour market. And the reason for 
dropping the children who do ‘only housework’ is to investigate how the intensity of 
housework is affected by the children’s and family’s characteristics. The comparison 
was only possible when the amount of housework of the school-attending children 
was taken into consideration. There are 191 children in this category. The number of 
children who participate in none of the activities is 250. As a result, the final sample 
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includes 9,306 girls and 9,593 boys for the 6-14 age group; and 3,382 girls and 
3,577 boys for the 15-17 age group. 
The age restrictions related to the unit of analysis are determined according to the 
aims of the study and the structure of the education system in Turkey. We restrict 
the sample to ages 6-14 and 15-17 to adhere to the ILO definition of a child 
labourer. According to the ILO the minimum age for working should not be below 
the age for finishing compulsory schooling. Another reason is that these two age 
groups differ from each other in terms of work done. Therefore it was crucial to 
define separate activities for each age group. 
The objective of this study is to explore the socioeconomic factors that affect 
demand for school attainment versus alternative activities by considering housework 
as a possible child activity. 
4.4.2. Variable Construction and Definition 
Table A4.1 gives an overview of the dependent and independent variables used in 
this study. However it is needed to explain some of them in more detail. 
4.4.2.1. Dependent Variables 
As stated in the data section, the data set is split into two groups by age and different 
choice variables defined for each age group.  
Activity6_14: In order to construct this variable, those children who are working and 
those who are neither attending school nor work nor doing housework are dropped 
from the sample. The choice variable takes the value of one if the child attends only 
school and does no housework. It takes the value of two, three and four respectively 




Activity15_17: Child labour is separated into two categories as market and non-
market child labour. Therefore, 6 activities are considered in this category. The 
choice variable takes the value of one if the child attends only school. It takes the 
value of two and three, respectively if the child only works in the labour market and 
only does housework. It takes the value of four if the child both attends school and 
works. It takes the value of five if the child both attends school and does housework. 
Finally it takes the value of six if the child neither attends school nor works nor does 
housework. The last category is defined as inactivity. Although parents do not 
actually choose ‘inactivity’, it may be a defacto choice so that parents are forced to 
embrace it due to economic or other constraints (Lodhi et al., 2011). 
4.4.2.2. Independent Variables 
male: Represents the gender of the child. This variable takes the value of one if the 
child is male, and zero if the child is female. It is emphasized in the literature that 
while boys are more likely to engage in the labour market, girls are more likely to 
engage in housework (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1995; Psacharopoulos and 
Arriagada,1989). Also, boys are more likely to go to school than girls (Nielsen, 
1998; Tansel, 2002). 
agechild: measures the age of the child in years. The empirical studies reviewed in 
the literature review show consistent results with each other and the results are as 
expected in terms of child’s age. It is found that as children get older, it is less likely 
that they only attend school without working - both market work and housework - 
(Kruger et al., 2010) 
extended, adult, sibling: Responsibilities of children are affected by the presence of 
others in the household who can do labour force work, housework and childcare. For 
example, having an infant at home reduces the child’s availability for school and 
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other activities, as infants require a constant attention of older children or adults 
(Assaad et al., 2001). Kruger et al. (2010) found that while the presence of siblings 
aged 0-5 decreases the probability of a child to only attend school, the presence of 
an elderly family member aged 60 or over increases the probability of a child to only 
attend school. 
In the current study, the ‘extended’ variable takes the value of one if at least three 
generations are living together in the household, and zero otherwise. The ‘adult’ 
variable represents the number of family members aged 15 or over. Finally, the 
‘sibling’ variable represents the number of family members aged 5 or younger. 
education of parents: In this study father’s and mother’s education have five 
different categories; have no qualifications, five years primary school, eight years 
primary school, secondary school, and university degree. The ‘have no 
qualifications’ category is used as the reference category.  
In the empirical literature, there is ample evidence that the education of parents 
affects their decision to send their children to school or the labour market. It is 
assumed that having more educated parents increases the probability of being sent to 
school while it decreases the probability of being sent to work. However mothers’ 
and fathers’ education may have different effects on boys’ and girls’ time allocation 
decisions. Using data from rural India, Kurosaki et al. (2006), for example, found 
that while fathers’ education has a negative effect on boys’ labour force participation 
and a positive effect on boys’ school enrollment, it has the opposite effects for girls’ 
labour force participation and school enrollment. However mothers’ education has 
similar positive effects on boys’ and girls’ participation choices.     
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parents’ employment: In this study father’s and mother’s employment status have 
three different categories; employed, unemployed and not in labour force. The 
‘unemployed’ category is used as the omitted category. 
weekly working hours of father and mother: This variable represents the usual 
weekly working hours in the parents’ main job if they are employed. This variable 
takes the value of zero if the father/mother is unemployed or not in the labour force.   
Mothers’ labour and children’s labour are substitutes, especially within the 
household. Thus an increase in the working hours of mothers is likely to lead to an 
increase in domestic chores done by children (Ray, 1999; Self, 2011).  
ever worked in agriculture: This variable takes the value of 1 if the father/mother is 
currently working in agriculture, or the last job was an agricultural job, or the main 
job in the last year was an agricultural job. It takes the value of zero otherwise. It is 
common in Turkey to get help from children for the household duties and children 
coming from farming families are expected to work in agricultural production 
(Rankin and Aytac, 2006). Therefore it is expected that having families working in 
the agriculture sector may interfere with schooling and increase the probability to 
work both in the household and in the field as an unpaid family worker.  
urban/rural: Represents the place of residence. In the survey, “urban” is defined as 
settlements with a population of 20,001 and more; and “rural” is defined as 
settlements with a population of 20,000 and less. 
total employment rate and weekly working hours: These variables represent the 
total employment rate and average number of usual weekly hours of work in the 
main job by 26 sub-regions (NUTS2 regions) in 2012. Related data is extracted from 
the EUROSTAT website. 
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regions: There are 12 level 1 statistical regions (NUTS1 regions); Istanbul, Western 
Marmara, Aegean, Eastern Marmara, Western Anatolia, Mediterranean, Middle 
Anatolia, Western Black Sea, Eastern Black Sea, Westeastern Anatolia, 
Southeastern Anatolia and Middleeastern Anatolia. A dummy variable is included 
for each region except Middleeastern Anatolia, the least developed region, which is 
used as the reference category. 
Tables A4.2 and A4.3 present the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
study. While Table A4.2 gives the descriptive statistics for the 6-14 age group, Table 
A4.3 gives the descriptive statistics for the 15-17 age group. 
4.4.3. Estimation Methods 
To analyze the factors affecting the children’s participation decisions in different 
activities, a multinomial logit model (MNL) will be applied. The MNL applies to a 
context where an agent chooses from an unordered set of options. Unordered choice 
models can be motivated by a random utility model. 
If a group of decision makers i=1, 2, …….., n are faced with j=1, 2, ……, J choices, 
then the utility obtained by decision maker i from choosing option j, can be given  as 
(Greene,2003): 
   𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                     (1) 
Here the choices have no natural order and the exogenous variables zi describe only 
the individual and are identical across alternatives. If the decision maker chooses j 
then we assume that Uij is the maximum among the J utilities. It can be shown as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑘                ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗                                                          (2) 
A statistical model which is driven by the probability that choice j is made, can be 
derived as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑘)                                       ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗                    (3) 
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      = Pr(𝑧𝑖
′𝛽𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 >  𝑧𝑖
′𝛽𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘)              ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗                     
      = Pr(𝜀𝑖𝑘 − 𝜀𝑖𝑗 < 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽𝑗 − 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽𝑘)               ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 
In order to estimate such a model, it is needed to make a choice about the 
distribution of the disturbance term 𝜀. If we assume that the disturbance terms are 
independently and identically extreme value distributed, the probability that decision 
maker i chooses alternative j is given by: 






   ,          j=1, 2, ….., J                   (4) 
which is the multinomial logit model.  
The interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward and the marginal effects 
need to be calculated for interpretation. Marginal effects are the derivatives of the 






] with respect to explanatory variables and 
can be formulated as follows: 
𝜕𝑃𝑗
𝜕𝑧𝑖
= 𝑃𝑗 [𝛽𝑗 − ∑𝑃𝑘𝛽𝑘
𝐽
𝑘=0
] =  𝑃𝑗[𝛽𝑗 − ?̅?] 
For identification purposes, the coefficient vector of one category is normalized by 
setting it to zero. It is not important which βk is normalized to zero. It only changes 
the interpretation of the coefficients: if βj is set to zero then other coefficients are 
interpreted relative to it.  
The MNL model can be estimated by using maximum likelihood methods. The log 
likelihood can be derived by defining 𝑑𝑖𝑗=1 if alternative j is chosen by individual i, 
and 0 if not, for the J possible outcomes. Hence for each individual only one of the 
𝑑𝑖𝑗’s is 1. The log likelihood function is given by: 




i=1 ]                                                          (5) 
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The dependent variable  𝑦𝑖 is defined as follows: 
For the 6-14 age group, 
𝑦𝑖 = {
1 if the child is attending school only                                                                                        
2 if the child is attending school and doing 1 − 2 hours housework per week            
3 if the child is attending school and doing 3 − 7 hours housework per week            
4 if the child is attending school and doing 8 and more hours housework per week 
 







1 if the child is attending school                                                                                       
2 if the child is working                                                                                                         
3 if the child is doing housework                                                                                       
4 if the child is both attending school and working                                                     
5 if the child is both attending school and doing housework                                   
6 if the child is inactive (neither goes school nor works nor does housework)
 
𝑧𝑖 contains the variables such as the education of mother and father, employment 
status of father and mother, whether parent working in agriculture, gender and age 
of the child, number of adults, number of siblings (aged 0-5), living in an urban area 
and a dummy for the each of 12 sub-regions. 
The MNL requires the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption 
(Greene, 2003). The IIA property imposes that the relative odds of choosing 
between any two activities is independent of the remaining probabilities. In other 
words adding/deleting any other alternative does not change the odds of the 
remaining alternatives. However, based on their unobserved characteristics certain 
households, who prefer their children to engage in only school rather than doing 
housework, are also likely to have unobserved preferences for working. Therefore, 
this assumption is questionable. 
If the IIA assumption is violated, the model estimation results may be biased (Long 
and Freese, 2006). Therefore where there is concern about the possible violation of 
IIA, a choice model that allows this assumption to be relaxed should be used. In this 
study, in order to control for unobserved household heterogeneity a random effects 
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multinomial logit model is also applied by using the ‘mixlogit’ command in STATA 
(Hole, 2007). In this case, the model will be: 
Uhij =  𝑧ℎ𝑖βj + ahj + εhij                                                                                    (7) 
where ahj denotes unobserved family characteristics and εhij are i.i.d error terms. 
The model then takes the form:  






,          j=0, 1, 2, ….., J                                        (8) 
where h is a subscript for the households. 
To identify the model, one of the βk’s and ahk’s are set to zero.  
In the simple multinomial logit model the correlation between each alternatives are 
assumed to be zero, which implies that IIA holds. Random effects multinomial logit 
model relaxes the IIA assumption (Glick and Sahn, 2005) since corr(ahj, ahk) can be 
nonzero.  
4.5. RESULTS 
4.5.1. Descriptive Analysis for the 6-14 Age Group 
Table 4.4 shows the child activities by gender and demography. According to this 
table most of the children living in rural areas (61%) are attending only school 
without doing any housework. This percentage decreases to 48% when children 
living in urban areas are considered. Urban and rural children have the same 
percentages in terms of attending school and doing three or more hours of 
housework. When boys and girls are compared, it can be seen that percentages of 
attending only school are higher for boys than girls in both urban and rural areas. 
Thus girls are doing more housework than boys. 
Table 4.5 shows the child activities by the age of children. As the age increases the 
percentages of children who are only attending school are decreasing; and the 
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percentages of children who are attending school and doing eight or more hours of 
housework is increasing. 
Table 4. 4. Summary of child activities by gender and demography 
  Urban Rural 








































































*Numbers in parentheses are percentage values 
 
 



















115      
(5.79) 
41     
(2.06) 
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(7.52) 
62         
(3.05) 









64      
(3.05) 









79      
(3.88) 









105   
(5.19) 









148   
(6.97) 
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Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 present the child activities by education of household head 
for girls and boys, respectively. As the education of the household head increases, a 
substantial decrease in the percentages of girls doing eight or more hours of 
housework can be seen. As the household head becomes more educated, the 
percentage of children who attend school and do 1-2 hours of housework is 
increasing for both girls and boys. It can also be seen from Table A4.4 that as the 
household head gets more educated, the percentages of children who only attend 
school are decreasing and the percentages of children who attend school and do 1-2 
hours of housework are increasing. 
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(25.84) 
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84    
(13.53) 
50            
(11.93) 
511   
(11.49) 
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(9.86) 
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(6.91) 
64     
(5.59) 
Total 
621   
(100) 




1095    
(100) 




*Numbers in parentheses are percentage values 
 
Table A4.5 presents the child activities by the geographical regions. The two least 
developed regions (Souhtheastern Anatolia and Middleeastern Anatolia) have the 
highest percentages in terms of children who are attending school and doing eight or 
more hours of housework. The percentages of children who are only attending 
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21       
(4.34) 
140 (3.05) 
33   
(3.05) 
71     
(4.36) 















*Numbers in parentheses are percentage values 
4.5.2. The Results of the Multinomial Logit Analysis  
4.5.2.1. Results for the 6-14 Age Group  
Table A4.6 presents the coefficients, and Table 4.8 presents marginal effects for the 
multinomial logit model for the 6-14 age group. In terms of gender and age of the 
child, the coefficients have the expected signs. While being male has a negative 
relationship with the probability of doing more housework, there is a positive 
relationship between the age of the child and the probability of doing more 
housework. Confirming our results, by using data from Brazil, Krueger et al. (2010) 
also find that girls are less likely to work in the market work and more likely to 
work in household chores. Our result suggests that being male increases the 
probability to attend only school. This result is also confirmed by Tansel (2002) who 
uses data from Turkey to study the determinants of educational attainment, and 
Nielsen (1998) who uses data from Zambia to study the joint allocation of child 
labor and school attendance. 
 Regarding the household composition, the results are consistent with the literature. 
While a one unit increase in the number of family members aged 15 or over 
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decreases the probability of doing eight or more hours of housework by 1 percentage 
point, an increase in the number of siblings aged 5 or younger increases the 
probability of doing eight or more hours of housework by 1 percentage point. 
Krueger et al. (2010) find that the time that children’s allocate to domestic works 
shifts toward school as the number of pre-school aged children decreases and the 
number of adults increases. Similarly, Dayioglu et al. (2009), by using data from 
Turkey, found that the size of sibling is negatively associated with the school 
enrollment. 
Considering the education of fathers and mothers, a rise in either will decrease the 
probability of only attending school and increase the probability of doing some 
amount of housework in addition to schooling. This may be a consequence of the 
idea that giving some responsibilities to children, which do not hinder their 
schooling, can help the children to develop healthy habits and enhance their social 
skills (Call, Mortimer and Shanahan, 1995). An increase in father’s education also 
decreases the probability of doing 8 or more hours of housework.  
In terms of parental employment, no meaningful effect of mother’s employment 
status is found. However an increase in the father’s weekly working hours increases 
the probability of doing 8 or more hours of housework. Moreover, relative to 
children who have an unemployed father, children with a father who is not in the 
labour force have a higher probability to only attend school and a lower probability 
to do 1-2 hours of housework in addition to attending school. These results can be 
explained by the substitution of the father’s labour and child labour. In the sample, 
the most prevalent type of housework is shopping. Therefore if the father is not in 
the labour force, he can do this kind of housework and this will reduce the burden on 
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the children. If the father is unemployed, he will go out to search for a job and this 
will lead to the children doing more housework. 
Regarding the household income, children who live in a household with an income 
higher than 5,000 TRY have higher probability to only attend school and lower 
probability of doing both 1-2 and 3-7 hours of housework in addition to schooling. 
Moreover, relative to children who live in a household with an income lower than 
1,000 TRY, children who live in a household with an income higher than 10,000 
TRY also have lower probability of doing 8 or more hours of housework. 
It is found that relative to children who are living in rural areas, children who live in 
urban areas have a higher probability of doing 1-2 hours of housework in addition to 
schooling. Also, total employment rates and weekly working hours in the region 
have a positive relationship with doing housework in addition to schooling. As the 
total employment rates and weekly working hours increase, the probability of  
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8 and more hours 
housework
Male 0.07***  (0.007) 0.06*** (0.007) -0.07*** (0.006) -0.06*** (0.004)
Agechild -0.05*** (0.001) 0.01*** (0.001) 0.03*** (0.001) 0.02*** (0.001)
Agemother 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001) -0.001** (.0004)
Agefather -0.0004 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) 0.001 (.0004)
Extended -0.01 (0.013) -0.001 (0.013) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01* (0.008)
Adult 0.03*** (0.004) -0.02*** (0.004) -0.01*** (0.003) -0.01*** (0.002)
Sibling -0.01 (0.006) -0.02** (0.006) 0.01*** (0.005) 0.01*** (0.003)
Father 5 years school graduate -0.03 (0.018) 0.03* (0.017) 0.01 (0.013) -0.01 (0.009)
Father 8 years school graduate -0.05*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.019) 0.02 (0.015) -0.02* (0.01)
Father secondary school graduate -0.05** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.019) 0.01 (0.015) -0.02* (0.01)
Father university graduate -0.03 (0.023) 0.05** (0.022) 0.01 (0.017) -0.04*** (0.011)
Mother 5 years school graduate -0.03*** (0.012) 0.03** (0.011) 0.01* (0.008) -0.01 (0.006)
Mother 8 years school graduate -0.06*** (0.018) 0.03* (0.016) 0.03* (0.014) 0.002 (0.01)
Mother secondary school graduate -0.03** (0.016) 0.02* (0.015) 0.02 (0.012) -0.01 (0.008)
Mother university graduate 0,01 (0.024) 0.03 (0.021) -0.03** (0.016) -0,00 (0.013)
Father weekly working hours -0.0001 (.0003) -0.0001 (.0003) -0.0001 (0.0002)  0.0003**  (.0002)
Mother weekly working hours 0.002*** (0.001) -0.002*** (.0005) -0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0001 (.0003)
Father employed -0.01 (0.024) -0.03 (0.023) 0.05*** (0.015) -0.01 (0.014)
Father not in labor force 0.06** (0.024) -0.06** (0.023)  0.01 (0.016) -0.01 (0.012)
Mother employed  -0.03  (0.035) 0.03 (0.031)  -0.01 (0.025) 0.003 (0.017)
Mother not in labor force 0.01 (0.025) -0.02 (0.021)  -0.01 (0.018) 0.01 (0.013)
Father employed last year -0.003 (0.014) 0.02 (0.013) 0.01 (0.011) -0.02*** (0.008)
Father not in labor force last year -0.02 (0.025) 0.01 (0.024) 0.01 (0.02)  -0.003 (0.014)
Mother employed last year  0.09** (0.034) -0.07** (0.033) -0.01 (0.028) -0.001 (0.021)
Mother not in labor force last year 0.10*** (0.034) -0.08** (0.032) -0.01  (0.027) -0.01 (0.021)
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.01 (0.015)  0.002 (0.014) -0.004 (0.011) -0.01 (0.007)
Mother ever worked in agriculture  -0.005 (0.014) -0.01 (0.013) 0.01 (0.01) 0.001  (0.007)
Urban -0.08*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.009) -0.001  (0.008) 0.01* (0.005)
Total employment rate -0.02*** (0.001) 0.01*** (0.001) 0.01*** (0.001) 0.001* (0.001)
Weekly working hours -0.02*** (0.004) 0.01** (0.004) 0.002  (0.003) 0.004** (0.002)
HH income (1000-2499)  -0.02 (0.009) 0.01 (0.009) -0.002 (0.007)  0.01 (0.005)
HH income (2500-4999) -0.0002  (0.018)  0.01 (0.016) -0.02 (0.013) 0.01 (0.01)
HH income (5000-9999) 0.11*** (0.036) -0.07** (0.029)  -0.04* (0.027) 0.01 (0.023)
HH income (>9999) 0.20*** (0.075)  -0.11** (0.057) -0.03 (0.066) -0.06***   (0.003)
Istanbul 0.03 (0.033) -0.08** (0.034) 0.11*** (0.025)  -0.06**  (0.025)
Westernmarmara 0.09***  (0.027)  0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) -0.12*** (0.022)
Aegean 0.10***  (0.032) 0.01 (0.035) -0.01 (0.022) -0.10***  (0.023)
Easternmarmara  0.11*** (0.027)  0.03  (0.03) -0.03 (0.019) -0.11***   (0.022)
Westernanatoliaa -0.09*** (0.023)  0.06** (0.025) 0.09*** (0.018)  -0.06***   (0.02)
Mediterranean 0.03  (0.025) 0.06** (0.027)  0.02  (0.019)  -0.11*** (0.021)
Middleanatolia 0.19*** (0.025) -0.08*** (0.026) -0.003 (0.018) -0.11***  (0.021)
Westernblacksea 0.40***  (0.031) -0.21*** (0.032) -0.07*** (0.021)  -0.12***   (0.023)
Easternblacksea  0.15*** (0.025)  -0.13*** (0.026)  0.05*** (0.019) -0.07*** (0.02)
Westeasternanatolia 0.12*** (0.033) -0.04  (0.035) 0.02 (0.023) -0.09***  (0.024)





~*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
~Standart errors are in the parentheses
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parents working and not being in the household for a long time increase. This 
situation may lead children to take responsibilities in terms of housework. As 
expected, living in the least developed region increases the probability of doing 
eight and more hours of housework and decreases the probability of only attending 
school. 
As is shown in Table 4.8, the age of the father and the age of the mother have no 
significant effect on the chosen activity for children. On the other hand, living in an 
extended family increases the probability of doing 8 or more hours of housework. 
Considering that household characteristics may exert differing effects on the 
participation decisions of girls and boys, analyses are disaggregated by gender. 
While Table 4.9 presents the marginal effects for the multinomial logit model for 
boys, Table 4.10 presents the results for girls. The coefficients of the multinomial 
logit models for boys and girls are presented in the appendix.  
An increase in age has the same effect for boys and girls in terms of the sign. 
However, the effect is higher for girls.  For example, while a one-year increase in 
the age decreases the probability of only attending school by 4 percentage points for 
boys, it decreases the probability of only attending school by 6 percentage points for 
girls. 
Living in an extended family increases the probability of doing 1-2 hours of 
housework for boys and the probability of doing eight or more hours of housework 
for girls. In extended families, the grandparents live within the household, and 
because grandparents may need extra or special care, it increases the burden on the 
children. An increase in the number of siblings aged 5 or younger increases the 
probability of doing more housework for girls but has no effect on boys. Likewise 
an increase in the number of family members who are aged 15 or older has the same 
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effect on both girls and boys. It increases the probability of only attending school by 
decreasing the burden on the children. 
Fathers’ and mothers’ educations have different effects on girls and boys. Fathers’ 
education has no effect on girls’ participation decisions. However, as the fathers 
become more educated, this increases the probability of doing 1-2 hours of 
housework for boys. On the other side, as the mothers become more educated, this 
increases the probability of doing more housework and decreases the probability of 
only attending school for boys. However as the mothers become more educated, this 
decreases the probability of doing more housework for girls. Thus mothers’ 
education appears to be more important than the fathers’ education in shielding girls 
from domestic work. 
An increase in fathers’ and mothers’ weekly working hours has no effect on girls. 
However an increase in mothers’ weekly working hours increases the probability of 
only attending school by 0.03 percentage points for boys. No effect of fathers’ and 
mothers’ employment status on girls’ and boys’ participation choices is found. 
Regarding the household income, living in a household with an income between 
5000 and 10000 increases the probability of only attending school for both boys and 
girls. No meaningful effect of other income categories is found. 
Living in an urban area and an increase in the total employment rate in the region 
have the same effects in terms of sign and similar effects in terms of magnitude for 
both girls and boys. While living in an urban area decreases the probability of only 
attending school by 0.10 percentage points, it increases the probability of doing 1-2 
hours of housework by 0.09 percentage points for boys. Living in an urban area also 
has no significant effect on the probability of doing eight or more hours of 
housework for boys.  
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Living in the more developed regions decreases the probability of doing eight or 
more hours of housework for girls and boys. This is true especially for girls because 
the magnitude and significance of the relevant coefficients are higher for girls. 







8 and more hours 
housework
Agechild -0.04*** (0.002) 0.01*** (0.002) 0.02*** (0.002)  0.005*** (0.001)
Agemother 0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)
Agefather   0.001 (0.001)   0.0001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)   0.0004 (0.0005)
Extended  -0.04** (0.019)  0.04** (0.019)    0.01 (0.013)   -0.004   (0.008)
Adult  0.04*** (0.006)   -0.03*** (0.006)  -0.01 (0.004)  -0.002 (0.002)
Sibling   0.002 (0.009)  -0.01 (0.009)   0.004 (0.006)    0.01* (0.003)
Father 5 years school graduate -0.05*  (0.026)   0.06** (0.027)   0.002 (0.017) -0.01 (0.009)
Father 8 years school graduate    -0.08*** (0.029) 0.08*** (0.029)   0.001 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01)
Father secondary school graduate -0.08*** (0.029)    0.09*** (0.029) -0.02 (0.02)  0.01 (0.01)
Father university graduate -0.06* (0.033) 0.09*** (0.033) -0.02 (0.023) -0.01 (0.012)
Mother 5 years school graduate -0.04*** (0.016) 0,01 (0.016) 0.02** (0.011) 0,005 (0.006)
Mother 8 years school graduate -0.08*** (0.024) 0.03 (0.023) 0.03** (0.016) 0.02*** (0.008)
Mother secondary school graduate -0.07*** (0.023) 0.02 (0.021) 0.03** (0.016) 0.02** (0.009)
Mother university graduate  -0.003 (0.033) -0,004 (0.031)   0.005 (0.025)   0.002 (0.014)
Father weekly working hours  -0.0001 (.0004)   0.0002 (0.0004) -0,0003 (0.0003)   0.0002 .(0002)
Mother weekly working hours 0.003*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0,0005 (0.001) -0,0001 (.0003)
Father employed -0.01 (0.034) -0.03 (0.032) 0.05* (0.024) -0,003 (0.013)
Father not in labor force 0.03 (0.035) -0,05 (0.034) 0.02 (0.025) -0,005 (0.012)
Mother employed  -0.11** (0.049)   0.07* (0.043) 0.03 (0.033)   0.01   (0.021)
Mother not in labor force -0.01 (0.035) -0.02 (0.031) 0.02 (0.024) 0.02 (0.016)
Father employed last year   -0.004 (0.021)  0.03 (0.02) -0.0001 (0.014) -0.02*** (0.006)
Father not in labor force last year -0,03 (0.035) 0.02 (0.035)   0.01   (0.024) -0.001 (0.012)
Mother employed last year 0.07 (0.049) -0.09** (0.043) -0,01 (0.035) 0.03 (0.025)
Mother not in labor force last year 0.08 (0.048) -0.09** (0.041)   0.01   (0.034) 0.01 (0.024)
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.03 (0.021) -0.02 (0.021) -0,01 (0.014)   0.002 (0.008)
Mother ever worked in agriculture -0,02 (0.019) -0.01 (0.019) 0.02 (0.013)   0.003 (0.007)
Urban -0.10*** (0.015) 0.09*** (0.015)   0.0001 (0.01) 0,01* (0.006)
Total employment rate -0.02*** (0.002) 0.01*** (0.002) 0.01*** (0.001) 0.00** (0.001)
Weekly working hours -0.02*** (0.005) 0.01** (0.006) 0.01* (0.003) 0.00*** (0.002)
HH income (1000-2499) -0.01 (0.013)  0.01 (0.012) -0.001 (0.009)   0.001 (0.005)
HH income (2500-4999)  0.01 (0.026)   0.002 (0.024) -0.02 (0.019)   0.003 (0.01)
HH income (5000-9999) 0.13** (0.055)   -0.09* (0.052)   -0.06   (0.048)  0.01 (0.022)
HH income (>9999)  0.34 (8.42) 0.02   (5.161)   0.00 (2.771) -0.36 (16.347)
Istanbul 0.03  (0.048) -0.09* (0.048) 0.09*** (0.03) -0.03* (0.016)
Westernmarmara 0.08**   (0.04)  0.03 (0.039)    -0.03 (0.029) -0.08*** (0.017)
Aegean  0.10** (0.046) -0.03 (0.046)  -0.04  (0.032)  -0.04** (0.015)
Easternmarmara 0.11*** (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) -0.07** (0.029) -0.05*** (0.015)
Westernanatoliaa   -0.12***  (0.034)   0.05 (0.034)     0.08** (0.024)   -0.01    (0.011)
Mediterranean 0.04 (0.036)  0.03 (0.035)  -0.02    (0.028)   -0.05*** (0.016)
Middleanatolia   0.19***  (0.037) -0.10***   (0.036)   -0.04   (0.028)  -0.05***   (0.016)
Westernblacksea 0.44*** (0.053)  -0.32*** (0.056)  -0.05 (0.036)  -0.07***  (0.019)
Easternblacksea   0.15***  (0.037)  -0.20*** (0.038)     0.07*** (0.025)   -0.02   (0.013)
Westeasternanatolia 0.12*** (0.047) -0.08* (0.048)   0.02    (0.032) -0.06*** (0.017)





*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01











8 and more hours 
housework
Agechild -0.06*** (0.002) -0.0001 (0.002) 0.03*** (0.002) 0.03*** (0.002)
Agemother 0.002* (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Agefather 0.002 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Extended 0.02 (0.019) -0.04** (0.019) -0.01 (0.016) 0.03*** (0.011)
Adult 0.03*** (0.006) 0.002 (0.006) -0.01** (0.005) -0.02*** (0.004)
Sibling -0.01 (0.008) -0.02** (0.008) 0.02*** (0.007) 0.01** (0.005)
Father 5 years school graduate -0.01 (0.025) 0.002 (0.026) 0.02 (0.022) -0.02 (0.012)
Father 8 years school graduate -0.02 (0.029) 0.02 (0.028) 0.03 (0.024) -0.03* (0.015)
Father secondary school graduate -0.01 (0.028) 0.03 (0.028) 0.03 (0.024) -0.05*** (0.015)
Father university graduate 0.02 (0.033) 0.01 (0.031) 0.04 (0.028) -0.06*** (0.019)
Mother 5 years school graduate -0.03* (0.016) 0.04*** (0.016) 0.4 (0.013) -0.02** (0.009)
Mother 8 years school graduate -0.02 (0.026) 0.04 (0.023) 0.01 (0.021) -0.03* (0.016)
Mother secondary school graduate 0.01 (0.023) 0.03 (0.021) 0.01 (0.019) -0.05*** (0.015)
Mother university graduate 0.02 (0.033) 0.07** (0.029) -0.08*** (0.03) -0.01 (0.022)
Father weekly working hours 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.0004 (0.0004) -0.0003 (.0003) 0.0003 (0.0003)
Mother weekly working hours 0.0004 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.001) 0.0002 (0.0005)
Father employed -0.01 (0.034) -0.03 (0.031) 0.06** (0.029) -0.02 (0.02)
Father not in labor force 0.08** (0.034) -0.07** (0.033) 0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.019)
Mother employed 0.05 (0.05) -0.01 (0.041) -0.04 (0.038) 0.003 (0.032)
Mother not in labor force 0.04 (0.037) -0.01 (0.029) -0.03 (0.027) 0.003 (0.024)
Father employed last year -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.019) 0.01 (0.017) -0.02 (0.011)
Father not in labor force last year 0.004 (0.035) -0.01 (0.034) 0.02 (0.03) -0.04 (0.019)
Mother employed last year 0.09* (0.052) -0.05 (0.041) -0.03 (0.039) -0.02 (0.031)
Mother not in labor force last year 0.12** (0.051) -0.06 (0.04) -0.04 (0.038) -0.02 (0.031)
Father ever worked in agriculture -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.019) 0.004 (0.016) -0.01 (0.012)
Mother ever worked in agriculture 0.002 (0.019) -0.01 (0.018) 0.005 (0.015) -0.001 (0.011)
Urban -0.07*** (0.015) 0.07*** (0.015) -0.01 (0.012) 0.01 (0.009)
Total employment rate -0.02*** (0.002) 0.01*** (0.002) 0.01*** (0.001) 0.0002 (0.001)
Weekly working hours -0.01 (0.005) 0.01 (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003)
HH income (1000-2499) -0.02 (0.013) 0.01 (0.012) -0.003 (0.011) 0.01* (0.008)
HH income (2500-4999) -0.01 (0.026) 0.02 (0.022) -0.02 (0.021) 0.01 (0.017)
HH income (5000-9999) 0.10* (0.052) -0.06 (0.047) -0.04 (0.05) 0.003 (0.037)
HH income (>9999) 0.67 (26.978) 0.07 (15.186) 0.3 (18.079) -1.04 (60.242)
Istanbul 0.04 (0.047) -0.09* (0.047) 0.08** (0.037) -0.04* (0.023)
Westernmarmara 0.11*** (0.038) -0.003 (0.038) 0.04 (0.032) -0.15*** (0.022)
Aegean 0.10** (0.045) 0.01 (0.045) -0.003 (0.038) -0.11*** (0.023)
Easternmarmara 0.11*** (0.039) 0.02 (0.039) -0.01 (0.033) -0.11*** (0.02)
Westernanatoliaa -0.09*** (0.034) 0.05 (0.033) 0.10*** (0.028) -0.06*** (0.017)
Mediterranean 0.02 (0.035) 0.05 (0.033) 0.06* (0.03) -0.13*** (0.022)
Middleanatolia 0.18*** (0.036) -0.07** (0.035) 0.02 (0.03) -0.13*** (0.023)
Westernblacksea 0.43*** (0.051) -0.22*** (0.055) -0.09** (0.045) -0.13*** (0.029)
Easternblacksea 0.17*** (0.035) -0.13*** (0.036) 0.03 (0.029) -0.06*** (0.018)
Westeasternanatolia 0.09** (0.046) -0.03 (0.048) 0.02 (0.039) -0.08*** (0.023)





*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
~Standart errors are in the parentheses
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4.5.2.2. Results for the 15-17 Age Group 
Table 4.11 shows the marginal effects of the multinomial logit model for the 15-17 
age group. 
As expected, being male increases the probability of only attending school, working 
in the labour market and the combination of school and labour force participation; 
and it decreases the probability of doing housework and the combination of doing 
housework and schooling. An increase in the age of the child decreases the 
probability of only attending school; and it increases the probability of working in 
the labour market and doing housework. 
In terms of parental education, fathers’ and mothers’ education have the same effect 
on children’s participation choices. Having more educated mothers and fathers 
increases the probability of only attending school and the combination of attending 
school and doing housework. However it decreases the probability of working in the 
labour market and doing only housework. Relative to children whose fathers have 
no qualification, children whose fathers have a university degree have 16 percentage 
points less probability to work in the labour market.  
It is found that fathers’ and mothers’ employment statuses do not have any 
significant effect on the participation decisions. However, having a father who ever 
worked in the agriculture sector increases the probability of doing housework. 
Regarding the household income, living in a household with an income higher than 
5,000 TRY decreases the probability of working in the labor market, doing 
housework and combining both schooling and labour market work. This result is 
confirmed by both Dayioglu (2006) and Kiral and Tiras (2013). They both uses data 
from Turkey and claims that poverty is one of the main determinants of child labor 
in Turkey along with the parent education as it is presented in the current study. 
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Living in an urban area increases the probability to combine both schooling and 








School Labor Houesework School+    labor
School+   
housework
Inactivity
Male 0.13*** (0.011) 0.09*** (0.007) -0.11*** (0.008) 0.03*** (0.006) -0.18*** (0.013) 0.03*** (0.005)
Agechild -0.02*** (0.007) 0.03*** (0.004) 0.02*** (0.004) 0.04*** (0.004) -0.07*** (0.008) 0.01*** (0.003)
Agemother 0.0004 (0.001) 0.0005 (0.001) -0.0002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
Agefather 0.003*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.0004 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001* (0.001)
Extended 0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.011) -0.01 (0.011) -0.01 (0.009) 0.02 (0.023) -0.02*** (0.006)
Adult 0.01* (0.006) 0.003 (0.003) 0.01*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) -0.03*** (0.007) 0.01*** (0.002)
Sibling 0.002 (0.012) 0.01 (0.006) 0.02*** (0.006) 0.01* (0.006) -0.05*** (0.014) 0.003 (0.004)
Father 5 years school graduate 0.03 (0.022) -0.08*** (0.019) -0.03** (0.015) -0.003 (0.015) 0.11*** (0.026) -0.02* (0.011)
Father 8 years school graduate 0.04 (0.027) -0.12*** (0.02) -0.06*** (0.018) -0.002 (0.017) 0.18*** (0.032) -0.03** (0.013)
Father secondary school graduate 0.07*** (0.027) -0.13*** (0.02) -0.09*** (0.017) -0.01 (0.017) 0.18*** (0.032) -0.03** (0.013)
Father university graduate 0.12*** (0.033) -0.16*** (0.019) -0.08*** (0.022) -0.03* (0.017) 0.19*** (0.038) -0.04** (0.016)
Mother 5 years school graduate 0.04** (0.016) -0.04*** (0.011) -0.06*** (0.011) 0.01 (0.009) 0.08*** (0.019) -0.03*** (0.009)
Mother 8 years school graduate -0.01 (0.028) -0.08*** (0.016) -0.07*** (0.021) 0.03 (0.018) 0.17*** (0.034) -0.04** (0.015)
Mother secondary school graduate 0.11*** (0.028) -0.09*** (0.015) -0.11*** (0.015) -0.01 (0.012) 0.15*** (0.031) -0.05*** (0.012)
Mother university graduate 0.15*** (0.046) -0.11*** (0.009) -0.12*** (0.022) -0.03** (0.014) 0.12** (0.048) -0.01 (0.035)
Father weekly working hours -0.0001 (0.0005) -0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.001*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.0001 (0.0002)
Mother weekly working hours -0.001 (0.001) -0.0002 (0.0004) -0.0003 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.0004 (0.0004)
Father employed 0.01 (0.036) 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.023) -0.02 (0.023) 0.01 (0.041) 0.01 (0.013)
Father not in labor force -0.02 (0.032) -0.005 (0.018) 0.03 (0.023) 0.03 (0.028) -0.06 (0.039) 0.03* (0.014)
Mother employed 0.07 (0.051) -0.01 (0.046) 0.05* (0.027) -0.002 (0.02) -0.12** (0.059) 0.01 (0.022)
Mother not in labor force 0.05 (0.036) -0.06* (0.035) 0.07*** (0.019) 0.01 (0.016) -0.09** (0.043) 0.02 (0.018)
Father employed last year 0.00005 (0.022) 0.004 (0.012) -0.01 (0.013) 0.01 (0.011) 0.00 (0.025) -0.01 (0.01)
Father not in labor force last year 0.01 (0.033) 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.017) -0.02 (0.012) 0.03 (0.037) -0.02 (0.01)
Mother employed last year 0.04 (0.046) 0.04* (0.021) -0.07 (0.057) 0.03 (0.024) 0.03 (0.056) -0.07 (0.045)
Mother not in labor force last year 0.03 (0.045) 0.06*** (0.02) -0.07 (0.057) -0.003 (0.023) 0.07 (0.056) -0.07 (0.047)
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.02 (0.021) 0.02 (0.012) 0.03** (0.013) 0.01 (0.011) -0.07*** (0.024) -0.01 (0.008)
Mother ever worked in agriculture -0.02 (0.019) 0.002 (0.011) 0.01 (0.012) 0.04*** (0.013) -0.02 (0.022) -0.01 (0.008)
Urban -0.02 (0.016) -0.02 (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.006) 0.06*** (0.018) -0.03*** (0.009)
Total employment rate -0.01*** (0.002) 0.002* (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001) 0.01*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.001)
Weekly working hours -0.01 (0.005) 0.005 (0.003) 0.01* (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.004 (0.006) -0.005** (0.002)
HH income (1000-2499) 0.01 (0.015) -0.01 (0.009) 0.001 (0.01) -0.004 (0.007) 0.01 (0.016) -0.004 (0.008)
HH income (2500-4999) 0.001 (0.028) -0.04 (0.028) -0.001 (0.031) -0.002 (0.017) 0.06 (0.037) -0.02 (0.016)
HH income (5000-9999) 0.09 (0.071) -0.09*** (0.006) -0.09*** (0.004) -0.05*** (0.004) 0.19*** (0.071) -0.04*** (0.003)
HH income (>9999) 0.19 (0.188) -0.09 (0.224) -0.09*** (0.004) -0.05*** (0.004) 0.08 (18.137) -0.04*** (0.003)
Istanbul -0.02 (0.043) -0.002 (0.026) -0.06* (0.036) 0.05** (0.022) 0.02 (0.054) 0.01 (0.017)
Westernmarmara 0.11*** (0.037) 0.02 (0.022) -0.09*** (0.03) 0.04*** (0.016) -0.11** (0.045) 0.03** (0.015)
Aegean 0.01 (0.041) 0.01 (0.025) -0.08** (0.033) 0.05** (0.021) -0.04 (0.051) 0.05*** (0.019)
Easternmarmara 0.04 (0.036) 0.03 (0.023) -0.04 (0.031) 0.02 (0.015) -0.08* (0.046) 0.02* (0.012)
Westernanatoliaa -0.01 (0.031) 0.03* (0.019) -0.06** (0.027) 0.02 (0.013) 0.02 (0.039) 0.00004 (0.008)
Mediterranean -0.005 (0.032) 0.05** (0.022) -0.03 (0.028) 0.02 (0.014) -0.05 (0.042) 0.02 (0.011)
Middleanatolia 0.22*** (0.038) -0.001 (0.022) -0.06** (0.029) 0.02 (0.015) -0.21*** (0.042) 0.03* (0.017)
Westernblacksea 0.37*** (0.056) -0.03 (0.024) -0.11*** (0.033) -0.01 (0.015) -0.30*** (0.055) 0.09** (0.033)
Easternblacksea 0.07** (0.034) 0.02 (0.021) -0.01 (0.027) -0.02 (0.013) -0.06 (0.041) 0.001 (0.009)
Westeasternanatolia 0.04 (0.043) 0.01 (0.026) -0.06 (0.035) 0.01 (0.019) -0.04 (0.054) 0.03* (0.017)





*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01




For the same reason as above, analyses for the 15-17 age group are also 
disaggregated by gender. Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 show the marginal effects of the 
MNL for boys and for girls, respectively. 
An increase in the age of the child increases the probability of working in the labour 
market for both boys and girls, but the effect on boys is much bigger than that for 
girls. Moreover, while there is no significant effect of age on housework for boys, it 
increases the probability of doing housework by 3 percentage points for girls.  
An increase in the number of siblings aged 5 or younger has different effects for 
boys and girls. It increases the probability of working in the labour market for boys 
and it increases the probability of doing housework for girls. 
Fathers’ education has the same effect for boys and girls in terms of working in the 
labour market. However the magnitude of the effect for boys is much higher than for 
girls. Moreover, while fathers’ education has no effect on boys’ housework 
participation, as the fathers become more educated girls have a lower probability to 
do housework. Mothers’ education also has a negative effect on boys’ labour force 
participation. As mothers become more educated, the boys’ probability of working 
in the labour market falls. Contrary to the finding in the younger age group, for the 
15-17 age group it seems that mothers’ education is less important than the fathers’ 
education in shielding girls from domestic work. 
It is found that both fathers’ and mothers’ employment status have no significant 
effect on children’s participation decisions. Also their weekly working hours have 
no meaningful effect. 
Boys who live in urban areas are 7 percentage points more likely to combine school 
and labour force participation relative to boys who live in rural areas. The reason for 
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this could be that it is easier to find a part-time job in urban areas. Those girls who 
live in urban areas are 9 percentage points more likely to combine school and 
household chores relative to those who live in rural areas. Finally, while there is no 
prominent difference among boys who live in different regions, living in the least 

































School Labor Houesework School+    labor
School+   
housework
Inactivity
Agechild -0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.007) 0.01 (omitted) 0.04*** (0.006) -0.08*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.005)
Agemother 0.001 (0.002) 0.0001 (0.001) 0.0001 (omitted) 0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
Agefather 0.00** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (omitted) -0.0003 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001)
Extended 0.04 (0.029) 0.01 (0.019) -0.02 (omitted) -0.01 (0.017) 0.01 (0.032) -0.03* (0.014)
Adult 0.01 (0.009) -0.001 (0.005) 0.01 (omitted) -0.003 (0.005) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.01** (0.003)
Sibling 0.01 (0.018) 0.03** (0.011) -0.003 (omitted) 0.01 (0.01) -0.05** (0.02) 0.01 (0.007)
Father 5 years school graduate 0.002 (0.037) -0.07*** (0.018) -0.02 (omitted) 0.01 (0.022) 0.10** (0.043) -0.02* (0.012)
Father 8 years school graduate 0.02 (0.043) -0.14*** (0.028) -0.01 (omitted) 0.01 (0.024) 0.16*** (0.048) -0.04* (0.018)
Father secondary school graduate 0.05 (0.043) -0.13*** (0.029) -0.05 (omitted) 0.01 (0.025) 0.20*** (0.048) -0.07*** (0.024)
Father university graduate 0.16*** (0.058) -0.34*** (0.103) -0.02 (omitted) -0.02 (0.036) 0.28*** (0.066) -0.06 (0.037)
Mother 5 years school graduate 0.06** (0.025) -0.06*** (0.015) -0.03 (omitted) 0.01 (0.013) 0.06** (0.026) -0.03*** (0.011)
Mother 8 years school graduate -0.03 (0.051) -0.14*** (0.049) -0.02 (omitted) 0.02 (0.023) 0.20*** (0.047) -0.03 (0.032)
Mother secondary school graduate 0.13*** (0.042) -0.22*** (0.061) -0.02 (omitted) -0.02 (0.026) 0.16*** (0.045) -0.03 (0.03)
Mother university graduate 0.72 (37.056) -1.37 (101.354) -0.48 (omitted) 0.10 (11.063) 0.84 (45.899) 0.18 (12.939)
Father weekly working hours -0.00005 (0.001) -0.0001 (.0005) -0.0001 (omitted) 0.001*** (.0004) -0.001 (0.001) -0.00003 (.0004)
Mother weekly working hours -0.002* (0.001) 0.0004 (0.001) -0.0002 (omitted) -0.0002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001)
Father employed 0.04 (0.055) 0.005 (0.036) -0.02 (omitted) -0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.057) -0.004 (0.026)
Father not in labor force -0.03 (0.052) 0.01 (0.032) -0.001 (omitted) 0.02 (0.028) -0.01 (0.053) 0.02 (0.021)
Mother employed -0.05 (19.904) -0.19 (14.884) 0.59 (omitted) -0.02 (5.17) -0.32 (25.755) -0.01 (7.421)
Mother not in labor force -0.11 (19.904) -0.24 (14.884) 0.59 (omitted) -0.03 (5.17) -0.23 (25.755) 0.02 (7.421)
Father employed last year -0.02 (0.032) 0.01 (0.021) 0.003 (omitted) 0.02 (0.019) -0.01 (0.034) -0.004 (0.014)
Father not in labor force last year 0.01 (0.049) 0.01 (0.032) 0.001 (omitted) -0.01 (0.029) 0.03 (0.052) -0.03 (0.019)
Mother employed last year 0.05 (0.08) 0.10 (0.079) -0.05 (omitted) -0.004 (0.034) -0.02 (0.076) -0.07* (0.038)
Mother not in labor force last year 0.03 (0.079) 0.16** (0.078) -0.07 (omitted) -0.03 (0.035) -0.02 (0.075) -0.07* (0.038)
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.03 (0.031) 0.02 (0.019) 0.001 (omitted) 0.003 (0.016) -0.05 (0.033) -0.01 (0.014)
Mother ever worked in agriculture -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.019) -0.01 (omitted) 0.05*** (0.013) -0.01 (0.031) -0.02 (0.015)
Urban -0.02 (0.024) -0.01 (0.016) -0.02 (omitted) 0.07*** (0.016) 0.02 (0.026) -0.03*** (0.011)
Total employment rate -0.02*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (omitted) 0.001 (0.002) 0.02*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.002)
Weekly working hours -0.01 (0.008) 0.004 (0.006) -0.0003 (omitted) -0.002 (0.005) 0.01 (0.009) -0.01* (0.004)
HH income (1000-2499) 0.01 (0.022) -0.02 (0.016) 0.01 (omitted) -0.02* (0.011) 0.03 (0.022) -0.005 (0.012)
HH income (2500-4999) -0.02 (0.048) -0.05 (0.063) 0.02 (omitted) -0.01 (0.03) 0.07 (0.048) -0.01 (0.041)
HH income (5000-9999) 0.93 (101.062) -0.54 (177.055) -0.30 (omitted) -0.63 (185.48) 42979 (123.775) -0.55 (174.02)
HH income (>9999) 0.59 (224.978) 0.28 (457.276) 0.11 (omitted) -0.78 (345.293) 0.49 (272.538) -0.69 (359.316)
Istanbul -0.05 (0.076) -0.001 (0.052) -0.001 (omitted) 0.05 (0.04) -0.04 (0.078) 0.04 (0.034)
Westernmarmara 0.08 (0.058) 0.04 (0.04) -0.02 (omitted) 0.03 (0.035) -0.17*** (0.064) 0.04 (0.027)
Aegean -0.01 (0.068) 0.01 (0.047) -0.01 (omitted) 0.05 (0.04) -0.08 (0.074) 0.05 (0.031)
Easternmarmara 0.003 (0.059) 0.06 (0.041) -0.003 (omitted) 0.04 (0.037) -0.12* (0.066) 0.02 (0.029)
Westernanatoliaa -0.07 (0.052) 0.04 (0.036) -0.03 (omitted) 0.03 (0.032) 0.03 (0.057) 0.002 (0.024)
Mediterranean -0.05 (0.055) 0.05 (0.038) 0.02 (omitted) 0.03 (0.033) -0.08 (0.059) 0.03 (0.025)
Middleanatolia 0.19*** (0.053) -0.04 (0.048) -0.02 (omitted) 0.03 (0.032) -0.20*** (0.06) 0.04 (0.028)
Westernblacksea 0.32*** (0.075) -0.01 (0.057) -0.03 (omitted) -0.06 (0.057) -0.34*** (0.087) 0.12*** (0.034)
Easternblacksea 0.08 (0.054) 0.05 (0.038) -0.01 (omitted) -0.10 (0.062) -0.03 (0.062) 0.01 (0.025)
Westeasternanatolia 0.01 (0.07) 0.02 (0.049) 0.003 (omitted) 0.02 (0.043) -0.09 (0.077) 0.03 (0.033)





*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
~Standart errors are in the parentheses
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School Labor Houesework School+    labor
School+   
housework
Inactivity
Agechild -0.01 (0.009) 0.01** (0.004) 0.03*** (0.008) 0.03 (omitted) -0.06*** (0.011) 0.004 (0.004)
Agemother -0.0003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.0002 (omitted) -0.001 (0.002) 0.001* (0.001)
Agefather 0.003* (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (omitted) 0.004* (0.002) -0.001 (0.001)
Extended 0.02 (0.026) -0.03* (0.014) -0.01 (0.021) -0.01 (omitted) 0.03 (0.034) -0.01 (0.01)
Adult 0.005 (0.008) 0.01** (0.004) 0.01* (0.006) -0.0001 (omitted) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.002)
Sibling -0.01 (0.016) -0.01 (0.008) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.01 (omitted) -0.04** (0.02) 0.001 (0.005)
Father 5 years school graduate 0.02 (0.034) -0.05*** (0.011) -0.04** (0.019) -0.02 (omitted) 0.09** (0.039) -0.01 (0.009)
Father 8 years school graduate 0.03 (0.039) -0.08*** (0.019) -0.09*** (0.028) -0.01 (omitted) 0.17*** (0.046) -0.02 (0.015)
Father secondary school graduate 0.08** (0.037) -0.10*** (0.026) -0.13*** (0.031) -0.02 (omitted) 0.16*** (0.047) 0.01 (0.011)
Father university graduate 0.14 (3.388) -0.48 (27.955) -0.03 (6.967) -0.01 (omitted) 0.37 (14.94) 0.02 (1.224)
Mother 5 years school graduate 0.01 (0.022) -0.002 (0.009) -0.07*** (0.016) 0.01 (omitted) 0.08*** (0.027) -0.02** (0.008)
Mother 8 years school graduate 0.07 (5.319) -0.47 (43.888) 0.01 (10.937) 0.05 (omitted) 0.36 (23.456) -0.02 (1.922)
Mother secondary school graduate 0.15 (5.164) 0.03 (1.849) -0.23 (8.684) 0.01 (omitted) 0.42 (15.941) -0.38 (32.636)
Mother university graduate 0.13 (4.726) -0.38 (38.991) -0.09 (9.717) -0.003 (omitted) 0.34 (20.839) 0.01 (1.707)
Father weekly working hours -0.001 (0.001) -0.0001 (0.0003) 0.001 (0.0005) -0.00 (omitted) 0.0002 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.0003)
Mother weekly working hours 0.0004 (0.001) -0.0005 (0.0004) -0.0005 (0.001) 0.0002 (omitted) -0.0003 (0.001) 0.001 (0.0004)
Father employed 0.001 (0.047) 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.039) 0.02 (omitted) -0.04 (0.059) 0.04 (0.024)
Father not in labor force 0.01 (0.043) -0.02 (0.023) 0.04 (0.035) 0.04 (omitted) -0.11* (0.056) 0.03* (0.02)
Mother employed 0.04 (0.073) 0.06 (0.038) 0.07 (0.088) -0.02 (omitted) -0.13 (0.097) -0.02 (0.034)
Mother not in labor force 0.06 (0.056) 0.02 (0.033) 0.11 (0.076) 0.002 (omitted) -0.19** (0.076) -0.005 (0.027)
Father employed last year 0.02 (0.031) -0.01 (0.012) -0.03 (0.022) -0.003 (omitted) 0.03 (0.037) -0.01 (0.011)
Father not in labor force last year 0.02 (0.042) 0.01 (0.021) -0.02 (0.031) -0.07 (omitted) 0.07 (0.056) -0.01 (0.012)
Mother employed last year -0.04 (12.643) -0.05 (4.599) -0.06 (10.261) 0.45 (omitted) -0.26 (49.007) -0.04 (2.121)
Mother not in labor force last year -0.05 (12.643) -0.05 (4.599) -0.07 (10.261) 0.42 (omitted) -0.21 (49.007) -0.05 (2.121)
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.01 (0.028) 0.01 (0.01) 0.05*** (0.019) 0.02 (omitted) -0.08** (0.034) -0.01 (0.011)
Mother ever worked in agriculture -0.01 (0.026) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (omitted) -0.01 (0.032) -0.01 (0.011)
Urban -0.01 (0.021) -0.01 (0.009) -0.05*** (0.016) 0.003 (omitted) 0.09*** (0.026) -0.02*** (0.008)
Total employment rate -0.003 (0.003) 0.002* (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (omitted) 0.004 (0.003) -0.0001 (0.001)
Weekly working hours -0.01 (0.008) 0.01* (0.004) 0.01** (0.005) -0.004 (omitted) -0.002 (0.009) -0.01 (0.003)
HH income (1000-2499) 0.002 (0.018) -0.01 (0.009) -0.01 (0.018) 0.01 (omitted) -0.0001 (0.024) -0.002 (0.009)
HH income (2500-4999) 0.07 (4.066) -0.43 (33.547) 0.07 (8.36) 0.03 (omitted) 0.26 (17.929) -0.01 (1.469)
HH income (5000-9999) 0.38 (41.69) -0.21 (73.112) -1.17 (210.058) -0.32 (omitted) 1.59 (162.416) -0.27 (108.125)
HH income (>9999) 0.40 (125.894) 0.22 (261.852) -1.29 (675.236) -0.34 (omitted) 1.31 (499.73) -0.30 (252.624)
Istanbul 0.08 (5.922) -0.003 (2.12) -0.01 (9.959) 0.07 (omitted) 0.19 (18.282) -0.33 (37.428)
Westernmarmara 0.16*** (0.061) -0.02 (0.03) -0.14*** (0.044) 0.06 (omitted) -0.10 (0.072) 0.04* (0.023)
Aegean 0.09 (0.071) -0.01 (0.033) -0.14*** (0.048) 0.06 (omitted) -0.07 (0.083) 0.07** (0.026)
Easternmarmara 0.13** (0.062) -0.02 (0.03) -0.05 (0.039) 0.03 (omitted) -0.13* (0.073) 0.05** (0.024)
Westernanatoliaa 0.08 (0.056) 0.01 (0.025) -0.07** (0.035) 0.02 (omitted) -0.04 (0.064) 0.002 (0.023)
Mediterranean 0.08 (0.058) 0.02 (0.024) -0.09** (0.039) 0.02 (omitted) -0.06 (0.067) 0.03 (0.021)
Middleanatolia 0.22*** (0.054) 0.02 (0.025) -0.05 (0.041) 0.03 (omitted) -0.27*** (0.067) 0.05** (0.02)
Westernblacksea 0.33*** (0.074) -0.08* (0.047) -0.12** (0.059) 0.04 (omitted) -0.21** (0.095) 0.04 (0.031)
Easternblacksea 0.13** (0.056) -0.01 (0.026) 0.01 (0.034) -0.01 (omitted) -0.11* (0.067) -0.004 (0.023)
Westeasternanatolia 0.11 (0.072) -0.02 (0.035) -0.10** (0.047) 0.04 (omitted) -0.08 (0.085) 0.06** (0.028)





*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
~Standart errors are in the parentheses
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4.5.3. The Results of the Random Effects Multinomial Logit Analysis  
As stated in the methodology section in order to control for the unobserved 
household heterogeneity, a random effects multinomial logit model is applied by 
extending the MNL model with a random term. Table 4.14 and Table 4.15 present 
the marginal effects of the random effects MNL for the 6-14 and 15-17 age groups 
respectively. The coefficients of the random effect MNL for both groups are 
presented in the appendix.  
Random effects MNL model is estimated using the ‘mixlogit’ command in STATA. 
Standard errors for the marginal effects are obtained by using the bootstrap method.  
Compared to the results of the MNL, the signs are the same in the random effects 
MNL. The marginal effects are generally the same with ±0.01 difference. In order to 
compare both models a likelihood-ratio test can be performed. Test statistic is given 
by the following formula: 
LR test statistic= -2 [ log likelihood (model1) – log likelihood (model2)]  
For the 6-14 age group; 
LR test statistic= -2 [(-15353.37) – (-15134.798)] = 437.144  
This statistic is distributed chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the 
difference in the number of degrees of freedom between the two models. In this case 
degree of freedom is equal to 6-3=3 and associated p-value is very low (less than 
0.00001).  
For the 15-17 age group; 
LR test statistic= -2 [(-6109.3942) – (-6092.8965)] = 32.9954 
In this case degrees of freedom is equal to 15-5=10 and associated p-value is 
0.000273.  These test results imply that by using random effects model results in a 
statistically significant improvement in model fit. 
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8 and more 
hours 
housework
Male 0.08 (0.03) 0.06 (0.04) -0.07 (0.03) -0.07 (0.04)
Agechild -0.05 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Agemother 0.001 (0.0003) -0.001 (0.0003) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Agefather 0.0005 (0.0002) 0.001 (0.0004) -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Extended -0.01 (0.004) -0.01 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.01 (0.01)
Adult 0.03  (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.004) -0.01 (0.01)
Sibling -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Father 5 years school graduate -0.02  (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Father 8 years school graduate -0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) -0.02  (0.02)
Father secondary school graduate -0.04 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 0.003 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
Father university graduate -0.02 (0.02) 0.04  (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03)
Mother 5 years school graduate -0.03  (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Mother 8 years school graduate -0.06 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.001 (0.004)
Mother secondary school graduate -0.03  (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Mother university graduate -0.003 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.001 (0.002)
Father weekly working hours -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0003)
Mother weekly working hours 0.002 (0.0005) -0.002 (0.001) -0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Father employed 0.002 (0.01) -0.03  (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01)
Father not in labor force 0.07  (0.01) -0.07 (0.02) 0.01  (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Mother employed -0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Mother not in labor force 0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Father employed last year -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.004) 0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
Father not in labor force last year -0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.002  (0.003)
Mother employed last year 0.07 (0.02) -0.07 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Mother not in labor force last year 0.08 (0.02) -0.08 (0.02) -0.004  (0.01) 0.001 (0.004)
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.01  (0.003) 0.002  (0.003) -0.01 (0.002) -0.01 (0.005)
Mother ever worked in agriculture -0.005  (0.004) -0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.002 (0.002)
Urban -0.07  (0.02) 0.07  (0.02) -0.002  (0.01) 0.004  (0.004)
Total employment rate -0.01  (0.003) 0.01  (0.003) 0.01 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
Weekly working hours -0.02  (0.003) 0.01  (0.004) -0.001 (0.003) 0.01  (0.004)
HH income (1000-2499) -0.01 (0.002) 0.01 (0.002) -0.004  (0.004) 0.01  (0.007)
HH income (2500-4999) 0.01 (0.004) 0.01 (0.007) -0.02  (0.01) 0.002 (0.003)
HH income (5000-9999) 0.12  (0.02) -0.06  (0.03) -0.05 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01)
HH income (>9999) 0.23  (0.05) -0.12  (0.05) -0.05  (0.03) -0.07 (0.07)
Istanbul 0.13  (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.04) -0.1 (0.06)
Westernmarmara 0.04 (0.01) -0.09 (0.02) 0.13 (0.07) -0.07  (0.04)
Aegean 0.10  (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) -0.13 (0.08)
Easternmarmara 0.11  (0.03) 0.002 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) -0.11 (0.06)
Westernanatoliaa 0.12 (0.03) 0.02 (0.04) -0.03  (0.02) -0.12 (0.07)
Mediterranean -0.07 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.09  (0.04) -0.07 (0.04)
Middleanatolia 0.04 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03) 0.02  (0.04) -0.12 (0.07)
Westernblacksea 0.21 (0.03) -0.08 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03) -0.12  (0.07)
Easternblacksea 0.41  (0.08) -0.22  (0.07) -0.06  (0.03 ) -0.13  (0.08)
Westeasternanatolia 0.15   (0.03) -0.14  (0.03) 0.06  (0.04) -0.07  (0.04)





*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
~Standart errors are in the parentheses
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The main objective of this chapter is to identify and describe the determinants of 
participation in children’s activities by defining different child activities for the 6-14 
and 15-17 age groups.  The impacts of child and household characteristics on a 
selection of children’s activities such as; 
School Labor Houesework School+    labor
School+   
housework
Inactivity
Male 0.14 (0.05) 0.09 (0.07) -0.11 (0.10) 0.03 (0.03) -0.18 (0.05) 0.03 (0.03)
Agechild -0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.04  (0.04) -0.08 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01)
Agemother 0.0005 (0.001) 0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0004) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Agefather 0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.0005 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001)
Extended 0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.08) 0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
Adult 0.01 (0.01) 0.003 (0.004) 0.01 (0.01) -0.003 (0.003) -0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Sibling 0.003 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) 0.003 (0.003)
Father 5 years school graduate 0.03 (0.03) -0.07 (0.05) -0.03 (0.03) -0.004 (0.01) 0.10 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02)
Father 8 years school graduate 0.03 (0.05) -0.12 (0.08) -0.05 (0.05) -0.003 (0.01) 0.18 (0.04) -0.03 (0.02)
Father secondary school graduate 0.07 (0.06) -0.12 (0.06) -0.09 (0.07) -0.01 (0.01) 0.18 (0.06) -0.03 (0.03)
Father university graduate 0.12 (0.08) -0.16 (0.12) -0.08 (0.07) -0.03 (0.03) 0.18 (0.07) -0.04 (0.03)
Mother 5 years school graduate 0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.07 (0.05) 0.01 (0.01) 0.09 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02)
Mother 8 years school graduate -0.002 (0.04) -0.08 (0.07) -0.07 (0.06) 0.03 (0.03) 0.17 (0.04) -0.04 (0.03)
Mother secondary school graduate 0.11 (0.07) -0.09  (0.07) -0.11 (0.09) -0.01 (0.01) 0.15 (0.07) -0.05 (0.04)
Mother university graduate 0.14 (0.06) -0.11 (0.11) -0.12  (0.10) -0.03 (0.03) 0.12 (0.08) -0.005 (0.03)
Father weekly working hours -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.00003 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0005 (0.001) -0.001 (0.0003) -0.0001 (0.0001)
Mother weekly working hours -0.001 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.001 (0.0002) 0.0004 (0.0005)
Father employed 0.004 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Father not in labor force -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
Mother employed 0.04 (0.03) 0.08 (0.05) 0.004 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.12 (0.03) 0.002 (0.01)
Mother not in labor force 0.05 (0.03) -0.06 (0.05) 0.07 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01) -0.09 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
Father employed last year 0.001 (0.01) 0.001 (0.004) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01)
Father not in labor force last year 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Mother employed last year 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04) 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) -0.07 (0.06)
Mother not in labor force last year 0.03 (0.03) 0.06 (0.06) -0.06 (0.05) -0.006 (0.01) 0.05 (0.03) -0.07 (0.06)
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Mother ever worked in agriculture -0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) 0.04  (0.04) -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01)
Urban -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.07 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Total employment rate -0.01 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.0001 (0.001) -0.0002 (0.001) 0.01 (0.003) -0.002  (0.002)
Weekly working hours -0.01 (0.0003) 0.01 (0.001) 0.005 (0.004) -0.001 (0.001) 0.01 (0.004) -0.005 (0.01)
HH income (1000-2499) 0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) -0.003 (0.003) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.005)
HH income (2500-4999) 0.01 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) 0.008 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
HH income (5000-9999) 0.12 (0.12) -0.10 (0.11) -0.10 (0.12) -0.05 (0.06) 0.17 (0.11) -0.04 (0.05)
HH income (>9999) 0.18  (0.11) -0.10 (0.11) -0.10 (0.12) -0.05 (0.06) 0.11 (0.11) -0.04 (0.05)
Istanbul 0.05 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) -0.05 (0.05) 0.01 (0.01) -0.06 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Westernmarmara -0.02 (0.02) 0.002 (0.01) -0.06 (0.05) 0.05 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.02 (0.02)
Aegean 0.11 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) -0.08 (0.07) 0.03 (0.03) -0.12 (0.06) 0.03 (0.03)
Easternmarmara 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) -0.08 (0.07) 0.04  (0.04) -0.05 (0.05) 0.05 (0.06)
Westernanatoliaa 0.05 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) -0.10 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Mediterranean -0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.03) -0.06 (0.05) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.002 (0.004)
Middleanatolia 0.0001 (0.02) 0.05 (0.04) -0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
Westernblacksea 0.22 (0.05) 0.01 (0.01) -0.06 (0.05) 0.02 (0.02) -0.22 (0.07) 0.03 (0.03)
Easternblacksea 0.36 (0.07) -0.03 (0.04) -0.10 (0.10) -0.02 (0.02) -0.31 (0.10) 0.09  (0.09)
Westeasternanatolia 0.07 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02) 0.002 (0.002)





*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
~Standart errors are in the parentheses
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• attending only school, doing 1-2 hours of housework per week in addition to 
schooling, doing 3-7 hours of housework per week in addition to schooling, doing 8 
and more hours of housework in addition to schooling were analyzed for the 6-14 
age group children 
• attending only school, only working in the labour market, only doing household 
work, a combination of school and working in the labour market, a combination of 
school and doing housework, and inactivity were analyzed for the 15-17 age group 
children. 
First of all the results show that a child who is older and female is less likely to 
attend school for the both age groups. Based on the results, while being female 
increases the probability of only doing housework, being male increases the 
probability of working in the labour market. As expected the work dynamics of girls 
and boys are different. Therefore it should be taken into account in designing child 
labour eradication and school promoting policies. For example, any policy that aims 
to improve children’s market work will not pay sufficient attention to girls’ working 
conditions since they mostly do housework. 
Parental education is found to be a primary determinant of child activities. For the 6-
14 age group, as fathers and mothers become more educated, the probability of 
doing a higher number of hours of housework decreases. Especially for girls, the 
mother’s education is more important than the father’s education. For the 15-17 age 
group, the father’s education is important both for boys and girls, but especially for 
boys, in order to prevent children from working in the labour market. Contrary to the 
finding in the younger age group, for the 15-17 age group it seems that mothers’ 
education is less important than the fathers’ education in shielding girls from 
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domestic work. Therefore in general it seems that targeting the education of fathers 
is more important. 
An increase in the number of siblings aged 5 or younger, increases the burden of 
both girls and boys. While it increases the probability of working in the labour 
market for boys in the 15-17 age group, it increases the probability of only doing 
housework for girls in the same age. It also increases the probability of doing more 
hours of housework for girls in the 6-14 age group. The schooling of both boys and 
girls is hindered by the presence of very young children. Therefore an improvement 
in the childcare subsidy policies may promote the educational attainment of both 
boys and girls. 
Father’s and mother’s employment status, and the weekly working hours of fathers 
and mothers do not seem to play a role in determining boys’ and girls’ participation 
in different activities for both age groups. On the other hand, mother’s employment 
status might have a lagged effect on the 6-14 age group children’s school attainment.  
The total employment rate and weekly working hours in a region increases doing 
more housework for both boys and girls in the 6-14 age group. The total 
employment rate and living in an urban area also increase the probability of working 
in the labour market for boys in the 15-17 age group. As the opportunity to find a 
job increases, the probability to work in the labour market increases for boys.  
Regarding the regions, both boys and girls who live in the least developed region 
(The Middleeastern Anatolia) have a higher probability to do more hours of 
housework compared to the children who live in a more developed region in the 6-
14 age group. 
Another finding of this study relates to the econometric methodology. Since the 
results of the MNL model and the random effects MNL model are similar, we can 
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conclude that the MNL model is sufficient to examine the determinants of 




4.7. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
Table A4. 1. Description of Variables 
Variable Name Description 
Activity6_14  
(for 6-14 age group) 
 
 
=1 if the child attending school only (base category) 
=2 if the child doing 1-2 hours housework per week 
=3 if the child doing 3-7 hours housework per week 
=4 if the child doing 8+ 
Activity15_17  






=1 if the child attending school (base category) 
=2 working 
=3 doing housework 
=4 both school and work 
=5 both school and housework 
=6 inactivity 
(neither goes school nor works nor does housework) 
Male =1 if child is male 
=0 if female 
Agechild Age of child 
Agemother Age of mother 
Agefather Age of father 
Extended =1 if at least three generations live together 
=0 if otherwise 
Adult # of adults, aged 15 or over 
Sibling # of younger siblings, aged 0-5 









=1 if father has no educational qualification 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if father has primary school (5 years) degree 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if father has primary school (8 years) degree 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if father has secondary school degree 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if father has university degree 
=0 otherwise 









=1 if mother has no educational qualification 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if mother has primary school (5 years) degree 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if mother has primary school (8 years) degree 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if mother has secondary school degree 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if mother has university degree 
=0 otherwise 
Father weekly working hours # of weekly working hours of father 
Mother weekly hours # of weekly working hours of mother 
Employedf  
 
Unemployed (ref. cat.) 
 
Notinlff 
=1 if father is employed 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if father is unemployed 
=0 




Unemployed (ref. cat.) 
 
Notinlfm 
=1 if mother is employed 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if mother is unemployed 
=0 
=1 if mother is not in labour forced 
=0 otherwise 








=1 if father was unemployed last year 
=0 




Lyunemployedm (ref. cat.) 
 
Lynotinlfm 
=1 if mother was employed last year 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if mother was unemployed last year 
=0 
=1 if mother was not in labour forced last year 
=0 otherwise 
Agrf =1 if father has ever engaged in agriculture 
=0 if otherwise 
Agrm =1 if mother has ever engaged in agriculture 
=0 if otherwise 
Urban =1 if household reside in urban area 
=0 if household reside in rural area 
Total employment rate Total employment rate 
by NUTS2 regions in 2012 
Weekly working hours Average number of usual weekly hours of  
work in main job by NUTS 2 regions in 2012 
HH income (<1000) 
 
HH income (1000-2499) 
 
HH income (2500-4999) 
 
HH income (5000-9999) 
 
HH income (>9999) 
=1 if HH income is lower than 1000 TRY 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if HH income is between 1000 and 2499 TRY 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if HH income is between 2500 and 4999 TRY 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if HH income is between 5000 and 9999 TRY 
=0 otherwise 
=1 if HH income is higher than 9999 TRY 
=0 otherwise 





















Middleeasternanatolia (ref. cat.) 
 
Southeasternanatolia 
=1 if georegion==1 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==2 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==3 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==4 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==5 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==6 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==7 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==8 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==9 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==10 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==11 
=0 if otherwise 
=1 if georegion==12 






Table A4. 2.  Descriptive Statistics of the 6-14 Age Group 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Activity6_14 1.778 0.94 1 4 
Male 0.508 0.50 0 1 
Agechild 10.023 2.57 6 14 
Agemother 36.807 6.57 16 89 
Agefather 40.813 6.72 16 85 
Extended 0.132 0.34 0 1 
Adult 2.862 1.26 2 16 
Sibling 0.487 0.71 0 5 
Father no educational qualification 0.065 0.25 0 1 
Father 5 years school graduate 0.473 0.50 0 1 
Father 8 years school graduate 0.127 0.33 0 1 
Father secondary school graduate 0.196 0.40 0 1 
Father university graduate 0.139 0.35 0 1 
Mother no educational qualification 0.226 0.42 0 1 
Mother 5 years school graduate 0.511 0.50 0 1 
Mother 8 years school graduate 0.074 0.26 0 1 
Mother secondary school graduate 0.123 0.33 0 1 
Mother university graduate 0.067 0.25 0 1 
Father weekly working hours 45.502 22.75 0 97 
Mother weekly working hours 7.715 17.21 0 97 
Father employed 0.858 0.35 0 1 
Father unemployed 0.058 0.23 0 1 
Father not in labour force 0.085 0.28 0 1 
Mother employed 0.197 0.40 0 1 
Mother unemployed 0.027 0.16 0 1 
Mother not in labour force 0.776 0.42 0 1 
Father employed last year 0.836 0.37 0 1 
Father unemployed last year 0.107 0.31 0 1 
Father not in labour force last year 0.057 0.23 0 1 
Mother employed last year 0.187 0.39 0 1 
Mother unemployed last year 0.014 0.12 0 1 
Mother not in labour force last year 0.798 0.40 0 1 
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.105 0.31 0 1 
Mother ever worked in agriculture 0.125 0.33 0 1 
Urban 0.784 0.41 0 1 
Total employment rate 44.398 6.39 26.9 53.9 
Weekly working hours 48.635 3.08 41.9 56.4 
HH income (<1000) 0.606 0.49 0 1 
HH income (1000-2499) 0.295 0.46 0 1 
HH income (2500-4999) 0.082 0.27 0 1 
HH income (5000-9999) 0.014 0.12 0 1 
HH income (>9999) 0.002 0.05 0 1 
Istanbul 0.108 0.31 0 1 
Westernmarmara 0.045 0.21 0 1 
Aegean 0.095 0.29 0 1 
Easternmarmara 0.080 0.27 0 1 
Westernanatolia 0.146 0.35 0 1 
Mediterranean 0.124 0.33 0 1 
Middleanatolia 0.063 0.24 0 1 
Westernblacksea 0.052 0.22 0 1 
Easternblacksea 0.042 0.20 0 1 
Westeasternanatolia 0.060 0.24 0 1 
Middleeasternanatolia 0.049 0.22 0 1 
Southeasternanatolia 0.138 0.34 0 1 





Table A4. 3. Descriptive Statistics of the 15-17 Age Group 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Activity15_17 3.638 1.75 1 6 
Male 0.520 0.50 0 1 
Agechild 15.980 0.82 15 17 
Agemother 42.101 6.26 21 89 
Agefather 46.056 6.41 30 85 
Extended 0.118 0.32 0 1 
Adult 4.020 1.25 3 16 
Sibling 0.244 0.55 0 5 
Father no educational qualification 0.088 0.28 0 1 
Father 5 years school graduate 0.515 0.50 0 1 
Father 8 years school graduate 0.126 0.33 0 1 
Father secondary school graduate 0.155 0.36 0 1 
Father university graduate 0.115 0.32 0 1 
Mother no educational qualification 0.271 0.44 0 1 
Mother 5 years school graduate 0.539 0.50 0 1 
Mother 8 years school graduate 0.054 0.23 0 1 
Mother secondary school graduate 0.093 0.29 0 1 
Mother university graduate 0.043 0.20 0 1 
Father weekly working hours 40.664 25.03 0 97 
Mother weekly working hours 8.644 18.66 0 97 
Father employed 0.783 0.41 0 1 
Father unemployed 0.064 0.24 0 1 
Father not in labour force 0.154 0.36 0 1 
Mother employed 0.205 0.40 0 1 
Mother unemployed 0.025 0.15 0 1 
Mother not in labour force 0.771 0.42 0 1 
Father employed last year 0.779 0.41 0 1 
Father unemployed last year 0.105 0.31 0 1 
Father not in labour force last year 0.116 0.32 0 1 
Mother employed last year 0.199 0.40 0 1 
Mother unemployed last year 0.199 0.40 0 1 
Mother not in labour force last year 0.785 0.41 0 1 
Father ever worked in agriculture 0.128 0.33 0 1 
Mother ever worked in agriculture 0.147 0.35 0 1 
Urban 0.788 0.41 0 1 
Total employment rate 44.485 6.28 26.9 53.9 
Weekly working hours 48.623 3.09 41.9 56.4 
HH income (<1000) 0.637 0.48 0 1 
HH income (1000-2499) 0.286 0.45 0 1 
HH income (2500-4999) 0.066 0.25 0 1 
HH income (5000-9999) 0.009 0.09 0 1 
HH income (>9999) 0.002 0.04 0 1 
Istanbul 0.104 0.31 0 1 
Westernmarmara 0.049 0.22 0 1 
Aegean 0.101 0.30 0 1 
Easternmarmara 0.085 0.28 0 1 
Westernanatolia 0.137 0.34 0 1 
Mediterranean 0.117 0.32 0 1 
Middleanatolia 0.065 0.25 0 1 
Westernblacksea 0.055 0.23 0 1 
Easternblacksea 0.043 0.20 0 1 
Westeasternanatolia 0.060 0.24 0 1 
Middleeasternanatolia 0.050 0.22 0 1 
Southeasternanatolia 0.136 0.34 0 1 
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Table A4. 5. Child activities by region and demography 













l Urban 853 (48.30) 518 (29.33) 288 (16.31) 107 (6.06) 
Rural 56 (70) 12 (15) 9 (11.25) 3 (3.75) 












Urban 234 (40.28) 136 (23.41) 164 (28.23) 47 (8.09) 
Rural 105 (34.09) 74 (24.03) 90 (29.22) 39 (12.66) 





 Urban 591 (41.94) 537 (38.11) 241 (17.10) 40 (2.84) 
Rural 197 (45.39) 139 (32.03) 81 (18.66) 17 (3.92) 













Urban 543 (44.25) 459 (37.41) 158 (12.88) 67 (5.46) 
Rural 105 (50.97) 554 (26.21) 31 (15.05) 16 (7.77) 













Urban 1068 (50.12) 755 (35.43) 222 (10.42) 86 (4.04) 
Rural 344 (64.78) 107 (20.15) 57 (10.73) 23 (4.33) 










Urban 578 (31.46) 653 (35.55) 443 (24.12) 163 (8.87) 
Rural 214 (38.56) 182 (32.79) 129 (23.24) 30 (5.41) 













Urban 372 (47.63) 258 (33.03) 124 (15.88) 27 (3.46) 
Rural 249 (52.53) 135 (28.48) 72 (15.19) 18 (3.80) 












Urban 417 (58.98) 171 (24.19) 94 (13.30) 25 (3.54) 
Rural 196 (59.39) 50 (15.15) 71 (21.52) 13 (3.94) 













Urban 362 (70.84) 77 (15.07) 55 (10.76) 17 (3.33) 
Rural 255 (75.89) 28 (8.33) 37 (11.01) 16 (4.76) 















 Urban 375 (58.78) 119 (18.65) 111 (17.40) 33 (5.17) 
Rural 470 (71.10) 28 (4.24) 115 (17.40) 48 (7.26) 
















 Urban 977 (59.14) 209 (12.65) 218 (13.20) 248 (15.01) 
Rural 567 (78.97) 41 (5.71) 55 (7.66) 55 (5.66) 

















Urban 253 (49.61) 135 (26.47) 62 (12.16) 60 (11.76) 
Rural 373 (72.29) 62 (12.02) 38 (7.36) 43 (8.33) 
Total 626 (61.01) 197 (19.20) 100 (9.75) 103 (10.04) 











8 and more hours 
housework 
male 0.05 -0.68*** -1.35*** 
agechild 0.14*** 0.331*** 0.41*** 
agemother -0.01 -0.00 -0.02** 
agefather 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
extended 0.03 0.03 0.25** 
adult -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.25*** 
sibling -0.05** 0.11*** 0.15*** 
father 5 years school graduate 0.19* 0.16 -0.13 
father 8 years school graduate 0.35*** 0.24* -0.15 
father secondary school graduate 0.36*** 0.15 -0.20 
father university graduate 0.28** 0.11 -0.55*** 
mother 5 years school graduate 0.19*** 0.18** -0.04 
mother 8 years school graduate 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.19 
mother secondary school graduate 0.18** 0.21** -0.12 
mother university graduate 0.10 -0.29* -0.11 
father weekly working hours -0.00 -0.00 0.01* 
mother weekly working hours -0.01*** -0.01* -0.00 
father employed -0.08 0.39** -0.14 
father not in labour force -0.37*** -0.03 -0.33 
mother employed 0.19 0.03 0.12 
mother not in labour force -0.10 -0.07 0.14 
father employed last year 0.08 0.04 -0.33*** 
father not in labour force last year 0.07 0.14 0.01 
mother employed last year -0.48*** -0.34 -0.25 
mother not in labour force last year -0.54*** -0.39* -0.45 
father ever worked in agriculture -0.01 -0.05 -0.13 
mother ever worked in agriculture -0.02 0.09 0.03 
urban 0.51*** 0.20*** 0.35*** 
total employment rate 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 
weekly working hours 0.07*** 0.05** 0.10*** 
HH income (1000-2499) 0.07 0.03 0.16* 
HH income (2500-4999) 0.05 -0.13 0.08 
HH income (5000-9999) -0.57*** -0.60** -0.17 
HH income (>9999) -0.99** -0.68 -14.52 
istanbul -0.40** 0.55*** -0.59** 
westernmarmara -0.15 -0.24 -2.13*** 
aegean -0.23 -0.45** -1.44*** 
easternmarmara -0.18 -0.62*** -1.72*** 
westernanatoliaa 0.49*** 0.82*** -0.28 
mediterranean 0.12 0.02 -1.60*** 
middleanatolia -0.77*** -0.55*** -1.95*** 
westernblacksea -2.07*** -1.66*** -2.81*** 
easternblacksea -0.99*** -0.08 -1.01*** 
westeasternanatolia -0.46** -0.21 -1.42*** 
southeasternanatolia -0.75** 0.28** -0.41 




N  15467  















male 0.70*** -2.02*** 0.21 -1.01*** 0.19 
agechild 0.59*** 0.42*** 0.95*** -0.06 0.44*** 
agemother 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
agefather -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03 -0.01 -0.05*** 
extended -0.27 -0.31 -0.42 -0.06 -0.66** 
adult 0.02 0.08 -0.09 -0.12*** 0.17*** 
sibling 0.16 0.32*** 0.24 -0.12 0.12 
father 5 years school 
graduate 
-0.88*** -0.51*** -0.25 0.15 -0.61** 
father 8 years school 
graduate 
-1.70*** -0.85*** -0.30 0.28 -1.02*** 
father secondary school 
graduate 
-1.94*** -1.57*** -0.61 0.13 -1.18*** 
father university graduate -4.22*** -1.66*** -1.42*** -0/02 -1.67*** 
mother 5 years school 
graduate 
-0.68*** -0.88*** -0.06 0.02 -0.91*** 
mother 8 years school 
graduate 
-1.42*** -0.86** 0.48 0.44** -1.02* 
mother secondary school 
graduate 
-2.10*** -2.29*** -0.92** -0.11 -1.94*** 
mother university 
graduate 
-15.49 -2.72*** -1.76** -0.30 -0.82 
father weekly working 
hours 
0.00 0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 
mother weekly working 
hours 
0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
father employed 0.03 -0.27 -0.43 -0.04 0.19 
father not in labour force 0.10 0.40 0.57 -0.06 0.79** 
mother employed -0.35 0.81 -0.40 -0.61* -0.00 
mother not in labour force -0.91** 1.20 -0.08 -0.46* 0.51 
father employed last year 0.05 -0.17 0.30 0.00 -0.14 
father not in labour force 
last year 
0.02 -0.29 -0.67 0.01 -0.52 
mother employed last year 0.53 -0.91 0.42 -0.10 -1.33** 
mother not in labour force 
last year 
0.85 -0.95 -0.19 0.02 -1.29** 
father ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.16 0.26 0.13 -0.23* -0.21 
mother ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.14 0.15 0.84*** 0.05 -0.23 
urban -0.14 -0.30* 0.93*** 0.25** -0.59*** 
total employment rate 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.01 
weekly working hours 0.10* 0.10** -0.00 0.04 -0.08 
HH income (1000-2499) -0.26* -0.03 -0.14 -0.01 -0.17 
HH income (2500-4999) -0.64 -0.04 -0.08 0.14 -0.63 
HH income (5000-9999) -11.42 -14.13 -15.43 0.07 -15.87 
HH income (>9999) -8.24 -14.10 -15.83 -0.47 -16.64 
istanbul 0.14 -0.54 1.31* 0.19 0.67 
westernmarmara -0.20 -1.61*** 0.55 -0.79*** 0.43 
aegean 0.11 -1.06*** 1.02 -0.20 1.21** 
easternmarmara 0.28 -0.58 0.51 -0.44 0.59 
westernanatoliaa 0.51 -0.56* 0.65 0.12 0.07 
mediterranean 0.67* -0.26 0.65 -0.10 0.68 
middleanatolia -0.78*** -1.48*** -0.18 -1.42*** 0.20 
westernblacksea -1.79*** -2.68*** -1.95*** -2.10*** 0.60 
easternblacksea -0.12 -0.43 -1.69** -0.51** -0.27 
westeasternanatolia 0.02 -0.81* 0.27 -0.33 0.72 
southeasternanatolia 0.09 -0.78 0.52 0.26 1.10 
_cons -15.38***  -9.92***  -19.20*** -1.41 -2.84 
Log Likelihood   -6161.3116   
N   5303  











8 and more hours 
housework 
agechild 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
agemother 0.002 -0.01 -0.02 
agefather -0.002 -0.01 0.01 
extended 0.23** 0.15 -0.04 
adult -0.18*** -0.14*** -0.13** 
sibling -0.05 0.03 0.15 
father 5 years school graduate 0.31** 0.13 -0.10 
father 8 years school graduate 0.48*** 0.19 0.01 
father secondary school graduate 0.50*** 0.03 0.34 
father university graduate 0.47*** -0.01 -0.14 
mother 5 years school graduate 0.15* 0.29** 0.25 
mother 8 years school graduate 0.29*** 0.49*** 0.90*** 
mother secondary school graduate 0.25** 0.45*** 0.72*** 
mother university graduate -0.01 0.05 0.08 
father weekly working hours 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
mother weekly working hours -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01 
father employed -0.09 0.42* -0.06 
father not in labour force -0.24 0.06 -0.21 
mother employed 0.51** 0.56 0.44 
mother not in labour force -0.06 0.19 0.57 
father employed last year 0.10 0.00 -0.67*** 
father not in labour force last year 0.13 0.13 0.04 
mother employed last year -0.49** -0.20 0.62 
mother not in labour force last year -0.49** -0.13 0.02 
father ever worked in agriculture -0.15 -0.18 -0.02 
mother ever worked in agriculture 0.02 0.20 0.14 
urban 0.55*** 0.24** 0.53*** 
total employment rate 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
weekly working hours 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.20*** 
HH income (1000-2499) 0.07 0.02 0.07 
HH income (2500-4999) -0.02 -0.16 0.05 
HH income (5000-9999) -0.60** -0.77 0.07 
HH income (>9999) -0.69 -0.89 -11.82 
istanbul -0.38 0.74** -0.91* 
westernmarmara -0.08 -0.46 -2.48*** 
aegean 0.31 -0.56* -1.32*** 
easternmarmara -0.23 -0.88*** -1.96*** 
westernanatoliaa 0.46** -0.92*** -0.05 
mediterranean 0.01 -0.30 -1.59*** 
middleanatolia -0.81*** -0.83*** -1.87*** 
westernblacksea -2.12*** -1.48*** -3.03*** 
easternblacksea -1.03*** 0.21 -0.83*** 
westeasternanatolia -0.57** -0.15 -2.04** 
southeasternanatolia -0.83** -0.04 -0.73 








*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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8 and more hours 
housework 
agechild 0.16*** 0.36*** 0.50*** 
agemother -0.02** 0.005 -0.02** 
agefather 0.01 -0.002 0.02* 
extended -0.22* -0.07 0.31** 
adult -0.10*** -0.18*** -0.31*** 
sibling -0.05 0.17*** 0.16** 
father 5 years school graduate 0.03 0.13 -0.20 
father 8 years school graduate 0.17 0.22 -0.27 
father secondary school graduate 0.17 0.17 -0.50** 
father university graduate 0.02 0.13 -0.78*** 
mother 5 years school graduate 0.25** 0.09 -0.15 
mother 8 years school graduate 0.23 0.13 -0.27 
mother secondary school graduate 0.10 -0.01 -0.60*** 
mother university graduate 0.21 -0.54** -0.18 
father weekly working hours -0.002 -0.0003 0.004 
mother weekly working hours -0.004 -0.001 0.002 
father employed -0.07 0.36 -0.16 
father not in labour force -0.51** -0.13 -0.41 
mother employed -0.18 -0.38 -0.12 
mother not in labour force -0.15 -0.27 -0.08 
father employed last year 0.07 0.09 -0.17 
father not in labour force last year -0.04 0.13 -0.02 
mother employed last year -0.47* -0.41 -0.49 
mother not in labour force last year -0.58** -0.56* -0.53 
father ever worked in agriculture 0.12 0.05 -0.13 
mother ever worked in agriculture -0.03 0.02 -0.01 
urban 0.47*** 0.16* 0.26** 
total employment rate 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 
weekly working hours 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
HH income (1000-2499) 0.07 0.04 0.21* 
HH income (2500-4999) 0.12 -0.10 0.12 
HH income (5000-9999) -0.52* -0.49 -0.25 
HH income (>9999) -1.34* -0.64 -13.77 
istanbul -0.48 0.34 -0.53* 
westernmarmara -0.30 -0.15 -2.05*** 
aegean -0.22 -0.34 -1.51*** 
easternmarmara -0.19 -0.43* -1.61*** 
westernanatoliaa 0.48** 0.77*** -0.38 
mediterranean 0.19 0.21 -1.54*** 
middleanatolia -0.78*** -0.42* -1.94*** 
westernblacksea -2.07*** -1.76*** -2.68*** 
easternblacksea -1.02*** -0.34 -1.15*** 
westeasternanatolia -0.39 -0.19 -1.14*** 
southeasternanatolia -0.76 0.68 -0.23 
_cons -6.47*** -7.49*** -8.25*** 











Table A4. 10. Multinomial Logit Coefficients for boys (15-17 age group) 





agechild 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.87*** -0.10 0.49*** 
agemother -0.002 0.0001 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
agefather -0.03** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.04* 
extended -0.08 -0.72** -0.35 -0.08 -0.63** 
adult -0.04 0.22** -0.09 -0.12** 0.11 
sibling 0.21 -0.09 0.17 -0.19** 0.11 
father 5 years school 
graduate 
-0.66*** -0.76** 0.09 0.28 -0.53** 
father 8 years school 
graduate 
-1.39*** -0.59 0.01 0.42 -0.91*** 
father secondary school 
graduate 
-1.49*** -1.73*** -0.22 0.40 -1.67*** 
father university 
graduate 
-3.80*** -1.64** -1.19* 0.23 -2.12*** 
mother 5 years school 
graduate 
-0.79*** -1.22*** -0.16 -0.01 -0.94*** 
mother 8 years school 
graduate 
-1.17** -0.68 0.42 0.69*** -0.60 
mother secondary school 
graduate 
-2.56*** -1.29** -1.02** -0.01 -1.30** 
mother university 
graduate 
-15.49 -16.83 -1.86* -0.16 -1.08 
father weekly working 
hours 
0.0004 -0.001 0.02*** -0.002 0.0001 
mother weekly working 
hours 
0.01 0.004 0.005 0.01* 0.01 
father employed -0.13 -0.65 -0.85 -0.06 -0.22 
father not in labour force 0.24 0.12 0.42 0.08 0.55 
mother employed -0.95 16.07 -0.17 -0.72 0.50 
mother not in labour 
force 
-1.17** 16.49 -0.06 -0.23 1.16 
father employed last year 0.21 0.19 0.45 0.04 0.03 
father not in labour force 
last year 
-0.06 -0.02 -0.23 0.07 -0.57 
mother employed last 
year 
0.66 -1.60** -0.20 -0.21 -1.42* 
mother not in labour 
force last year 
1.19 -1.87** -0.58 -0.16 -1.41* 
father ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 -0.24 
mother ever worked in 
agriculture 
-0.003 -0.09 0.96*** 0.05 -0.24 
urban -0.04 -0.43 1.26*** 0.15 -0.51** 
total employment rate 0.08*** 0.09** 0.08** 0.11*** 0.02 
weekly working hours 0.06 0.02 0.001 0.07 -0.10 
HH income (1000-2499) -0.29 0.21 -0.43* 0.02 -0.16 
HH income (2500-4999) -0.34 0.70 -0.11 0.27 -0.18 
HH income (5000-9999) -9.55 -12.84 -14.74 -0.09 -14.85 
HH income (>9999) -0.60 0.19 -15.50 -0.63 -14.96 
istanbul 0.26 0.23 1.09 0.07 1.02 
westernmarmara 0.13 -0.71 0.28 -0.75** 0.52 
aegean 0.19 -0.28 0.94 -0.19 0.92 
easternmarmara 0.59 -0.002 0.68 -0.33 0.39 
westernanatoliaa 0.60 -0.42 0.84 0.32 0.28 
mediterranean 0.74* -0.95* 0.79 -0.05 0.80 
middleanatolia -1.00* -1.30* -0.16 -1.24*** 0.03 
westernblacksea -1.16* -1.89* -2.30** -2.11*** 1.21* 
easternblacksea 0.11 -0.66 -1.96* -0.39 -0.07 
westeasternanatolia 0.22 0.10 0.24 -0.31 0.57 
southeasternanatolia 0.57 -0.11 1.15 0.17 1.33 
_cons -14.65*** -25.34 -19.62*** -4.21* -3.11 
Log Likelihood   -3475.6603   
N   2760   
*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Table A4. 11. Multinomial Logit Coefficients for girls (15-17 age group) 
  




agechild 0.51*** 0.38*** 1.24*** -0.02 0.33* 
agemother 0.04 0.001 -0.01 -0.001 0.06* 
agefather -0.14*** -0.05*** -0.05 -0.01 -0.07** 
extended -1.10** -0.27 -0.58 -0.10 -0.75* 
adult 0.24* 0.08 -0.02 -0.08 0.34*** 
sibling -0.28 0.49*** 0.29 -0.03 0.14 
father 5 years school 
graduate 
-1.75*** -0.59** -0.91 -0.01 -0.70 
father 8 years school 
graduate 
-2.92*** -1.18*** -0.79 0.07 -1.12* 
father secondary school 
graduate 
-3.91*** -1.80*** -1.35** -0.26 -0.44 
father university 
graduate 
-16.62 -1.90*** -1.84** -0.33 -0.83 
mother 5 years school 
graduate 
-0.24 -0.75*** 0.28 0.09 -1.05*** 
mother 8 years school 
graduate 
-15.73 -1.18** 0.71 0.08 -1.85* 
mother secondary school 
graduate 
-0.76 -3.57*** -0.74 -0.21 -17.22 
mother university 
graduate 
-13.34 -2.25** -1.41 -0.31 -1.16 
father weekly working 
hours 
0.002 0.01 0.004 0.004 -0.01 
mother weekly working 
hours 
-0.02** -0.01 0.004 -0.003 0.02 
father employed 0.20 -0.14 0.62 -0.08 1.48 
father not in labour force -0.57 0.35 1.36 -0.25 1.45* 
mother employed 1.60 0.40 -0.96 -0.49 -0.97 
mother not in labour 
force 
0.26 0.61 -0.32 -0.75* -0.40 
father employed last year -0.63 -0.47 -0.27 -0.10 -0.50 
father not in labour force 
last year 
-0.02 -0.28 -2.63** -0.001 -0.38 
mother employed last 
year 
-0.88 -0.34 16.67 -0.17 -1.59 
mother not in labour 
force last year 
-0.84 -0.36 15.61 -0.01 -1.62 
father ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.44 0.41 0.58 -0.20 -0.30 
mother ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.58 0.24 0.45 0.08 -0.20 
urban -0.41 -0.38* 0.18 0.25 -0.93** 
total employment rate 0.09** 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.02 
weekly working hours 0.29** 0.15** -0.10 0.05 -0.14 
HH income (1000-2499) -0.20 -0.09 0.48 -0.01 -0.12 
HH income (2500-4999) -14.07 -0.41 0.26 -0.04 -1.15 
HH income (5000-9999) -11.61 -13.88 -14.89 0.17 -15.95 
HH income (>9999) 1.78 -14.57 -15.19 -0.42 -16.93 
istanbul -1.01 -1.16 2.06 -0.16 -14.53 
westernmarmara -1.97* -2.35*** 1.14 -1.28** 0.55 
aegean -0.89 -1.75** 1.44 -0.76 1.97* 
easternmarmara -1.52 -1.29*** 0.22 -1.08** 1.08 
westernanatoliaa -0.34 -1.15** 0.23 -0.60 -0.55 
mediterranean 0.11 -1.26** 0.16 -0.65 0.60 
middleanatolia -0.96 -1.85*** -0.21 -1.97*** 0.50 
westernblacksea -4.98*** -3.37*** -1.01 -2.59*** -0.67 
easternblacksea -1.19 -0.84 -1.26 -1.07** -1.03 
westeasternanatolia -1.30 -1.55** 0.69 -0.87 1.50 
southeasternanatolia -2.53 -1.75* -1.71 -0.37 1.76 
_cons -19.60*** -9.33** -28.84 0.69 1.13 
Log Likelihood   -2515.5714   
N   2543   
*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Table A4. 12. Marginal Effects for the Multinomial Logit Model for urban (6-14 age group) 




hw 8 and more hours hw 
male 0.06*** 0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** 
agechild -0.05*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
agemother 0.002* -0.001 0.001 -0.001** 
agefather -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.0005 
extended 0.005 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 
adult 0.03*** -0.02*** -0.004 -0.01*** 
sibling -0.01 -0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
father 5 years school graduate -0.01 0.02 0.00005 -0.01 
father 8 years school graduate -0.03 0.04* -0.001 -0.01 
father secondary school graduate -0.03 0.06** -0.01 -0.02* 
father university graduate -0.004 0.05* -0.01 -0.04*** 
mother 5 years school graduate -0.04*** 0.03** 0.01 -0.01 
mother 8 years school graduate -0.05** 0.03 0.02 0.002 
mother secondary school graduate -0.04** 0.03* 0.02 -0.01 
mother university graduate 0.002 0.04 -0.05*** 0.01 
father weekly working hours -0.00003 0.00005 -0.0001 0.0001 
mother weekly working hours 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.0004 0.0002 
father employed -0.01 -0.04 0.04** -0.002 
father not in labour force 0.08*** -0.07** 0.01 -0.02 
mother employed -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.001 
mother not in labour force 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
father employed last year -0.001 0.02 0.001 -0.02*** 
father not in labour force last year -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.0002 
mother employed last year 0.11*** -0.08** -0.04 -0.0001 
mother not in labour force last year 0.14*** -0.09*** -0.05 -0.01 
father ever worked in agriculture 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.0001 
mother ever worked in agriculture 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
total employment rate -0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.001 
weekly working hours -0.01*** 0.01* 0.003 0.003* 
HH income (1000-2499) -0.005 0.01 -0.01 0.005 
HH income (2500-4999) 0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 
HH income (5000-9999) 0.13*** -0.08** -0.05 -0.004 
HH income (>9999) 0.55 0.07 0.18 -0.80 
istanbul 0.11*** -0.14*** 0.07*** -0.05*** 
westernmarmara 0.14*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.12*** 
aegean 0.13*** -0.01 -0.04 -0.07*** 
easternmarmara 0.13*** 0.01 -0.06** -0.08*** 
westernanatoliaa -0.7** 0.03 0.07*** -0.03*** 
mediterranean 0.09*** 0.005 0.01 -0.10** 
middleanatolia 0.25*** -0.12*** -0.04 -0.09*** 
westernblacksea 0.49*** -0.30*** -0.08** -0.11*** 
easternblacksea 0.17*** -0.14*** 0.03 -0.05*** 
westeasternanatolia 0.14*** -0.07 -0.004 -0.07*** 
southeasternanatolia 0.10 -0.13** 0.04 -0.01 
N 12132 






Table A4. 13. Marginal Effects for the Multinomial Logit Model for rural (6-14 
age group) 





8 and more 
hours 
housework 
male 0.12*** 0.03** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
agechild -0.05*** 0.03 0.03*** 0.02*** 
agemother 0.0001 0.001 -0.001 -0.00003 
agefather 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 
extended -0.05** -0.03 0.06*** 0.03** 
adult 0.04*** -0.005 -0.02*** -0.01*** 
sibling -0.01 0.01 -0.0001 0.003 
father 5 years school graduate -0.07** 0.04 0.05* -0.02* 
father 8 years school graduate -0.11*** 0.07** 0.07* -0.03* 
father secondary school 
graduate 
-0.10*** 0.06* 0.06* -0.02 
father university graduate -0.08* 0.03 0.07 -0.02 
mother 5 years school 
graduate 
-0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
mother 8 years school 
graduate 
-0.11*** 0.05 0.06** 0.01 
mother secondary school 
graduate 
-0.02 -0.005 0.03 -0.002 
mother university graduate 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.09 
father weekly working hours -0.0001 -0.001* -0.0001 0.001*** 
mother weekly working hours 0.001 -0.001 0.0002 -0.0001 
father employed -0.02 -0.01 0.07* -0.04* 
father not in labour force 0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.003 
mother employed -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.04 
mother not in labour force -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.06 
father employed last year -0.02 0.002 0.03 -0.01 
father not in labour force last 
year 
-0.02 0.01 0.01 0.003 
mother employed last year -0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 
mother not in labour force last 
year 
-0.05 -0.04 0.13* -0.04 
father ever worked in 
agriculture 
-0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
mother ever worked in 
agriculture 
-0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.01 
total employment rate -0.01*** 0.003 0.01*** 0.001 
weekly working hours -0.01* 0.01 -0.003 0.01* 
HH income (1000-2499) -0.06*** 0.02 0.03* 0.02* 
HH income (2500-4999) -0.09* 0.03 0.04 0.01 
HH income (5000-9999) -0.01 -0.13 0.001 0.14** 
HH income (>9999) 2.24 -1.16 -0.87 -0.21 
istanbul -0.17*** 0.05 0.13*** -0.01 
westernmarmara -0.05 0.09** 0.03 -0.08*** 
aegean 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05* 
easternmarmara 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.08*** 
westernanatoliaa -0.15*** 0.13*** 0.10*** -0.07*** 
mediterranean -0.09** 0.13*** 0.04 -0.08*** 
middleanatolia -0.02 0.02 0.07** -0.07*** 
westernblacksea 0.28*** -0.12** -0.06 -0.09*** 
easternblacksea 0.12*** -0.17*** 0.08** -0.03 
westeasternanatolia 0.1 -0.02 0.01 -0.09** 
southeasternanatolia 0.09 -0.14* 0.1 -0.05 
N 3335 







Table A4. 14. Marginal Effects for the Multinomial Logit Model for urban (15-17 age group) 
  






male 0.11*** 0.09*** -0.08*** 0.04*** -0.18*** 0.02*** 
agechild -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** -0.08*** 0.01** 
agemother 0.0002 0.0003 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
agefather 0.004*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001 0.003* -0.001* 
extended 0.03 0.002 -0.01 -0.002 0.003 -0.02** 
adult 0.01** -0.001 0.01*** -0.005 -0.03*** 0.01*** 
sibling -0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.01* -0.05*** 0.01* 
father 5 years school 
graduate 
0.01 -0.05*** -0.02** -0.01 0.08** -0.01 
father 8 years school 
graduate 
0.02 -0.10*** -0.03** -0.01 0.14*** -0.02 
father secondary 
school graduate 
0.05 -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.01 0.15*** -0.02 
father university 
graduate 
0.13*** -0.22*** -0.06** -0.03 0.20*** -0.01 
mother 5 years school 
graduate 
0.02 -0.03*** -0.05*** 0.001 0.07*** -0.02*** 
mother 8 years school 
graduate 
-0.02 -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.02 0.16*** -0.02 
mother secondary 
school graduate 
0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.03 0.17*** -0.03* 
mother university 
graduate 
0.30 -0.82 -0.07 0.03 0.50 0.05 
father weekly 
working hours 
0.0002 -0.0005 0.0003 0.001*** -0.001 -0.0001 
mother weekly 
working hours 
-0.0003 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.0002 
father employed -0.03 0.03 0.0003 -0.03 0.01 0.02 
father not in labour 
force 
-0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.03* 
mother employed 0.06 0.004 0.08 0.01 -0.17** 0.01 
mother not in labour 
force 
0.07 -0.05** 0.08* 0.002 -0.12** 0.02 
father employed last 
year 
0.02 -0.00004 -0.02** 0.01 -0.004 -0.002 
father not in labour 
force last year 
0.02 0.003 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 
mother employed last 
year 
0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.005 -0.03 
mother not in labour 
force last year 
0.02 0.06 -0.07** -0.01 0.03 -0.03 
father ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.01 0.002 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
mother ever worked 
in agriculture 
-0.01 0.002 -0.005 0.03*** -0.02 0.004 
total employment rate -0.01*** 0.003** 0.001 -0.002 0.01*** -0.001 
weekly working hours -0.01 0.01 0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.01** 
HH income (1000-
2499) 
0.02 -0.01 -0.0003 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
HH income (2500-
4999) 
0.004 -0.05 0.01 -0.004 0.05 -0.02 
HH income (5000-
9999) 
0.59 -0.39 -0.61 -0.51 1.28 -0.36 
HH income (>9999) 0.65 -0.19 -0.60 -0.55 1.08 -0.39 
istanbul -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
westernmarmara 0.13*** -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.15*** 0.04** 
aegean 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.05** 
easternmarmara 0.05 0.02 0.001 0.02 -0.11** 0.03 
westernanatoliaa -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
mediterranean 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.02 
middleanatolia 0.23*** 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.25*** 0.02 
westernblacksea 0.32*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.32*** 0.07*** 
easternblacksea 0.09* 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.12** 0.02 
westeasternanatolia 0.05 -0.0004 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.04* 
southeasternanatolia -0.03 -0.01 -0.001 -0.05 0.04 0.05 
N 4181 
*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Table A4. 15.  Marginal Effects for the Multinomial Logit Model for rural (15-17 age group) 
  






male 0.16*** 0.10*** -0.20 0.01 -0.10*** 0.04 
agechild -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02 0.01 -0.05*** 0.02 
agemother 0.0001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
agefather 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.0002 0.001 -0.001 
extended 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.08* -0.02 
adult -0.005 0.01* 0.01 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
sibling 0.02 0.002 0.02 -0.0002 -0.02 -0.01 
father 5 years school 
graduate 
0.03 -0.06** -0.04 0.02 0.09 -0.04 
father 8 years school 
graduate 
0.06 -0.15*** -0.11 0.04 0.21*** -0.06 
father secondary school 
graduate 
0.09 -0.16*** -0.13 0.04 0.19*** -0.04 
father university 
graduate 
1.02 -1.97 0.63 0.10 1.35 -1.14 
mother 5 years school 
graduate 
0.07** -0.06*** -0.04 0.02 0.06* -0.05 
mother 8 years school 
graduate 
0.99 -1.98 0.69 0.17 1.30 -1.17 
mother secondary 
school graduate 
1.05 0.68 -2.30 0.14 1.55 -1.13 
mother university 
graduate 
1.85 -1.28 -1.68 -0.40 2.32 -0.81 
father weekly working 
hours 
-0.001 0.001 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.00004 -0.0001 
mother weekly working 
hours 
-0.002 -0.0002 0.0003 0.001 -0.0002 0.001 
father employed 0.08 -0.10 -0.14 0.36 -0.17 -0.03 
father not in labour 
force 
-0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.36 -0.19 0.001 
mother employed -1.13 0.93 1.02 0.20 -1.43 0.40 
mother not in labour 
force 
-1.18 0.89 1.09 0.24 -1.49 0.45 
father employed last 
year 
-0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.004 0.03 -0.01 
father not in labour 
force last year 
0.002 0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.001 -0.06 
mother employed last 
year 
-0.40 1.41 -0.37 0.34 -0.65 -0.33 
mother not in labour 
force last year 
-0.46 1.40 -0.32 0.32 -0.60 -0.34 
father ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.07*** -0.02 
mother ever worked in 
agriculture 
-0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
total employment rate -0.01 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.01** -0.002 
weekly working hours -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.003 -0.01 
HH income (1000-2499) -0.02 -0.04 0.02  0.01 0.02 0.01 
HH income (2500-4999) 0.95 0.69 -2.18 0.11 1.49 -1.07 
HH income (5000-9999) -4.06 1.43 -0.78 -0.10 2.52 0.99 
HH income (>9999) -4.61 1.20 -1.18 0.38 2.08 2.12 
istanbul -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 0.09 0.15 0.05 
westernmarmara 0.01 0.14** -0.23 0.07 0.02 -0.02 
aegean -0.04 0.12* -0.21 0.07 0.06 0.001 
easternmarmara 0.05 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.04 
westernanatoliaa 0.04 0.01 -0.13 0.02 0.08 -0.01 
mediterranean -0.11 0.08* -0.04 0.03 -0.001 0.02 
middleanatolia 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.09 0.07 
westernblacksea 0.41 0.001 -0.20 -0.56 0.21 0.14 
easternblacksea 0.19 0.12  0.01 -0.60 0.33 -0.04 
westeasternanatolia 0.68 0.40 0.21 -0.51 0.60 -1.38 
southeasternanatolia 0.16 0.02 -0.18 -0.47 0.36 0.11 
N 1122 










8 and more 
hours 
housework 
male -0.17*** -1.09*** -2.64*** 
agechild 0.23** 0.52*** 0.74*** 
agemother -0.01 -0.001 -0.05** 
agefather 0.004 -0.02** 0.03 
extended -0.02 0.05 0.30 
adult -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.41*** 
sibling -0.09 0.22*** 0.43*** 
father 5 years school 
graduate 
0.24 0.24 -0.30 
father 8 years school 
graduate 
0.49** 0.34 -0.44 
father secondary school 
graduate 
0.56** 0.16 -0.48 
father university graduate 0.38 0.20 -1.03** 
mother 5 years school 
graduate 
0.35*** 0.24* -0.20 
mother 8 years school 
graduate 
0.45*** 0.46** 0.24 
mother secondary school 
graduate 
0.32* 0.26 -0.41 
mother university graduate 0.22 -0.47 -0.21 
father weekly working 
hours 
-0.0005 -0.001 0.01** 
mother weekly working 
hours 
-0.02*** -0.01 -0.005 
father employed -0.27 0.64** -0.31 
father not in labour force -0.78*** 0.07 -0.60 
mother employed 0.34 -0.02 0.48 
mother not in labour force -0.29 -0.23 0.57 
father employed last year 0.14 0.17 -0.74*** 
father not in labour force 
last year 
0.17 0.32 0.12 
mother employed last year -0.84** -0.31 0.12 
mother not in labour force 
last year 
-0.89** -0.32 -0.25 
father ever worked in 
agriculture 
-0.004 -0.06 -0.28 
mother ever worked in 
agriculture 
-0.10 0.22 0.12 
urban 0.84*** 0.21* 0.50** 
total employment rate 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 
weekly working hours 0.13*** 0.05 0.23*** 
HH income (1000-2499) 0.09 0.03 0.26 
HH income (2500-4999) 0.6 -0.30 0.14 
HH income (5000-9999) -0.89** -1.10** -0.39 
HH income (>9999) -1.86** -1.35 -20.55 
istanbul -0.83** -0.19 -3.14*** 
westernmarmara -0.92** 1.11*** -2.65*** 
aegean -0.22 -0.36 -4.41*** 
easternmarmara -0.39 -0.72* -3.08*** 
westernanatoliaa -0.30 -0.10*** -3.56*** 
mediterranean 0.63** 1.28*** -1.15** 
middleanatolia 0.25 0.02 -3.48*** 
westernblacksea -1.32*** 0.90*** -3.92*** 
easternblacksea -3.52*** -2.45*** -5.38*** 
westeasternanatolia -1.68*** -0.02 -1.89*** 
southeasternanatolia -1.52** 0.69 -1.23 





*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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 Table A4. 17. Coefficients of the random effects multinomial logit model (15-17 age group) 






male 1.14*** -2.47*** 0.31 -1.43*** 0.15 
agechild 0.78*** 0.54*** 1.12*** -0.19*** 0.47*** 
agemother 0.004 -0.02 0.02 -0.1 0.02 
agefather -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03 -0.01 -0.05*** 
extended -0.32 -0.36 -0.47 -0.03 -0.68*** 
adult 0.03 0.12* -0.11 -0.19*** 0.17*** 
sibling 0.20 0.35*** 0.25 -0.26** 0.12 
father 5 years school 
graduate 
-1.14*** -0.62** -0.31 0.37 -0.63*** 
father 8 years school 
graduate 
-2.26*** -0.96*** -0.34*** 0.69 -1.02** 
father secondary school 
graduate 
-2.53*** -1.86*** -0.70 0.50* -1.19*** 
father university graduate -5.03*** -1.90*** -1.65*** 0.30 -1.68*** 
mother 5 years school 
graduate 
-0.91*** -1.10*** -0.01 0.24 -0.91*** 
mother 8 years school 
graduate 
-1.95*** -1.06** 0.58 0.79*** -1.05* 
mother secondary school 
graduate 
-2.65*** -2.64*** -1.03** 0.17 -2.00*** 
mother university 
graduate 
-20.54 -3.14*** -1.95** -0.14 -0.86 
father weekly working 
hours 
0.001 0.01 0.02** -0.02 -0.001 
mother weekly working 
hours 
-0.002 -0.002 0.1 0.1 0.1 
father employed -0.03 -0.40 -0.48 0.05 0.15 
father not in labour force 0.03 0.50 0.66 -0.14 0.78* 
mother employed -0.19 1.13 -0.50 -0.78 0.05 
mother not in labour 
force 
-1.16** 1.53* -0.10 -0.66* 0.49 
father employed last year 0.03 -0.21 0.31 0.01 -0.17 
father not in labour force 
last year 
0.10 -0.38 -0.75 0.10 -0.51 
mother employed last 
year 
0.72 -1.12 0.47 -0.13 -1.39** 
mother not in labour 
force last year 
1.13 -1.18 -0.26 0.07 -1.30** 
father ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.22 0.29 0.16 -0.39** -0.22 
mother ever worked in 
agriculture 
0.23 0.20 0.98*** 0.02 -0.20 
urban -0.13 -0.37* 1.13*** 0.43*** -0.58*** 
total employment rate 0.09*** 0.06** 0.05 0.10*** 0.01 
weekly working hours 0.14* 0.13** -0.004 0.07 -0.08 
HH income (1000-2499) -0.34 -0.03 -0.17 0.02 -0.18 
HH income (2500-4999) -0.84 -0.10 -0.11 0.18 -0.66 
HH income (5000-9999) -16.15 -19.54 -20.01 0.13 -20.12 
HH income (>9999) -10.70 -18.79 -20.08 -0.44 -20.39 
istanbul 0.11 -1.11* 0.36 -0.62 0.74 
westernmarmara 0.19 -0.78 1.54* 0.13 0.68 
aegean -0.11 -1.97*** 0.69 -1.19*** 0.48 
easternmarmara 0.19 -1.39** 1.21 -0.41 1.31** 
westernanatoliaa 0.43 -0.81* 0.61 -0.80** 0.63 
mediterranean 0.76 -0.81* 0.78 0.13 0.11 
middleanatolia 0.94* -0.44 0.73 -0.29 0.72 
westernblacksea -0.72 -1.76*** -0.13 -2.05*** 0.24 
easternblacksea -2.05*** -3.23*** -2.39** -2.96*** 0.66 
westeasternanatolia -0.01 -0.54 -1.80* -0.70** -0.25 
southeasternanatolia 0.01 -1.15 0.64 0.18 1.17 
Log Likelihood   -6109.3942   
N   5303   
*p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Turkey is a country that displays the main characteristics of developing countries. 
While Turkey has made a good progress in increasing the number of children 
enrolled in schools, like in other developing countries there are still many children 
who are not enrolled and who do not complete compulsory schooling. There are 
many reasons for that.  As improving education is necessary for developing 
countries’ long-run economic growth, it is important to identify these reasons and 
make policy suggestions where needed. The overall aim of this thesis is to examine 
and analyse three separate studies that try to shed light on different issues related to 
child education.  
The first empirical study presented in Chapter 2 examined the effects of having a 
mother with migration history on children’s education in Turkey. The Turkey 
Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) for the year 2008 was used in the analysis. 
In order to explore the relationship between mother’s migration background and the 
education of her children, a standard OLS equation is estimated as a first step. In 
addition, an instrumental variables model is estimated to account for the potential 
endogeneity problem, which may arise from the fact that unobserved characteristics 
of mothers may affect their propensity to migrate as well as their children’s 
educational attainment.  
The main finding of this chapter is that Turkish mothers’ internal migration has an 
effect on their children’s educational attainment. Having a migrant mother increases 
the probability of starting high school and to continue to post compulsory education. 
Another main finding relates to the econometric methodologies employed in this 
chapter since the results of the main interest variables are different between the 
specifications, which highlights the importance of accounting for the selective 
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nature of the migration. Once the risk of migration is used as an instrument for the 
propensity to migrate, a negative effect of mothers’ migration is found. It is an 
important result for policy makers. According to official estimations, the number of 
Turkish individuals who migrated for security reasons is around 1 million during the 
1986-2005 time period. Considering the intergenerational effects of migration, 
education of both the migrants themselves and their children is important if a 
country wants to build a strong and economically sustainable economy. Building 
facilities that provide information to the migrants and more schools to the areas, in 
which the migrants live intensely, should be the priorities for policy makers. This 
would help to accelerate the integration of the migrants to the new place and change 
their aspirations in a positive way.  
The second empirical study presented in Chapter 3 investigated the effect of 
intermarriage on the educational attainment of children from those marriages in 
Germany. For the purpose of this study, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
was used. The SOEP is a nationally representative longitudinal survey, which started 
in 1984, and in this chapter the 2013 wave was used as a cross sectional data set. 
The most important reason for using the 2013 wave is that it introduced a new 
sample (IAB-SOEP Migration Sample) to the survey which oversamples immigrants 
and includes rich information on both first and second generation immigrants. As 
the dependent variable has more than two categories and each category naturally has 
a meaningful order, an ordered probit model is estimated. 
It is founded that having intermarried parents does not have a significant effect on 
the educational attainment of children compared to having native-native and 
immigrant-immigrant married parents relatively. However, while there are no 
significant differences between having an immigrant mother-native father and 
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having two immigrant parents; having an immigrant father-native mother has a 
significant and negative relationship with the education of children compared to 
having two immigrant parents. These findings indicate that it is hard to generalize 
the effect of intermarriages on the educational attainment of children since the 
results are mixed. Moreover since the results are different for each type of 
intermarriage, this indicates that the results are not stemming from the 
characteristics of intermarriage but the characteristics of the intermarried fathers and 
mothers.  
 Another important finding is that the school environment is a vital factor that affects 
children’s educational attainment. After additionally controlling for whether the 
child had experienced any disadvantages in school due to country of origin, having 
intermarried parents increases the probability of attaining an upper-level secondary 
school degree compared to having native-native parents. This proves the importance 
of offering equal opportunities to the children of immigrants. In order not to cause 
any unrest in the society due to immigrants, participation and attainments of them in 
the education system is a must for their integration. Therefore, governments should 
provide better information to students both with and without immigrant background, 
as well as teachers and institutions. Moreover informing parents and students better 
about the education system of the host country such as different educational paths, 
different school types, required exams and so on should also be encouraged.  
Overall, the findings imply that countries, including Turkey, should focus on the 
policies, which aim to improve the community and school environments of 
immigrants and their children rather than policies, which aims to integrate them into 
native society through intermarriage even though the second type of policies may 
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lead to more and rapid integration of immigrants such as language acquisition and a 
social network composed of natives. 
Finally, the third empirical study presented in Chapter 4 examined the relevant 
determinants of children’s participation in different activities in Turkey. The 2012 
Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS-2012) and the 2012 Working Child Survey 
(WCS-2012) were used to estimate a multinomial logit and a random effects 
multinomial logit models. The random effects multinomial logit model is used to 
relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption that the multinomial 
logit model imposes. In this chapter the dataset is split into two age groupss, 6-14 
and 15-17, and analyzed separately.  The reason for doing this is that these two age 
groups differ from each other in terms of work done. While the first age group 
generally work at home, working in the labour market is prevalent in the latter age 
group.  
One of the main finding of this chapter is that being older and female are associated 
with a lower probability to attend school for both age groups; and the work 
dynamics of girls and boys are different. While being female increases the 
probability of only doing housework, being male increases the probability of 
working in the labour market. This implies that policies geared toward an increase in 
school participation and completion of the schooling, and to improve the child 
labour conditions, should consider household chores as a component of child labour.  
Any policy which does not take into account housework as child labour will 
underestimate the time devoted to household chores instead of studying. As a result, 
increased schooling of the children will not translate into an increase in the quality 
of education, especially for girls. 
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The findings from Chapter 4 indicate that father’s and mother’s education is a 
primary determinant of a child’s participation in different activities. For the 6-14 age 
group, as fathers and mothers become more educated, the probability of their 
children doing higher number of hours of housework decreases. Especially for girls 
in this age group, the mother’s education is more important than the father’s 
education. This result suggests that policies that aim to improve the education of 
girls will contribute toward closing the gender gap in the future. For the 15-17 age 
group, father’s education seems to be more important than the mother’s education 
for both boys and girls, but especially for boys. As a result, intergenerational 
transmission of parental education is confirmed by the findings and these findings 
call policy makers’ attention to the importance of increasing the educational level of 
the current generation once again. 
The findings from Chapter 4 further indicate that the number of siblings aged 5 and 
younger creates a burden on girls and boys. The presence of very young children 
prevents both girls and boys from schooling by increasing the probabilities of 
working in the labour market for boys and of doing only housework for girls in the 
15-17 age group. It also increases the probability of doing more hours of housework 
for girls in the 6-14 age group. Therefore, policies devoted to improve childcare 
subsidies may help to prevent children from working in the labour market and doing 
household chores, and to promote educational attainment.  
Findings related to the community characteristics are also important determinants of 
the child participation decisions. Living in an urban area decreases the probability of 
only attending school and increases the probability of doing 1-2 hours of housework 
for the 6-14 age group. The reason for this could be the perception of parents 
towards child participation in the household works. Parents living in urban areas 
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may think that doing a small amount of housework does not interfere with the 
child’s schooling but it may promote it. Moreover, living in an urban area increases 
the probability of working in the labour market for boys in the 15-17 age group. This 
finding implies that opportunities to find a job increases the probability to work in 
the labour market for boys. Similarly, for both boys and girls in the 6-14 age group, 
living in the least developed region increases the probability to do more hours of 
housework compared to children who live in a more developed region. Therefore, in 
order to get the desirable results, policies that encourage children’s participation in 
schooling should be designed depending on the location of the target groups since it 
is likely to depend on the location of the programs. 
In conclusion, the empirical studies presented in this thesis have provided a number 
of interesting insights into three specific issues related to child education. Since 
Turkey is a developing country, which tries to maintain a sustainable development, 
the government should aim to improve the human capital of the country.  While 
doing this, each child, and particular the ones with backgrounds, should be taken 
into account.  Therefore, the empirical findings presented in this thesis may be 
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